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After an unfortunate series of accidents in the mid
1930 ’ s the Air Transport Association (ATA) lobbied Congress
for regulation of the industry. The ATA claimed that unfair
2competition was endangering the public safety. The Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 created the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) and gave the CAB the authority to regulate the
industry. During the regulation era airline ridership
increased and safety improved.
During the regulation period , opportunity for comparing
the safety record of the regulated industry with the record
。f the unregulated portions of the industry was limited.
The few attempts made rendered inconclusive results.
During a period of high inflation and high interest
rates in the 1970 ’ s interest in deregulating the airlines
arose. With passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 , interest in the effects of regulation on airline
safety was renewed. More than a decade has passed since
deregulation. The industry has continued to improve its
safety record during the deregulation period. The question
remains: "How has deregulation affected airline safety?".
In this study records of airline accidents and
incidents investigated by the National Transportation Safety
Board are examined. The occurrences are divided into those
with causes that are under the airlines control and those
that are not under their control. Those under the airlines
control are regressed against time and a dummy variable for
deregulation. The possible effects of airline profitability
。n the results , are also explored.
3The results indicate that deregulation had an adverse
effect on airline safety. The effects of alternative
formulations are also examined. The effect though
statistically significant is small. It does not suggest the
need to return to a regulated airline industry. But , it
does suggest the need for additional research into the
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCT工ON
Since the beginning of the history of flight , air
safety has been a concern. We are told that Daedalus
briefed Icarus on flight safety as part of the preflight
preparation before aviation ’ s "first" fatal accident
(Bulfinch , 1947: 156) ‘
This concern for aviation safety was part of the
impetus for the regulation of the airline industry in the
1930's. The Civil Aeronautics Act was passed in 1938 after
an unfortunate series of accidents and allegations of
impropriety in the airmail and airline industry. Senator
Bronson Cutting and four others died in the crash of a TWA
Skychief in Missouri in May 1935. Wiley Post and Will
Rogers died just three months later. These accidents
damaged public faith in the industry and demonstrated the
limitations present in aviation (Whitnah , 1966: 116).
Providing a safe airline is an expensive proposition.
preventative maintenance; redundancy of important
instruments and controls; and training of aircrews ,
maintenance personnel , and cabin attendants are all
expensive. Established airlines were right to fear price
2competition from new entries that might not be as conscious
。f safety. They also were right to fear the adverse public
perception of the airline industry caused by aircraft
accidents.
The airlines formed the Air Transport Association of
America in 1936 to lobby Congress for regulation. The 1938
Act created the independent regulatory agency , the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Act gave the CAB authority t。
control entry into and exit from markets (routes). The CAB
was also authorized to regulate fares , to award subsidies ,
to control mergers and to regulate safety.
Economic regulation and the resultant limits t。
competition are generally viewed as advantageous by the
industry being regulated. As Jordan shows in Airline
Regulation in America: Effects and Imperfections ,
regulation protects producers by helping them form a cartel
to obtain monopoly benefits. These benefits include
limiting entry so that relatively fewer firms exist. Exit
would also be controlled so that the market share of an
exiting firm would accrue to one or more of the remaining
firms. Higher price levels would be expected. The U.S.
airline industry fit this description during the regulation
era (Jordan , 1970: 49).
Economic regulation provided an environment that
fostered growth and high safety levels in the U.S. airline
industry. The domestic trunks flew 3.3 million revenue
3passenger miles (RPM) in 1945. By 1975 this had increased
to 119 million RPM (Bailey, Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 204 ,5).
This increase was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in
accident rates.
During the seventies , the political climate turned in
favor of deregulation of the transportation industry.
工nflation was a major impetus in airline deregulation. The
prevailing economic theory indicated that deregulation
should have a positive effect. Deregulation was expected t。
result in lower fares and increases in passenger travel.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The problem addressed by this study concerns the
relationship between economic regulation of the airline
industry and air safety. Specifically the study will
address the effect on air safety of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978.
It is certain that safety has continued to improve
since the beginning of the deregulation era. However , the
question is , has safety improved as much as it would have if
the industry were still regulated?
Note also that safety may have been over-provided
during the regulation era. The appropriate economic goal
for regulators is optimum safety not maximum safety. The
。ptimum level of safety is reached when an additional
increment of safety would cost more than the resulting
4benefit to society in decreased risk. This level might be
different for different consumers. Given the opportunity ,
more risk-adverse consumers might opt for higher levels of
safety than their less risk-adverse counterparts.
Transportation consumers might not be willing to pay
for the "optimum" level of safety. There may be third party
who are affected by the transportation consumers' decisions.
Air travel consumers may not be willing to pay for these
third parties ’ needs.
The possibility that safety was over-provided will not
be addressed in this study. Nor will I try to establish
what the optimum level of safety might be.
A safe airline operation is in everyone ’ s best
interest , but safety has a concomitant cost. An airline ’ s
profitability might affect its ability to cover this cost.
To the extent that this is true , deregulation may have had a
positive effect on airline safety. This would be the case
if deregulation had a positive effect on airline
profitability , and this positive effect on airline
profitability had , in turn , a positive effect on safety
expenditures.
The Null Hypothesis
The Null Hypothesis will be that "Economic deregulation
。f the airlines has had no effect on airline safety. ’l
5SIGN工FICANCE OF THE STUDY
The cost to society of even one major aircraft accident
is tremendous. Modern airliners , in addition to being very
expensive , are capable of carrying several hundred
passengers. The potential loss of even one aircraft with
its passengers and crew is terrible. Under regulation the
airline industry ’ s safety record was a very good and
improving one. There is no clear evidence that the
airlines' safety record has deteriorated greatly under
deregulation. There is , however , no clear , quantifiable
basis for decision making concerning economic regulation and
air safety. Comparing the safety record of the airline
industry prior to , and since deregulation could establish
this basis. The results of such an analysis could
significantly enhance the knowledge of the relationship
between economic regulation and safety. This would thus
advance the economic theory of regulation and provide
information needed to make regulatory decisions.
It should be noted here that finding a mathematical
correlation between regulation/deregulation and airline
safety does not establish a causal relationship. Finding a
significant correlation between deregulation and safety
merely establishes the possibility of a relationship. The
nature of the relationship must be determined by the use of
some other theoretical construct. Some possible mechanisms
whereby the economic impact of deregulation might affect
safety will be explored in this project; the main thrust is
still to determine if such a correlation exists.
Establishing a correlation between deregulation and
safety is an important first step in establishing a
relationship. If no significant correlation is found , any
relationship that exists must be very slight assuming that
the model is properly formulated. That is , such a
relationship could be masked by factors that were not
considered or it could be too small to be detected. Every
effort will be made to eliminate the effects of other
variables so that negative findings will indicate that any





THE HISTORY OF REGULATION
Early History
The airlines formed the Air Transport Association of
America in 1936 to lobby Congress for regulation. The 1938
Act created the independent regulatory agency , the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) , with authority to regulate market
entry , fares , subsidies , mergers and safety. 工n 1958
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. This act
left the economic regulation of the airlines intact , and
transferred safety regulation to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) (Bailey , Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 11).
The Regulation
The Civil Aeronautics Board ’ s economic regulation of
the industry was imposed , in the main , through its authority
to regulate entry and exit and its authority to regulate
fares.
The Board during the period from its formation until
the deregulation act of 1978 did not award a single major
8route to a new industry entrant (Bailey , Graham and Kaplan ,
1985: 13).
The only way to exit from the industry was through
merger with an existing airline. Merger with a struggling
line was a way for a healthy airline to expand into new
markets (Bailey , Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 13).
In addition to controlling the entry of new airlines
into the industry , the Board controlled entry and exit from
specific markets by existing airlines. The Board limited
service to markets to limit competition.
The Board also , in many cases , prohibited nonstop
service by local service airlines. In the sixties and
later , it sometimes relaxed these prohibitions where the
competition with the trunk was deemed not to be excessive.
This was done to improve the financial position of the local
service airlines and hence to control subsidy costs (Bailey ,
Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 13).
The Board also regulated exit from markets and required
airlines to provide adequate service to cities on their
certificates.
The Board regulated air fares with respect to average
cost of the airlines. An airline with high costs would
drive up the average cost for the industry , and hence the
fares. In this way the high-cost airline would be able t。
recapture some of the additional cost. This was most
important for large airlines. The incentive was especially
9small to control labor costs. A new union contract would
likely establish an industry standard that set costs for all
airlines and resulted in increased fares to cover the cost.
A strike , however , would mean losses that could not be
recovered and might even entail a long-term loss of market
share.
The Board's route entry policy had the effect of
protecting the airlines from efficient , new entries into a
market (Bailey , Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 96). In addition ,
the CAB used its route authority to aid those airlines which
were fiscally the weakest. The Board often awarded
lucrative new routes to those lines most in need of
financial help (Bailey, Graham and Kaplan , 1985: 13).
Competition
The Board did not regulate airline schedules. Nor did
it regulate the type or size of aircraft used. This meant
that the main way to compete was through service. Airlines
were free to decide when and how to serve a city pair. An
airline could serve a route with a nonstop , connecting or
through flight. The type of aircraft used proved to be an
important way to differentiate product. As the technology
improved , airlines improved their equipment , first with
pressurized cabins , then with jet service and later with
wide-body service.
10
Domestic Passenger Fare 工nvestigation
In January of 1970 , the CAB began the Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation. During the course of the
investigation , the CAB found that higher fares encouraged
higher capacity on a route. The higher capacity resulted in
lower load factors and increased costs (Load factor , as used
here , is the ratio of paying passengers to seats available.
It is generally expressed as a percent.) At the same time ,
lower fares caused lower capacity and higher load factors.
The Board ’ s response was to establish standard seating
densities and to encourage the airlines to reduce capacity
。n routes with excess capacity.
In addition , the CAB found a number of discount fares
to be discriminatory and required them to be eliminated. In
this climate of increasingly pervasive regulation and
concern over inflation the time seemed right to consider
regulatory reform (Oster et al. , 1981: 41).
The differential pricing that the Board found
discriminatory , Frank calls efficient (Frank , 1983: 238).
The airlines enjoy important economies of scale. The
marginal cost of adding another passenger to a partially
loaded aircraft is much below the average cost per
passenger. To price at the average price denies the price-
sensitive passenger the flight and the airline the revenue.
If the airline can differentiate between the price-sensitive
11
and non-price-sensitive passengers and charge accordingly ,
they increase market efficiency (Frank , 1983: 238).
The Move to Deregulation
By 1975 , President Ford's administration proposed
legislation to remove rate control from the CAB. At the
same time Senator Kennedy's Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
the CAB was gaining a great deal of publicity claiming that
CAB regulation of the airline industry had resulted in much
higher fares than would otherwise be the case.
In March of 1975 , Board Chairman Robert Timm , a
proponent of regulation and capacity limitations , was
replaced by John Robson. The Board soon began to liberalize
the rules governing charter flights and ended the route
moratorium in effect since 1969. Airline officials opposed
deregulation , though most believed that a gradual reduction
in price controls would not be harmful. The industry seemed
to most fear the loss of route-entry regulation.
The industry stance was not united , however. Anti-
deregulation forces took another blow in late 1976 when
United Airlines stated that it would not oppose
deregulation.
Chairman Kahn
In 1977 , President Carter appointed Alfred Kahn as
chairman of the CAB. Kahn was the first chairman to come
。ut in favor of deregulation prior to his appointment. By
12
the time of his appointment , reform had gained considerable
momentum. Outgoing chairman Robson carne out in favor of
deregulation. Continental and Airwest joined United in
favor of deregulation and several diverse political groups
also supported regulatory reform or deregulation (Oster et
al. ,1981: 47).
Under Chairman Kahn air fare restrictions were reduced.
By April 1978 approval was not required for up to 50 percent
fare reductions. Route authority was also liberalized. By
1978 , opponents of a route authorization needed to show
cause why a new route authorization should not be granted.
The fact that a competitor was already established on the
route and objected to the entry of another airline was not
sufficient to prevent the authorization as in the past.
In October 1978 , President Carter signed the Airline
Deregulation Act into law. The act provided for a phaseout
。f airline regulation over a five-year period beginning in
January 1979. The CAB was to be required to approve some
new routes each year. It lost all route authority after
1981 and rate authority after January 1983. In fact ,
deregulation began almost immediately with the CAB granting
approval to all requested route and fare changes.
DEREGULATION
The prospect of deregulation was greeted by predictions
。f bankruptcies , of decreased fares , of increased demand , of
13
increased profitability (for at least the largest lines) and
。f declining service , especially in the smaller cities.
Some observers also predicted a decrease in safety.
Not all of these predictions have been shown to be
accurate. While the darkest predictions of widespread
bankruptcies proved to be too gloomy , there have been
bankruptcies. Under the CAB ’ s regulation there were n。
bankruptcies. Exit from the industry was by merger only.
Increased competition has caused decreases in air
fares. The decreases in air fares resulted in remarkable
increases in both traffic and load factors. Additionally ,
the deregulated airlines were able to structure fares t。
target price sensitive portions of the market. Since
deregulation , an incremental decrease in average fare causes
a larger increase in traffic volume (Meyer , 1980: 71).
Therefore , the airlines' profitability has increased as
well.
In their study "Assessment of Efficiency Effects of
Airline Deregulation" Caves , et ale compared U.S. air
carriers with non-U.S. airlines that had not been
deregulated. They concluded that U.S. airlines improved
their relative position in growth of total factor
productivity versus the regulated non-U.S. carriers (Caves ,
Christensen , Tretheway and Windle , 1987: 304).
There were some losers in the deregulation aftermath.
Labor lost its ability to command premium wages. The loss
14
was not complete in that increased demand for air travel
increased the demand for airline pilots. This did leave a
somewhat odd legacy , in that demand for pilots was going up
at the same time that wages for pilots were going down.
Under economic regulation airline labor unions were
strong and wages were relatively high. The time period
since deregulation has been characterized by wage and work
rules concessions , new non-union carriers and "B scales."
"B scales" were instituted so that newly hired employees are
hired under a different , less lucrative wage structure than
previously hired employees. This is consistent with the
increased level of competition under deregulation.
Since deregulation there has been an increase in the
number of mergers and also in the number of new airlines
being formed. The previously unregulated intrastate
airlines have taken advantage of their new mandate to enter
interstate service. In the two years after deregulation Air
Florida , Pacific Southwest Airlines , Southwest Airlines and
Air California , all former intrastate lines , entered the
interstate market.
New commuter lines have also sprung up to offer service
in smaller markets , many of which were abandoned by the
trunk lines. Many of these commuter lines eventually formed
marketing alliances with the major airlines. Most of the
larger commuters now belong to such an alliance (Oster and
Zorn , 1989: 132).
15
People Express was an airline that demonstrated the
changes brought by deregulation. People Express inaugurated
no frills , low cost trans-Atlantic flights and then faded
from the scene when other airlines began to compete.
Service Levels
The service to some smaller communities has declined ,
but the picture is not all bleak. There were more non-hub
locales where the total number of flights increased than
locales where the number declined , in the period May 1978 t。
June 1979. (Non-hubs are the smallest airports in the FAA ’ s
airport classification system , i.e. those that enplane fewer
than 115 ,000 passengers per year.) However , this increase
。f flights to non-hubs was small and not evenly distributed.
Some non-hub airports lost all of their service while others
gained (Meyer , 1980: 27).
The nature of flights into and out of non-hubs changed ,
also. There were substantial increases in flights from non-
hubs to hubs and decreases in flights from non-hubs to other
non-hubs. Both Oster and Meyer argue that this change in
the nature of the service to small cities has made it more
useful to the consumer. They argue that flights to a hub
where one will likely find connections to many other places
are more useful than flights to another non-hub where air
service is also poor. The result is much better service
16
than indicated by the small growth in flights into and out
from non-hubs (Oster , 1980: 109) (Meyer , 1980: 76).
Huston and Butler examined service levels before and
after the Ozark-TWA and the Northwest-Republic mergers. For
their analysis they first compared the number of flights per
day to cities served from three major hubs. These hubs were
st. Louis in the case of TWA-Ozark, and Detroit and
Minneapolis in the case of Northwest-Republic. They als。
looked at the number of cities served from the major hubs.
They found that the number of flights from each served city
to the hub decreased. This decrease averaged one flight per
day. They also found that a total of 25 more cities were
served from these hubs , after the mergers (Huston and
Butler , 1988: 205).
However , Huston and Butler also argued that the number
。f flights into a city is not the proper measure of service
level since the advent of hub and spoke routing. They
argued that the proper measure was the number of cities that
can be reached in a day , by traveling through the hub. The
loss of a flight into a hub does not decrease the public
welfare as much as additional destinations increases the
public welfare (Huston and Butler , 1988: 207).
The Market and Hub and Spoke Systems
Hub and spoke systems allows carriers to fill a higher
proportion of their seats. 工t also allows them to increase
17
the number of nonstop routes between their hubs and other
destinations. This has decreased the competition at hub
airports (Borenstein , 1992: 49).
Hub and spoke operations do require that passengers
change planes more often than traditional routing systems.
The increased flights into hubs do , however , allow more
flights to be completed without a change of airline
(Borenstein , 1992: 49).
Fares at Hubs
Huston and Butler compared fares at st. Louis before
and after the TWA-Ozark merger. That merger gave TWA an 82
percent share of the traffic at st. Louis. Huston and
Butler refer to hub airports that are dominated by a single
carrier like this , fortress hubs (Huston and Butler , 1988:
203). They found an average increase in fares of 21 percent
at st. Louis compared to a 3.9 percent change in the average
airline fares for the same period (Huston and Butler , 1988:
210) .
Borenstein found that the dominant airline at an
airport attracts a disproportionate share of the passengers
who originate there. He also found that prices at
Minneapolis increased faster than the national average after
the Northwest-Republic merger as did the prices at st. Louis
after the TWA-Ozark merger (Borenstein , 1992: 56).
18
First Huston and Butler , and later , Borenstein argued
that fortresshubs provide the dominant airline a stronger
position there that makes competition from other airlines
ineffective (Huston and Butler , 1988: 211) (Borenstein ,
1992: 54). Certainly most flights by one airline int。
another's fortress hub are direct flights from its own hubs.
More on Contestability
Bailey and Panzer argued that airline markets were
contestable*. They held that there were few barriers t。
entry into a new market. Capital costs are not sunk costs
because they are mobile and can be applied to other markets
if conditions change. Further , they argued that a carrier
that served both ends of a city pair could readily respond
to an opportunity in such a market (Bailey and Panzer , 1981:
128). More recent experience indicates that hub markets are
not as contestable as Bailey and Panzer thought.
Morrison and Winston conclude that airline markets are
not perfectly contestable , but that they are imperfectly
contestable. They regressed the price per seat mile on the
number of competitors in a market. They found significant
differences in the price per seat mile when there were
several competitors as compared to only one or two airlines
* I use contestable in the broader sense here. I use
contestable to describe a market where the threat of
competition has some effect on market behavior. Perfectly
contestable is used to describe a market where a single
potential competitor is sufficient threat to prevent the
taking of monopoly rents.
19
flying the route (Morrison and Winston , 1987: 61). In a
perfectly contestable market , where there were no entry
costs , additional competitors should make no difference in
the price of the service. The presence of potential
competitors would be sufficient to keep the prices down.
That a market is not perfectly contestable does not
mean that potential competitors don ’ t have an effect.
Morrison and Winston also found that potential competitors
could substitute for competitors , if imperfectly. They
found that it took approximately three potential competitors
to have the effect of one actual competitor. They defined
potential competitors as airlines that served at least one
end of a city pair market. Because potential competitors
did increase travelers' welfare , albeit not as much as
actual competitors , they concluded that airline markets were
imperfectly contestable (Morrison and Winston , 1987: 59).
Summary of History Section
The nature of the economic pressures on the airlines
changed with deregulation. These changes in economic
pressures caused changes in the way the airline industry
。perates. Some of these changes were not universally
expected. Others , like the hub and spoke routing system
were not mentioned in the economic literature at all prior
to deregulation.
20
The question remains: "How have these changes in
economics and the changes in operating procedures affected
airline safety?"
SAFETY
Concern for airline safety was a πajor cause of airline
regulation in 1938. After the war years , the fifties and
sixties were characterized by expansion of the air travel
industry and by increased levels of safety. Very little was
published about airline safety in the economic literature
during this period.
Airline safety has become a hot topic since airline
deregulation. When it became clear that airline regulation
would change , there were a number of monographs published
expressing concern over the likely state of airline safety
under deregulation. As the data on airline .safety under
deregulation became available , several empirical studies
were published.
Airline Safety under Regulation
During the regulation era , there were ways to compare
the effects of regulation on airline safety. One could
compare the safety record of the major airlines with the
intrastate carriers. One could also compare the majors with
the commuter airlines.
21
In his book Airline Regulation in America; Effects and
Imperfections , Jordan compares passenger fatality rates of
the California intrastate carriers and the rates of the
larger trunk and local service airlines , over the same
routes (Jordan , 1970: 50). The low-cost intrastate carriers
were not subject to economic regulation by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. They were subject , only , to the much
less restrictive California state regulations. All carriers
。perated under essentially the identical safety regulations
。f the FAA (CAA prior to 1958).
During the period 1949 to 1965 the accident rate for
the California intrastate carriers was 2.67 per 100 million
Revenue Passenger Miles (RPM) compared to 0.45 and 0.92 per
100 million RPM for the trunk and local service carriers
respectively (Jordan , 1970: 49). (Revenue passenger miles
are the number of paying passengers times the number of
miles flown and are related to seat miles by load factor.)
Jordan points out a difficulty interpreting these figures.
The intrastate carrier accident rate reflects only two fatal
accidents by the California intrastate carriers during this
period. He further notes that one of these accidents was an
accident by Paradise Airlines , an airline that accounted for
93 percent of the California intrastate carriers' fatalities
while accounting for less than one half of one percent of
all RPM carried by California intrastate carriers. If this
airline is left out of the statistics , the fatalities per
22
100 million RPM of the remaining carriers is 0.19 , which is
lower than either the trunk or local service carriers. 工f
。ne eliminates the least successful carrier from the group
。f trunks or local carriers , neither of those fatality rates
would be reduced as low as 0.19 (Jordan , 1970: 51).
Jordan ’ s analysis emphasizes the difficulty of "measuring’l
safety by comparing accident or fatality rates , due to the
paucity of occurrences.
Comparing accident rates of the certified carriers with
the accident rates of the air taxi services or commuter
lines might seem like a good way to assess the effects of
regulation on air safety. And , indeed , the regulated
airlines have a much better safety record. However , the
comparison is one of apples to oranges. First , air taxi and
commuter services fly much shorter distances increasing the
number of takeoffs and landings per revenue mile. As
accidents are much more apt to happen in the takeoff and
landing phase than while cruising at altitude , this
comparison is inherently unfair (Oster and Zorn , 1983: 7).
Additionally , comparisons of accidents per RPM are
unfair because the smaller size of the aircraft flown by the
commuters biases that calculation. 工f we look at accidents
per operation we find that the accident rate for commuter
lines is very near that of the major airlines , but it is
still significantly higher (Oster and Zorn , 1983: 7). Even
this comparison is not conclusive because of the different
23
types of equipment used by the different operations. The
jet powered aircraft used by all the regulated airlines are
simply more reliable than the smaller reciprocating engine
aircraft used by some commuters. Jet engines themselves are
inherently more reliable than reciprocating engines. Als。
jet powered aircraft because of their higher cruise
altitudes and increased rates of climb spend less time
exposed to severe weather and mid-air collision potential
than their reciprocating engine counterparts.
Also the type of operation itself affects the safety
record. Because the commuters by their very nature use
smaller , less used airports they do not have the benefits of
the best facilities. At these smaller airports the runways
are shorter and the ground-based navigation and approach
facilities are not as good. Often the weather information
is poorer and radar approach control facilities may be
poorer or lacking altogether. However , weather and approach
minimums are higher for these poorer equipped airports and
should compensate for the lack of technical equipment , at
least from a safety , if not from a convenience , standpoint.
Oster and Zorn did a study of commuter safety during
the seventies. In this study they stated that carrier size
was an important determinant in commuter airline safety. In
the study they found that commuters above a certain minimum
size had a better safety record than smaller lines. The
safety record for the larger commuter lines was comparable
24
to the majors when measured in terms of accidents pe~
。peration. (Oster and Zorn , 1983: 8).
Non-regulatory Incentives for Safe Operation
Regulatory forces are not the only forces that push for
safe operation of an airline. Most airline employees could
be expected to have a personal stake in the safe operation
。f the airline. Pilots have an especially strong incentive
as their own safety is directly affected by their actions t。
maintain a safe operation. Besides the personal incentives
。f the employees there are also possible market incentives
to run a safe airline operation.
Paul Biederman in his book , The U.S. Airline Industry:
End of an Era , calls safety a largely discounted but
potential source of product differentiation for the
airlines. However , while consumers are concerned over
airline safety , they generally fail to see differences in
safety among the certified carriers. He further states that
while the CAB certified carriers have shown a better safety
record than the charter operators , the gap is reduced as the
supplemental airlines obtain newer equipment (Biederman ,
1982: 53).
Andrew Chalk likens the market forces on aircraft
manufacturers to classic lemon equilibrium , where the
consumer is unable to determine which aircraft are good or
bad (Chalk , 1986: 44). While the consumer is unable t。
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enforce airline safety standards through purchase decisions ,
Chalk demonstrates that at least in the case of the DC-10
crash on May 25 , 1979 the capital market did provide a
market incentive to invest in safety.
Chalk studied the stock market's response to McDonnell
Douglas at the time of the accident , by correlating
newspaper accounts of the accident with McDonnell Douglas
stock price movements. He found a $200 million decline in
McDonnell Douglas shareholder wealth associated with the
accident (Chalk , 1986: 44).
Karels criticizes Chalk's study. Since the accident
was blamed on faulty maintenance practices by American
Airlines , Karels argues that there should have been n。
effect on McDonnell Douglas stock. Further , he states that
by extension of Chalk's argument , American Airlines should
have been affected by a loss of shareholder wealth. Karels
finds no such loss for American and in fact the losses he
finds for McDonnell Douglas are much smaller than those
Chalk finds and are not significant (Karels , 1989: 353).
I find Karels' arguments weak. At the time of the
accident and for most of the period of Chalk's study , most
。bservers expected McDonnell Douglas to be blamed for the
accident. The newspapers explained in great detail all of
the difficulties that McDonnell Douglas had with the DC-10.
They hardly mentioned the issue of American ’ s maintenance
practices. They even implied , in some cases , that McDonnell
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Douglas ’ s concern about American ’ s maintenance practices was
simple misdirection on their part.
Barnett and Lo Faso performed another study of the
aftermath of the 1979 DC-10 crash. They looked for
passenger avoidance of the DC-10. They found no evidence of
avoidance (Barnett and Lo Faso , 1983: 1225).
After the 1989 crash of a DC-10 , Barnett et al. found
some resistance to the DC-10. The effect was short-lived
and began to fade within one month (Barnett , Menighetti and
Prete , 1992: 46).
Borenstein and Zimmerman looked for market incentives
for the safe operation of commercial airlines. For their
study they used accidents with at least one on-board
fatality. They found little or no effect on consumer
response prior to deregulation and only weak response after
deregulation. They also looked for changes in airline
equity associated with accidents. They concluded that
。verall the changes in equity value were lower than the
social costs of the accidents. For their sample they found
an average equity loss of $4.5 million associated with an
average of over forty fatalities. In addition to the loss
。f life , most accidents involved the total destruction of
the aircraft (Borenstein and Zimmerman , 1988: 933).
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The FAA and Other Safety Considerations
Economic and safety regulation of the airlines were
separated by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 did not change the FAA ’ s role in
regulating airline safety.
Some observers like John Godson , who has written a
number of books condemning the airlines' safety record ,
maintain that the industry has a history of under-regulating
safety. Godson in his books (Unsafe at any HeightI 프묘nw르Y..'
The Rise and Fall of the DC- 10 , etc.) is especially hard on
the FAA and claims that the agency has neither the will nor
the expertise to regulate airline safety. He is especially
incensed at what he considers the FAA's unwillingness t。
make the tough decisions required to ensure airline
passenger safety (Godson , 1973: 135).
Captain "X ," the author of the book Unfriendly Skies:
Revelations of a Deregulated Airline Pilot , maintains that
increased competitive pressure brought on by deregulation
has adversely affected safety ("X" and Dodson , 1989: 171).
Safety is determined not only by the economic
environment , i.e. competition , regulation , etc. , but also by
the level of government expenditure on safety enforcement
and infrastructure (airports , air traffic control , weather
forecasting service , etc.). The optimum level of
expenditure on safety enforcement and infrastructure may be
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different post deregulation compared to during regulation
(Moses and Savage , 1989: 315).
To the extent that economic deregulation is the cause
。f increased airline traffic it should be accompanied by
土ncreased expenditures on surveillance and infrastructure.
Decreases in safety level that are attributable to a failure
to make these expenditures are different than decreases that
are attributable to changes in economic regulation (Moses
and Savage , 1989: 313). The decreases due to a lack of
expenditures on surveillance and infrastructure are not the
primary concern of this study.
The volume of air traffic has increased tremendously
since the onset of deregulation. While traffic volume has
gone up , the number of airports available to the airlines
has remained static. The last new airport constructed was
the Dallas-Ft. Worth airport in 1973 (Bailey 89). When the
new Denver airport is completed it will have been over
twenty years since the last new airport was completed.
Deregulation occurred in the first decade of this hiatus.
Deregulation caused a large increase in traffic that was not
compensated for by an increase in infrastructure.
SAFETY IN THE DEREGULAT 工ON ERA
Deregulation has caused a number of changes in the
airline industry. It is responsible for increased levels of
competition , changes in the route structure , and shifts in
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travel patterns. Deregulation is also at least partly
responsible for large increases in air travel in the past
decade. It is the cause of changes in the profitability of
airlines and is credited with causing a number of airline
bankruptcies. Each of these changes has had a potential
impact on safety.
Safety and Competition
Safety is expensive. It costs money to train aircrews ,
to inspect aircraft , and to perform preventative
maintenance. There is an optimum amount of safety for the
airlines to provide. This optimum amount is something less
than absolute safety. If additional safety expenditures
will not result in savings from losses to society at least
equal to the expenditures , the expenditures should not be
made.
According to Moses and Savage , there is every reason t。
believe that the airlines provided more than the optimal
amount of safety under regulation. The airlines competed in
the area of service because they could not compete on the
basis of price. They therefore provided too much service.
For instance , load factors before deregulation were lower
than after because they provided too many flights. They
probably also provided too much of the service called safety
(Moses and Savage , 1989: 309).
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Change to Commuters
The commuter and local service airline ’ s safety record
improved significantly in the post deregulation era (Oster
and Zorn, 1989: 139). Safety regulations for commuter
。perations were changed in 1978. Other changes in market
structure make the commuter airlines , as a group , look more
like the safest commuters in the earlier Oster and Zorn
analysis (Oster and Zorn , 1983: 6).
The commuter airlines serve many communities that were
served by the majors prior to deregulation. The transition
from jet service to commuter service could be expected t。
adversely affect airline safety for these markets.
Deregulation may also have caused an increase in the
average number of stops one makes per trip. This increase
。f operations per trip increases the travelers' exposure.
The overall effect on air safety is probably quite small
(Rose , 1992: 80).
Shjft oJ Travel from Highways to Air
The commuters have increased the number of flights int。
the smaller markets as they have taken these markets over
(Rose , 1992: 79). Service has changed to a hub and spoke
which would make the flights from these smaller markets more
attractive. These factors combined to induce a shift from
automobile to air travel. To the extent that travelers
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shift from highway to air travel , the total transportation
system ’ s safety is improved.
Accident rates for the air transportation system are
quite low. Conversely the accident rates for automobiles
are relatively high. Therefore , it would seem that any
change from highway to air travel would have a very positive
effect. However , there are some statistical caveats that
need to be addressed.
Rural interstates are the safest of our highways. They
are also the roads that compete most with air travel.
Highway travel incurs nearly the same risk per mile on long
。r short trips. Air travel incurs almost all of its risk on
the takeoff and landing phases of flight. Consequently , the
risk per mile is much higher for short trips (Evans , Frick
and Schwing , 1990: 239).
The accident rates for highway travel vary considerably
for different profile drivers. This difference in profile
does not bear on air travel accident rates. Further , the
average air passenger ’ s profile is different from that of
the average driver. A belted , low risk driver , driving on a
rural interstate on a short inter-city trip , during daylight
hours , enjoys approximately the same low risk of fatality as
an air passenger making the same inter-city connection
(Evans , Frick and Schwing , 1990: 239). still the shift from
highway to air travel has had a positive effect. Rose
calculates the figure at 90 to 140 lives per year (Rose ,
1992: 82).
New Carriers
Deregulation spawned a number of new air carriers.
According to Barnett and Higgins the safety record of these
new entrants is not enviable. As a group they averaged
twelve times as many fatalities per flight as the
established majors during the period 1979-1986 (Barnett and
Higgins , 1989: 1).
The risk is sensitive to the measure of safety
performance , however. Using accidents per departure , the
new entrants appear to perform at least as well as the
established carriers (Rose , 1992: 86).
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Age of Aircraft
Competition levels have increased since deregulation.
Traffic levels have also increased. This has caused
airlines to postpone retiring aging aircraft from the fleet.
Fleet age has been widely viewed with concern. The Aloha
Airlines accident in April 1988 highlighted this concern.
Morrison and Winston looked at aircraft age and
accidents. They compared the age (in flying hours) of
aircraft involved in accidents pre and post deregulation.
They found that the age of aircraft involved in accidents
had increased during deregulation but not as fast as the
average age of the fleet (Morrison and Winston , 1988: 12).
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Profitability and Safety
工ncreased competition , leading to reduced
profitability, leading to shortcuts in training or
maintenance is touted as a mechanism by which deregulation
could lead to reduced safety. Some observers suggest that
if deregulation increased profitability , as seems likely ,
that deregulation may then have improved safety (Rose , 1989:
93) •
In a study of airline safety during the regulation era ,
Golbe found no relationship between safety and profitability
(Golbe , 1986: 31 7) . 工n a more recent study , Rose looked for
a relationship between profitability and safety. She found
that higher operating profits are associated with lower
accident rates the following year (Rose , 1989: 97).
Deregulations Effect on Safety
There have been a number of recent studies that
addressed the question , ’'How has deregulation affected
airline safety? ’, The answers have varied from researcher t。
researcher.
Morrison and Winston looked for a deregulation effect
。n insurance expenses for the airlines. They found n。
correlation between deregulation and safety (Morrison and
Winston , 1988: 10).
Barnett and Higgins looked at fatalities per departure
to measure airline safety. Fatality rates have decreased
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dramatically for the u.S. domestic trunks since
deregulation. They conclude that the established carriers
were not affected by deregulation. However , the new jet
entrants that arose since deregulation did not enjoy the
same low fatality rates. Had deregulation not occurred ,
these new entrants would not have existed. Therefore , the
airlines I. safety record would have improved even more if
deregulation had not occurred (Barnett and Higgins , 1989:
17) •
Rose looked for and found no deregulation effect on
safety (Rose , 1992: 89). Morrison and Winston looked to see
if pilot experience was a factor since deregulation. They
found that the average age and flying experience of pilots
involved in accidents is higher since deregulation. They
conclude that deregulation has not caused the airlines t。
hire less experienced pilots (Morrison and Winston , 1988:
11).
Summary of Safety Section
Many researchers have addressed the question "How has
deregulation affected airline safety?" The answer is
muddled by continued changes in the industry. It is ,
however , safe to draw some conclusions from the work already
done.
First , the safety record of the airlines has continued
to improve during the deregulation era. Profitability
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appears to be positively linked with safety in the case of
the smaller airlines. The change in travel patterns from
highway travel to air travel has a positive effect on
。verall transportation safety. Older , well established
airlines , as a group , are safer than the new entrants , as a
group.
There remains the question of the safety performance of
those airlines most directly affected by the deregulation
act. The large trunk lines that carry the bulk of the
country ’ s air passengers have an improving safety record
during the deregulation era , but is it as good as it would
have been under regulation?
CHAPTER 工II
THE MODELS AND METHODOLOGY
MEASURING SAFETY
Government Statistics and Definitions
To determine if deregulation affected airline safety ,
。ne must first decide how to measure safety. Even defining
something so seemingly simple as a "fatal accident" can be
surprisingly complex. The FAA reports a number of different
statistics indicative of safety levels. These included
accidents , fatal accidents , various accident rates , and
service difficulty reports.
Accidents . Accidents are the most commonly used
indicator of safety. The National Transportation Safety
Board defines an aircraft accident as follows:
An occurrence associated with the operation of an
aircraft which takes place between the time any
person boards the aircraft with intention of
flight until such time as all such persons have
disembarked , and in which any person suffers death
。r serious injury as a result of being in or upon
the aircraft or by direct contact with the
aircraft or anything attached thereto , or in which
the aircraft receives substantial damage.
and fatal injury as:
Any injury which results in death within 30 days
。f the accident. (NTSB , various)
The NTSB reports accidents and fatal accidents for air
carriers. F’rom the definitions given above it is easy t。
see that accidents caused by hijackings or sabotage should
be included , and when the NTSB reports fatal accidents it
reports those resulting from these causes. Yet when it
reports fatal accident rates it often leaves out fatalities
that result from hijackings (NTSB , various).
The NTSB similarly reports as fatal , those accidents
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where a collision between a general aviation aircraft and an
airliner results in the death of a general aviation
passenger. Again when calculating rates , these accidents
are not included.
other Measures. The FAA is not just interested in
accidents. Some events that are indicative of safety levels
are not serious enough to be categorized as accidents.
These events are called incidents. The FAA also records and
reports these incidents. According to the Department of
Transportation an incident is:
An occurrence involving the operation of one or
more aircraft in which a hazard or potential
hazard to safety is involved but which is not
classified as an accident due to degree of injury
and/or extent of damage. (U.S. DOT , 1986: 6)
Another category of events that the FAA tracks are
called Service Difficulty Reports or SDR's. SDR's are
reported for a variety of problems including in-flight
fires , false fire warnings and certain in-flight engine
shutdowns. Unfortunately , the criteria for reporting SDR's
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is vague enough to render them inappropriate for this type
。f analysis.*
**The Part 121~- airlines report accidents and incidents
per the U.S. Department of Transportation ’ s Order 8020.11 ,
Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification , Investigation
and Reporting. The NTSB investigates all airline accidents
and selected incidents involving Part 121 carriers.
Safety as Measured in the Literature
Some researchers use fatal accidents as the appropriate
measure of airline safety. Some go further and
differentiate between those accidents that are fatal to only
a small percentage of the passengers and those airline
disasters that kill nearly everyone on board (Barnett and
Higgins , 1989: 5).
* The worst of the criteria is the last which reads:
Any other failure , malfunction or defect in an
aircraft that occurs or is detected at any time
if , in the airline's opinion , that failure ,
malfunction or defect has endangered or may
endanger the safe operation of an aircraft used by
i t.
工n addition to the vague definitions the numbers are
staggering and they make analysis a daunting task. F’。r
instance , in the two-year period January 1987 to January
1989 , over 24 ,000 SDR ’ s were filed with the FAA by the U.S.
air carriers (Seattle Times , 1989: E1).
** The scheduled airlines , the subject of this study , are
those airlines operating under Part 121 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs). Those eight major airlines
that operated for the full period of the study were
selected. They were American , Continental , Delta , Eastern ,
NorthWest , PanAm, TWA , and United.
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Chance and Ferris looked for stock market changes
caused by airline disasters. E’。r their analysis they used
。nly accidents that resulted in more than ten fatalities
(Chance and Ferris , 1987: 154).
While these disasters make headlines and are the sort
。f thing most of us associate with the term airline accident
they are not suited to measuring the effect of deregulation
。n airline safety. These kinds of disasters are simply to。
*rare .
Oster and Zorn , also argue that accidents are rare
enough events that further limiting one ’ s analysis should be
avoided (Oster and Zorn , 1989: 135).
Rose argues that FAA inspection results and fines are
inappropriate measures of safety. These are more measures
。f safety inputs than outputs. She argues that how these
inputs might translate to safety outputs is not well
understood (Rose , 1989: 95).
Rose further argues that incidents are not appropriate
measures to use because the definition of an incident is not
as objective as that of an accident. She also argues that
incidents are more likely to include a higher proportion of
events attributable to air traffic control errors (Rose ,
1989: 96).
* Thin statistics do not result in biased estimates of
regression coefficients , but rather inefficient estimates
(Rose , 1989: 97).
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Divisor
To change the raw numbers of accidents or incidents t。
a rate , one must divide by a suitable factor representing
exposure. There are several measures of accident rates in
use for the airlines. These include accidents per revenue
passenger mile (RPM) , fatalities per RPM , and accidents per
flying hour.
Revenue Passenqer Miles . Revenue passenger miles is
the most common measure of air transportation use.
Fatalities per RPM is probably the best available measure of
the public ’ s risk. 工t is not necessarily the best measure
。f the airlines ’ efforts to maintain a safe operation.
The airline accident rate measured in accidents per RPM
is biased downward as equipment gets larger. The accident
rate as measured in fatalities per RPM is biased upward as
load factors increase. These biases are due to changes in
Revenue Passenger Miles that don ’ t have a direct bearing on
the airlines safety practices.
Operations. Oster and Zorn make a strong argument for
using accidents per operation (one takeoff and landing) as a
measure of safety when comparing one airline to another.
This is especially important when comparing short haul lines
to trunks. The takeoff and landing phases of flight are the
most dangerous portions of any flight. Short haul and
commuter airlines make many more takeoffs and landings per
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million revenue passenger miles than do trunk airlines
(Oster and Zorn , 1983: 7).
펀표프. For the purposes of this study accidents and
incidents per 100 ,000 flying hours will be used. 工n this
study , each airline's safety record will be compared only t。
itself. Also the airlines used in the study have been
chosen so that the nature of their operations has not
changed a great deal over the time frame in question.
Therefore , the advantage of accidents per operation over
accidents per flying hour does not accrue in this case*.
Rates Used in this study
The Airlines. The airlines I selected for this study
are American , Continental , Delta , Eastern , NorthWest , Pan
American , Trans World and United. Of the eleven trunk**
airlines that entered the deregulation era in 1979 these
eight airlines are the only ones that remained in business
* The most obvious way the nature of operations could
change and affect exposure as measured by hours of flying
time would be to change the average stage length or the
length of the flights. To confirm the hypothesis of n。
advantage using operations , I compared regressions for three
OLS models. The results are shown in the appendix. I
compared the results from the model using hours as the
measure of exposure with two other models. The first uses
。perations as the measure and the second uses operations and
stage length as measures of exposure. These are the
measures used by Oster and Zorn , and by Rose , respectively.
The results are similar to the results obtained by the OLS
맺。del using hours as the measure of exposure.
* Trunk was the term used to designate the large long haul
airlines operating under Part 121 of the FARs. The locals
were the smaller , short haul carriers that also operated
under Part 121.
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for the duration of the study. The other trunks were
Western , National , and Braniff. Their dispositions were:
Western was purchased by Delta , National was purchased by
Pan Am and , Braniff entered bankruptcy. Since the end of
the study period Eastern and Pan American have also ceased
to operate.
Commuters and 工ntrastate carriers did not come under
the same CAB regulations as the trunk and local airlines.
The local and regional airlines have for the most part
undergone a great deal of change during the time since
deregulation. These changes include mergers and changes in
route structure that make comparisons very difficult. ’rhose
regionals that have undergone the least change tend to be
rather small so that there are few data points to work with ,
making analysis difficult.
Exclusions . Oster and Zorn omit intra-Alaska , intra-
Hawaii , international , Caribbean and charter operations from
their analysis (Oster and Zorn, 1989: 136). Other
researchers have excluded international and/or charter
。perations from their analysis (Barnett and Higgins , 1989:
5) (Rose , 1989: 97). I have included all operations for
each of the selected airlines. The purpose of this research
was to determine how deregulation affected the individual
airline ’ s operations. There is no reason to believe that
deregulations effects will be different on different
segments of a major airlines operations.
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工n this analysis , I have used incident and accident
statistics as a measure of safety levels rather than
accident statistics alone. The advantage to using incident
statistics is that accidents are rare resulting in small
sample problems , while incidents are common enough to be
useful in most statistical analyses. One of the
disadvantages of using incident statistics is the
possibility suggested by Rose that incidents data might
contain more occurrences caused by agents other than
airlines or airline employees. She is concerned
specifically by the possibility that incidents are more
。ften caused by air traffic control. This and other issues




Having determined how to measure safety , the next step
is to determine exactly when deregulation took place. Again
this is more complex than one might hope.
The airline deregulation act was signed into law in
October 1978. The act called for the CAB to begin granting
new routes by January 1980. In fact the CAB began granting
new routes immediately. This was a drastic change from the
policies of the early 1970's.
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After the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation of
1970 , the Board reduced the capacity of the airlines t。
compete. It established standard seating densities t。
discourage excess capacity on highly competitive routes. 工t
also ruled certain discount fares were discriminatory.
By the mid 1970's the political climate was such that
this kind of strict economic regulation was much out of
favor. By 1978 , prior to the deregulation act , the
restrictions on fare reductions were largely eliminated.
Route authorizations had also been liberalized somewhat , by
1978.
Deregulation Timing in the Literature
The literature contains a number of empirical studies
where the regulation era was compared and contrasted with
the post-regulation period. A sampling of these studies
demonstrates the difficulties one encounters in establishing
a date for the end of regulation.
Oster and Zorn use 1978 as the date of deregulation.
For their analysis they compared the period 1970-78 with the
post-deregulation period of 1979-85 (Oster and Zorn , 1989:
139). Moore also uses 1979 as the first year of the
deregulation era (Moore , 1989: 13).
Morrison and Winston claim that certain economic
effects of deregulation stabilized , after a transition
period ending in 1982 (Morrison and Winston , 1990: 390).
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Bailey and Panzar comment that the Civil Aeronautics
Board ’ s policies on entry changed in early 1978. Yet , they
maintain that entry barriers did not really topple until
after the Airline Deregulation Act passed in October of that
year. They point to January 1979 as the date when the new
policies were in full effect (Bailey and Panzar , 1981: 130).
Morrison and Winston use 1976 as the first year of the
deregulation era in their analysis of air safety and
deregulation. They provide no explanation for their use of
such an early date (Morrison and Winston , 1988: 11).
The literature provides one other helpful note. Rose
looked for and found a relationship between the economic
well-being* of an airline and its safety record the
following year (Rose , 1992: 111). It is not likely that
economic deregulation ’ s effects would show up more quickly
than the effects of economic well-being.
Bailey ’ s contention that deregulation was in full
effect in January 1979 and Rose ’ s findings of a one-year lag
from economic changes in well-being to changes in safety
performance are the criteria I considered most important in
making my decision on the timing for the dummy variable
(Bailey and Panzar , 1981: 130) (Rose , 1992: 111). 工 am
using 1980 as the year of my dummy variable for
* Rose used operating margin as her measure of economic
well-being. She defines operating margin as one minus the
。perating expense divided by the operating revenue (Rose ,
1992: 100).
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deregulation. I did not end my analysis of the timing issue
here. Morrison and Winston's point that certain effects
stabilized after 1982 is important too (Morrison and
Winston , 1990: 390). That the effects of deregulation might
take a number of years to come to fruition is entirely
credible. I will address this issue later in this section.
Time Series Model
Since the beginning of the Jet Age , airline accident
rates have continued a downward trend. This is true for the
period since deregulation too. The Null Hypothesis for the
study will be that "Economic deregulation of the airlines
has had no effect on airline safety." To test this
hypothesis I have run a time series regression analysis of
accident and incident rates using a dummy variable for pre
and post deregulation. Since accidents per hour has trended
lower approaching zero asymptotically, a regression equation
using the log form is suggested.
ln (Rate) = J10 + fll Time (1 )
To Test for a deregulation effect 工 add a dummy
variable for deregulation. The equation can then take tw。
forms.
ln (Rate) = J10 + fll Time + Jk Dummy (2)
ln (Rate) = J10 + 꺼 Time + h Dummy * Time (3)
The form in equation (2) assumes that the effects of
deregulation change the intercept term. This might be the
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case if deregulation induced airlines to make a one-time
change in inspection cycles. 工f lengthening an inspection
cycle caused a incremental decrease in safety , we would then
expect that }2, the regression coefficient for the dummy
variable , would be positive and significant.
Equation (3) assumes that the effects of deregulation
change the rate at which safety improves over time. This
might be the result if deregulation induced the airlines t。
reduce spending on training. Assume that a certain portion
。f the training dollars an airline spends are effective in
improving safety performance. This seems reasonable given
that a great deal of the training effort is focused on
analyzing past accidents and how to avoid repeating them.
Then if spending on such training was reduced we could
expect that the rate at which safety performance improved
would be reduced.
It is possible that both of the foregoing effects will
be found hence equation (4)*
In (Rate) = flo + .P1 Time + Jk Dummy + .p3 Dummy * Time (4 )
* Note that for periods before deregulation the dummy is
equal to zero and equation (4) reduces to equation (1). F’。r
periods after regulation , where the dummy is equal to one ,
equation (4) can be rearranged to:
In (Rate) = (flo + Jk) + (.P1 +.Ps) * Time
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Box-Cox Transformation
The log form for measuring safety performance is not
the only form the equation could take. An inverse time
function would also approach a zero accident rate
asymptotically. 工n cases where the exact form is not known
the use of a Box-Cox transformation is appropriate.
G. E. P. Box and D. R. Cox suggest a transformation of the
form:
(Yλ - 1) / λ (5 )
where: 0 < λ < 1. Note that here lim λ • o [(Yλ - 1) / λ] =
In Y For this formulation λ is estimated along with the
。ther regression coefficients (Box and Cox , 1964: 214).
Then:
Rate = flo + J11 TI빼(am어T때e + .fk Dummy (6)
Rate = flo + J11 Trans(on뼈Time + 왜 Dummy * T빼sf，。뼈T매e (7)
Rat e = flo + J11 Trans(or뼈
工nstability in the Time Series Model
In the previous models I have looked for instability in
the time series model caused by deregulation. Specifically ,
工 used a dummy variable that is zero before 1980 and one
beginning in 1980 , to test for instability in the time
coefficient at that point. As I mentioned earlier the first
quarter of 1980 is not the only point that could be chosen
to represent the beginning of deregulation. Nor is
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deregulation the only shock that could cause instability in
the coefficient.
There are several techniques that can be used to test
for instability of the slope coefficient. Quandt ’slog
likelihood Ratio Technique tests to determine for an abrupt
change in the regression relationship at some unknown time.
Comparison of the recursive residuals and their standardized
sum or sum of squares to approximate confidence bounds ,
called CUSUM or CUSUM of squares tests , can be used to test
for instability and its location. Another method t。
investigate time variation is to calculate the regression
。ver a short segment of successive observations and move the
segment along the series. Comparisons of the coefficients
so calculated are then used to test for instability and its
location (Brown , Durbin and Evans , 1975: 151).
I have used the CUSUM and CUSUM of squares tests to
seek instabilities in the time series model.
other Model Considerations
The airline fleet age has gone up since the advent of
deregulation. This has caused some observers to question
the effect this might have on airline safety. An increasing
fleet age can affect safety in two ways. First , it is
possible that airliners could simply wear out. This would
not apply to components like engines or avionics that are
replaced several times during the lifetime of an aircraft ,
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but would apply to the airframe itself. While accidents of
this sort are extremely rare , they do happen. The most
spectacular recent example is the Aloha accident in 1988.
In that accident the airframe failed and a portion of it
separated. One life was lost.
There is another way that an increase in fleet age
could affect safety performance. An increase in fleet age
is an indication that the airlines are not replacing older
aircraft with newer presumedly safer models as quickly as in
the past.
Morrison and Winston looked at aircraft age and
accidents. They compared the age (in flying hours) of
aircraft involved in accidents pre and post deregulation.
They found that the age of aircraft involved in accidents
had increased during deregulation but not as fast as the
average age of the fleet (Morrison and Winston , 1988: 12).
Given these results and the difficulty obtaining detailed
fleet age data I have not pursued this issue further.
CONTROLLABLE OCCURRENCES
Certain types of incidents are more apt to be under an
airline's control than are others. 工ncidents that are
aircraft maintenance related and those related to aircrew
training are examples of incidents over which airlines have
control.
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It was the airlines who were deregulated by the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 , not the National Weather Service ,
the FAA, or the aircraft manufacturers. It is appropriate
then , to use those accidents and incidents that are under
the control of the airlines in determining if deregulation
had an effect on airline safety.
Using only those accidents and incidents that are under
the control of the airlines will have an additional benefit.
Rose claims accidents are most often attributable to factors
under the airlines ’ control. Such things as pilot or crew
error , maintenance , or lack of training are the usual
causes. Conversely incidents are likely to have a higher
proportion of events attributable to air traffic control
errors. Therefore , incident rates might be more sensitive
to the air traffic controllers strike of 1981 than accident
statistics (Rose , 1989: 96). By focusing on accidents and
incidents under the airlines' control we can eliminate any
problems caused by this supposed bias in incident
statistics.
Having decided to use only those occurrences that are
under the airlines' control , it remains to make the
appropriate separation. But first let us see how others
have addressed the problem.
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Cause and Other Researchers
Other researchers have separated accidents into those
under the airlines' control and those not under their
control. It is instructive to look at these earlier
efforts.
Oster and' Zorn compared pre and post deregulation
accident rates for the major airlines and the commuters.
For their analysis they assigned accidents to one of eight
categories according to '’primary contributing factor" (Oster
and Zorn , 1989: 142). Their assignments differ
significantly from the type of assignments I have made.
Oster and Zorn minimize the number of occurrences
assigned to the pilot error category. They assign weather
as the "primary contributing factor" in some cases where the
pilot flew into known inclement weather. They call the
distinction between pilot error and weather their most
subjective (Oster and Zorn , 1989: 143).
They also list general aviation as the "primary
contributing factor" for any accident where a general
aviation aircraft was involved! This is true even for
accidents like the PSA crash in San Diego (Oster and Zorn ,
1989: 144). In this accident the PSA 727 ran a general
aviation aircraft down from behind. The general aviation
aircraft was where it was told to be by Air Traffic Control
(ATC). ATC pointed the aircraft out to the PSA crew and
instructed them to remain clear of it.
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Oster and Zorn found that commuter carrier accidents
caused by weather (their cause listing) happened at half the
former rate after deregulation. As the weather certainly
wasn ’ t that much better we can only assume that the real
cause of these accidents was pilot error. Pilot error
accident rates also improved over this period according t。
their figures (Oster and Zorn , 1989: 145).
Mitchell and Maloney looked for a brand name effect for
airline accidents that were under an airline ’ s control. For
their analysis , they used pilot error as the criterion t。
determine that the airline was at fault. They did not use
accidents caused by other factors like maintenance. They
grouped maintenance-related accidents with those like air
traffic control mistakes that are outside the airlines ’
control (Mitchell and Maloney , 1989: 334).
Criteria Used in this Analysis
For my analysis I have used the accidents and incidents
that the National Transportation Safety Board investigated.
To accommodate data availability , I have limited the
analysis to the period 1964 through 1988. I obtained from
the NTSB computer listings of all the Part 121 accidents and
incidents for that period. These listings include cause
codes and narrative descriptions of the occurrences.
Dividing accidents and incidents into those under the
direct control of the airline and those not under their
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direct control requires using some subjective standards. It
is easy to assign most maintenance-related incidents to the
group under the airlines' control. Maintenance-related
incidents list a system failure or malfunction code from the
Air Transport Association Aircraft Component Code Table as
the primary cause. Most also list a secondary cause.
It is also easy to assign incidents caused by air
traffic control errors and those caused by unruly passengers
to groups beyond the airlines' control. But others are not
so easy to assign.
The primary cause listed for an incident where a flight
attendant was injured when the aircraft encountered clear
air turbulence (CAT) is "continued flight into area of
severe turbulence." The implication is that the aircrew was
responsible. The trouble with this is that if the CAT was
not forecast , and if the crew was not warned by a previous
flight that the turbulence was there , they would have no way
。f knowing it.
Some occurrences have both a primary and a secondary
cause and one is under the airline ’ s control and the other
is not. In general , the primary cause will be used as the
determining factor. Therefore , the incident with "continued
flight into area of severe turbulence" listed as the primary
cause is under airline control even though the turbulence is
not.
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An exception is the case where aircrew error is listed
as the primary cause and improper or conflicting
instructions from air traffic control (ATC) is listed as the
secondary cause. An example of this is incidents when tw。
aircraft respond to the same clearance and ATC doesn ’ t catch
the discrepancy (There is no way for the aircrew to know
that this has happened , since they can't receive and
transmit at the same time.)
Another example is an incident where an aircrew aborted
a takeoff on ATC instructions issued late in the takeoff
roll. The late abort caused two blown tires. The primary
cause is listed as aircrew error i.e. aborted the takeoff
late , resulting in two blown tires. The secondary cause is
ATC issued improper instructions i.e. called for an aborted
takeoff late in the takeoff roll. (The Traffic Sector had
become overloaded.) It is clear that safety is not enhanced
by encouraging the crew to avoid blown tires by continuing
the takeoff roll in the face of ATC instructions to the
contrary.
It should be noted , that by not listing these incidents
as under the airlines ’ control , the implication is not that
they are the fault of the air traffic controllers. Rather
it is simply that the airline cannot control these incidents
by providing the aircrew with more or better training.
A small number of occurrences could not be classified.
These included accidents that occurred under the
jurisdiction of a foreign power where the NTSB did not have
the results of the accident investigation. They als。
included a very small number of accidents , where the
investigation was closed with the cause listed as
undetermined.*
After separating the occurrences into those under the
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control of the airlines and those not under their control , I
was able to recalculate rates using only those occurrences
under the control of the airlines. I then ran the
regressions suggested by the models in equations (2) , (3) ,
(4) , (6) , (7) , and (8) •
ECONOMIC HEALTH AND SAFETY
One way in which deregulation might affect safety
performance is through changes in economic well-being. 工f
the additional competitive pressure caused by deregulation
squeezed an airline ’ s profit margin , the airline might
scrimp on safety inputs to recover some of the lost profit.
This raises the question of a possible relationship between
economic well-being and safety performance. Other
researchers have looked for such a relationship.
* Of the 1,118 occurrences investigated , a total of fifty-
six had causes that could not be determined. These fifty-
six occurrences were left out of the analysis.
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Economic Health and Safety in the Literature
Golbe looked for and found no relationship between
economic well-being and safety. She regressed the square
root of accidents on average current profits , departures and
stage length. Using aggregate data she found no significant
relationship between profits and safety (Golbe , 1986:100).
Rose confirms Golbe's results using non-lagged
aggregate data. However , she goes on to show that using
pooled data masks the true relationship. Using cross-
sectional data and regressing accident rates on lagged
。perating margin she found a correlation between profit and
safety. Specifically she found a significant correlation
between higher operating margins and lower accident rates in
the following year (Rose , 1989: 111).
In view of these findings it is important to control
for profitability in the earlier models.
Measures of Economic Well-beinq
The usual measure of economic well-being is Return on
工nvestment (ROI). However ROI is affected by historical
costs and accounting methods. A statistic that reflects
current operating health might be more useful.
Other researchers also found ROI less than
satisfactory. Golbe used both ROI and net income. She
cited the link between capital expenditures and safety
improvements as her difficulty with ROI (Golbe , 1986: 312).
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Gomez-Ibanez , Oster and Pickrell use operating ratio as
the appropriate measure. They looked for the effects of
deregulation on profitability. For the operating ratio they
used operating expenses divided by operating revenues
(Gomez-工banez ， Oster and Pickrell , 1983: 81).
Rose uses operating margin as a measure of economic
well-being. She defines operating margin as one minus the
。perating ratio (Rose , 1989: 100).
I have selected operating ratio as the measure of
profitability to use for this analysis. Such a statistic
can be calculated from data available from Data Base
Products , Inc. Data Base Products extracts the data from
Form 41 Data reported by the airlines to the FAA and CAB.
Model
To control for profitability I have used the following
models.
ln(Rate) =flo +fi1 Time +h Dununy +fi4 Opratio (9)
ln (Rate) .. flo + fi1 Time +.fls Dwr빼 * Time +껴 Opratio (10)
ln (Rate) =flo + fJ1 Time + h Dwr빼 + .Ik Dununy * Time + fJ4 Opratio (11)
These are simple modifications of the models shown in
*equations (2) and (3)n. Here Opratio is used to indicate
the operating ratio lagged one year. There is an advantage
to these new formulations. With these models , if the
* Note here the use of time as the measure of
technological progress. As noted earlier time turns out t。
be a better measure than uncontrollable occurrences.
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regression coefficient for the dummy term is significant , we






The data for this study is taken from published
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) statistics and
from computer tape data supplied by the NTSB. The published
data includes listings of fatal accidents and total
accidents and flying hours. The tape data included listings
。f incidents and accidents that the NTSB has investigated.
The listings are for Part 121 carriers , and occurrences from
1964 through 1988.
Table I shows fatal accidents and total accidents for
the years 1961 through 1987. Table II shows the tabulated
results of sorting the accidents and incidents into those
under the airlines' control and those not under their
control. (The appendix has a more complete listing and
includes the results from each individual occurrence.)
The column also lists , under the heading "other
。ccurrences，" the number of occurrences that could not be
assigned to one category or other. This was most often due
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incident or accident occurring outside u.S.thet。
it was because the investigationMore rarely,jurisdiction.
Fifty-sixa cause being determined.was closed without
were classified as。f the occurrences(approximately 5훌 )
"other."
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Ordinary Least Squares Results
The first regression results are ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions. The regressions have been run using
three data sets. The first two sets use fatal accident and
all accident rates for all part 121 carriers. Also shown
are regressions using controllable occurrences for the eight
airlines (American , Continental , Delta , Eastern , Northwest ,
Pan Am, TWA , and United). Controllable occurrences are
those accidents and incidents with causes that are under the
airlines ’ control. The models are equations (2) , (3) , and
(4) from the previous chapter and are repeated below for
reader convenience. These and all subsequent regression
results are obtained using the SHAZAM, econometrics computer
program , DOS extended memory version 6.2.
In(Rate) = flo + fJ1 Time + k Dummy (2)
In (Rate) = flo + fJ1 Time + fl3 Dummy * Time (3)
ln(Rate) = flo + fJ1 Time + k Dummy + fl3 Dummy * Time (4)
The models are generic. The rate could be all fatal
accidents for all Part 121 carriers divided by total hours
flown by those carriers. Or , depending on the data set
being used , the rate might be the number of occurrences with
cause factors that are under the airlines' control divided
by hours flown.
Regression Results The coefficients for time in the
fatal accident models have the expected sign and are
significantly different from zero. See Table III. The
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coefficients for the dummy variables are not significant.
This is not unexpected given the thinness of the fatal
accident statistics and it is consistent with the findings
。f other researchers (Rose , 1989: 100). Note the use of a
zero dummy in the fatal accident model. This is used as an
alternative formulation where a regression formula leads t。
a In(O) problem. (There were no fatal accidents by Part 121
carriers in 1980.) This formulation was pioneered by Pakes
and Griliches and by Hausman , Hall and Griliches. It will
be discussed in later sections (Pakes and Griliches , 1980:
378) (Hausman , Hall and Griliches , 1984: 910).
The results from the controllable occurrence models and
the models using all accidents are more instructive.
These results differ from Rose ’ s 1989 results. She did
not have data for 1987 and 1988 for her calculations. Als。
Rose tested the dummy variable for significance using 1978
as the year when deregulation began. As discussed in the
last chapter I believe 1980 to be more appropriate. Rose
did not use a dummy variable for time since deregulation , in
her 1989 study (Rose , 1989: 99).
In the models using all accidents the coefficient for
time is significant. The coefficient for the deregulation
dummy has the expected sign , but is not significant. In the
model using time since deregulation , the coefficient is




Dependent Variable = ln Fatal accident rate
j밍o ~ j녁2. j경
coefficient ~~95 ~0.0832 ~0.0408
t-ratio 4.30tt -4.22tt -0.117




R-square adjusted = 0.6990
coefficient 5.70
t-ratio 3.99tt
R-square adjusted = 0.6891
-0.0762 -0.0367
-4.04tt -0.608
Sum of Square Errors = 5.2558
-0.0797 0.279 0.0736
-3.92tt 0.517 0.783
Sum of Square Errors = 5.1925
All Accidents
Dependent Variable = In All accidents rate
coefficient 훌41 --0.902 짧0285 hP1
t-ratio 13.4tt -10.ltt 0.187









0.9226 Sum of Square Errors =
-0.0955 -0.249
-1 1. 3tt -1. 38








Dependent Variable = ln Controllable occurrence rate
PO 1"1 1"2 P3
coefficient -8.54 --0.0888 -0.480
t-ratio 6.51tt -4.85tt 1.75*
R-square adjusted = 0.6165 Sum of Square Errors = 2.9506
coefficient 10.2
t-ratio 10.6tt
R-square adjusted = 0.7800
coefficient 10.2
t-ratio 9.27tt
R-square adjusted = 0.7695
-0.113 0.156
-8.48tt 4.65tt
Sum of Square Errors = 1.6928
-0.112 -0.1039 0.157
-7.30tt -0.421 3.95tt
Sum of Square Errors = 1.69287
A ←~ constant fl1 •. year
fi2 ~ deregulation dummy fl3 ~ time since deregulation
* significant at the 10’~ level t 5% level tt 1 훌 level
74
In the regressions using controllable occurrences the
coefficients all have the expected sign and all are
significantly different from zero. The deregulation dummy
in equation (2) is significant at the 10훌 level (one-
tailed) , while all others including the time since
deregulation dummy are significant at the 1% level.
These results provide evidence that airline safety was
affected by economic deregulation. Airline safety improved
。ver time during the regulation era. Deregulation did not
reverse that trend. However , the results of the OLS
regressions indicate that the trend has slowed in the period
since deregulation. This preliminary evidence is reason
enough to look closer at the relationship between
deregulation and airline safety.
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE OLS MODEL
Before the results of the OLS are accepted , there are
some difficulties that need to be addressed. For the
results of an OLS regression to be valid some assumptions
need to be made about the data. The data presented here
violate some of those assumptions. Specifically , the error
terms are assumed to be normally distributed. Accident
data , however , is ordinarily thought to follow a Poisson
distribution. Also , the error terms are assumed to be
uncorrelated. In this case , several firms react to the same
economic conditions , in the same time periods. Under these
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circumstances , cross-sectional correlation of the error
terms is a more reasonable assumption than uncorrelated
error terms.
In addition to concerns about the error terms , there
are the specification concerns discussed in the previous
chapter. These include the possibility that the log form
does not best model the safety to time relationship. There
is also the concern that the true relationship includes a
term that measures economic well-being of the airlines.
One last concern needs to be addressed before we can
accept the OLS results. That is the problem raised by the
model specification and the resulting need to substitute for
the log(O). Each of these concerns will be addressed in
subsequent sections.
Poisson Distribution and Maximum Likelihood Regressions
The Poisson distribution is characterized by discreet
events occurring at random intervals. 工n a Poisson
distribution , the number of events that occur in one time
period is independent of the number of events occurring in
。ther periods. The number of accidents in a certain period
is a typical exaπpIe of this distribution (McClave and
Dietrich , 1982: 154). A number of researchers have applied
this model to accident research (Rose , 1990: 950).
The appropriate regression technique for a Poisson
distribution is a maximum likelihood technique like that
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used by the SHAZAM non-linear command (Hausman , Hall and
Griliches , 1984: 912). Alternatively , the Poisson
distributed variable could be transformed so that it assumes
a normal distribution. Both techniques have been used in
the literature. Rose used a maximum likelihood technique
when she looked for a relationship between accident rates
and economic well-being (Rose , 1990: 50).
Golbe took the square root of accidents to transform
the distribution to a normal one. Golbe also sought a
relationship between accident rates and economic well-being
(Golbe , 1986: 312).
Results from both the maximum likelihood regression and
OLS regressions using the square root of accident rates are
shown below. They are similar to the results from the OLS
regressions. See Table IV.
The maximum likelihood regression is the appropriate
technique to use for the Poisson distribution. These
regression results indicate that using the simpler OLS form
does not overstate the case for a relationship between






























Dependent Variable ln Controllable Occurrence rate
flo J11 Jk.
coefficient 10.2 -0.112 -0.0103
t-ratio 9.87tt -7.75tt -0.451










Dependent Variable square root Fatal accident rate
flo J11 Jk. f13
coefficient 3.98 -0.0410 -0.302 0.0637
t-ratio 5.91tt -4.28tt -1.47 1.74*
R-Square Adjusted = 0.6605 Sum of Square Errors = 1.2069
Dependent Variable square root All accident rate
.po J11 Jk. f13
coefficient 12.4 -0.135 -0.0827 0.120
t-ratio 20.1tt -15.4tt -0.439 3.58tt
R-Square Adjusted = 0.9479 Sum of Square Errors = 1.0175
Dependent Variable square root Controllable Occurrence rate
.po J11 Jk. f13
coefficient 15.3 -0.170 0.218 0.204
t-ratio 11.0tt -8.79tt 0.701 4.09tt
R-Square Adjusted = 0.8216 Sum of Square Errors = 2.6825
.f1SJ ~ constant .fJ1 ~ yeark ←~ deregulation dummy fi3 ←~ time since deregulation




Accident rates have declined throughout aviation
history. The data indicates a decaying function that
approaches zero asymptotically. It is usual to assume the
form is a log decay function. However there is n。
requirement that accidents should decay logarithmically.
The formulation suggested by Box and Cox is appropriate when
the exact form is not known.
The Box-Cox models from Chapter III are shown below.
The results of the regressions for these models are shown in
Table v.
Rate = flo + fi1 TrιISfonn어 Time + h Dummy (6)
R없at머e=flo+ }J.꺼'1 TI까다싫‘}버벼raI때잉때IS“빼r때form에뼈뻐l뼈빼 T다돼‘、i닙꾀in때me뼈 + fl3 D마ummy * TI삶‘놔뼈뼈m뻐Time뻐 (꺼m7기)
R없at머e = flo + fi1 T파빠‘늄늄때I3II sf，뼈orm뼈뻐e
The Box-Cox results are similar to the results obtained
using the log form. This similarity indicates that the log
form is an adequate representation of the true relationship
between safety and time.
The Cross-sectional Model
The data fits the form of a cross-sectionally
correlated and time-wise auto-regressive model described by
Kmenta (Kmenta , 1986: 622). There is a difficulty using the




Dependent Variable ln Fatal accident rate
.po )1 Jk
coefficient 6.14 -0.0832 -0.3.12
t-ratio 5.51tt -5.25tt -0.907
R-square adjusted = 0.6987 Sum of Square Errors =
Dependent Variable ln All accident rate
.po )1 Jk
coefficient 21.6 -0.254 -0.161
t-ratio 19.0tt -15.8tt -0.462









Dependent Variable ln Controllable Occurrences rate
.po )1 Jk fl3
coefficient 20.3 -0.236 0.293 0.288
t-ratio 12.5tt -10.5tt 0.787 4.90tt
R-square adjusted = 0.8238 Sum of Square Errors = 5.2791
μ、 •-+ constant
fi2 ~ deregulation dummy J11 ~ι‘ ~
year
time since deregulation
tt significant at the 1훌 level
The data is such that when one separate's the
accidents/incidents out by airline the occurrence rate is
。ften zero for a given year. Rose addresses this problem
and suggests the form used by Griliches et ale (Rose , 1989:
99) (Pakes and Griliches , 1980: 378) (Hausman , Hall and
Griliches , 1984: 910).
This method requires using a zero dummy. This dummy is
set to '1 ’ where the rate is zero and '0 ’ where the rate is
non-zero. A transformed rate is then calculated. This
transformed rate does not have zeroes. The transformed rate
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is equal to the original rate plus the zero durnmy* (Hausman ,
Hall and Griliches , 1984: 910).
Griliches suggests selecting the data set to reduce the
number of occurrences of zeroes , to preferably less than ten
percent (Hausman, Hall and Griliches , 1984: 910). The data
set in use here does not fit that description. It is ,
however , possible to select airlines for which the data does
fit that criteria. By eliminating Continental , NorthWest ,
and Pan Am from the data sample we are left with only the
five largest airlines. The resulting data set fits the
criteria. In this truncated data set , zero occurs in only
three per cent of the data points.
The regression results of a pooled cross-sectionally
correlated and time-wise auto-regressive model are shown in
Table VI.
It is also possible to transform the rate to eliminate
the log(O) problem. This creates a new problem , in that
there is no theoretical basis for the form of the
transformation. One can make some pertinent observations
though.
If the rate is transformed by adding a very small
number , (10-6 ) the log can be taken. This seems at first t。
be a good transformation in that it requires little change
to the data. However , this creates another problem. The
* One disadvantage to this transformation is that it does



































































































































































































"zero points" become outliers. 工n fact , regressions run
using this kind of transformation give coefficients and t-
ratios for time that are much different from those expected.
By adding a larger number to the number of occurrences ,
。ne for instance , the data remains smooth and the regression
coefficients have the expected signs and t-ratios. While
this is not particularly satisfying from a theoretical
standpoint , it does have the advantage of making the pooled
cross-sectional analysis possible. Also the results are
similar to those obtained using the Box-Cox transformation·*
OPERATING RATIO
If the airlines ’ economic health is a determinant in
airline safety , some measure of economic health should be
included in the formulation. Omitting variables from
regression models can make the remaining variables appear t。
be more significant than they really are. Many observers
suggested that deregulation would adversely affect the
airlines ’ economic health. Some researchers have found
links between airline economic well-being and safety (Rose ,
1990: 953). In that case , omitting economic well-being
could easily make the dummy for deregulation appear
significant when it really is not.
* This transformation preserves the data ordering and does
not introduce any obvious problems with respect to the
residuals. Plots of the residuals are shown in Appendix H.
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To test this hypothesis the regressions from equations
(9) and (10) were run. The equations are shown below.
ln (Rate) ... flo + 11 Time + h Dununy +껴 。pratio (9)
ln (Rate) ... flo + 11 Time + fl3 Dununy * Time + 14 Opratio (10)
ln (Rate) .. flo + 11 Time + h Dununy + fl3 D~y * Time + fl4 Opratio (11)
The variable "opratio" is the ratio of operating
expenses divided by operating revenue and is lagged one
period.* Operating ratio is used to measure economic well-
being. To the extent that safety improvements require
capitalization , the use of return on investment could
。bscure the profitability-safety relationship. Operating
ratio also has the advantage that it does not include the
non-airline business of the airline holding companies. The
。ther variables are as before.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table
V工工. The operating ratio is not significant in either form.
the deregulation dummy is significant in both forms. The
。perating ratio results confirm Rose ’ s results. She found
that economic well-being was not a significant factor in
determining safety for larger airlines. She obtained these
results using data from all Part 121 carriers. However , she
found that the effects varied for different carrier groups.
* Operating ratio is used as the measure of economic well-
being to avoid problems with other measures. Return on
investment can obscure the safety-profit relationship where
safety improvements are imbedded in capital (Golbe , 1986:
312). Operating ratio as used here has the additional value
。f focusing on the airline operation and not on other
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For the largest airlines operating ratio did not have a
clear effect on safety , while for the smaller airlines there
was a profitability effect. For the smaller airlines high
profitability had a favorable effect on safety (Rose , 1990:
955) •
The regressions were also run using an un-lagged form.
(See the appendix.) The results were similar. The
。perating ratio results confirm earlier work by Golbe
(Golbe , 1986: 31 4) .
These results indicate that the original formulation
was not harmed by the omission of the operating ratio.
OTHER TESTS
CUSUM Test
Another test for structural changes in regression
models is the CUSUM or cumulative sum of residuals test.
The output from this test is shown in Table V工II. The test
was performed three times , using fatal accidents , all
accidents , and accidents and incidents that were under the
airlines ’ control.
The fatal accident and all accident models showed n。
indication of structural change. The model , using
。ccurrences under the airlines ’ control , goes outside the
10용 significance bounds in the last year. A plot of the
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These results are not conclusive. However , they are
not inconsistent with the results of the OLS regressions.
Coincidence of the Structural Change and the Date of
Deregulation
We have seen that there is an apparent structural
change in the model near the time of deregulation. The
question remains then , is 1980 the date of this apparent
change? One obvious way to test this is to simply run the
regressions using different dates for the dummy variable.
Results of such an exercise are shown below in Table
IX. F’rom the table one can see that any of the years 1978
through 1980 appear to fit the data quite well.
The time frame 1978 through 1980 fits the date of
89
deregulation well. CAB chairman , John Robson began to relax
some of the regulatory restrictions as early as 1976.
Alfred Kahn , his successor , continued the process. The
airlines could not be fully deregulated without legislation ,
however. The legislation was passed and signed into law in
October 1978. The law provided for a seven-year phase in
period. The CAB , however , had completely deregulated the
industry by the end of 1979 ( Caves , Christensen , Tretheway
and Windle , 1987: 286).
1980 then was the first full year after deregulation
was complete. Some of the early changes in regulatory










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As a final exercise I have regressed the occurrences
that are not under the airlines' control on time and the
dummy for deregulation. I used equation (4) , shown below.
In (Rate) =.fJo + J11 Time + .Ik Dummy + h Dummy * Time (4)
This equation reduces to equation (1) for time periods
prior to deregulation. It can also be rearranged as follows
for periods after deregulation.
In (Rate) = (.fJO + Jk) + 띠 + h) * Time (12)
The regression results are shown in Table X. Looking
at the table , one can see that the dummy coefficient is
small compared to the constant term. While the coefficient
for the term for time times dummy , (TIMEDUM) , is large
compared to the coefficient for the time variable , (YEAR).
This can also be seen , graphically in Figure 2. The results
are disturbing. As we have seen from earlier regressions ,
the rate of improvement in airline safety slowed during the
period since deregulation. The large positive coefficient
。n the variable TIMEDUM implies that the occurrences not
under the airlines' control have fared even worse.
Economic deregulation cannot explain these results.
Moses and Savage suggest that the infrastructure is an
important factor that can affect airline safety. The
increases in flying activity brought on by deregulation
require additional investment in the infrastructure. They
suggest that the government might not have invested enough
TABLE X
OCCURRENCES NOT UNDER THE AIRLINES ’ CONTROL
Dependent Variable In uncontrollable occurrence rate
;8j ~ ~
coefficient ~~71 ~O.OS28 ~1.299 O~274
t-ratio 4.65tt -3.74tt -.570 7.50tt
R-Square Adjusted = 0.7756
Sum of Squared Errors = 1.4275
.po ~ constant ;81 ~ year Jk ~→ deregulation dummy
fi3 ~ time since deregulation
92
* significant at the 10% level t 5훌 level tt 1% level
to meet this increased need for infrastructure. Without
this investment , the aviation industry cannot achieve the
。ptimum level of safety (Moses and Savage , 1990: 174).
Appropriate investment in the infrastructure is needed
to obtain the high levels of safety we expect. The













































































SJnOH 6u!지.:I U인 I I!씨 Jed se~ueJJn~~o ul
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
There has not been a decrease in safety levels since
deregulation. Safety levels have continued to improve since
then. The question , however , is "Are safety levels as high
as they would be if the industry were still regulated?"
HYPOTHESIS
Null Hypothesis
The original question to be answered with this study
concerned the effect of deregulation on airline safety. The
Null Hypothesis was "Economic deregulation of the airlines
has had no effect on airline safety." ’I’。 test this
hypothesis I focused primarily on the safety records of
those eight trunk airlines that existed throughout the test
period.
Other researchers have looked at the effect of new
entrants. New entrants , as a group , are not as safe as the
established airlines (Barnett and Higgins , 1989: 16).
Others have also looked at the effects of expanding the
commuters ’ share of the market. The smaller commuter lines
are not as safe as the major carriers. However , the larger
95
commuters have safety records approaching those of the
majors (Oster and Zorn , 1983: 9).
The major trunk lines dominate the airline industry.
The eight largest trunks controlled 86.5훌 。f the market in
1987 (Borenstein, 1992: 47). Since the major trunks
dominate the industry , it is important to see how
deregulation affected this portion of the industry. The
effect of deregulation on the trunks is the effect that has
the greatest impact on the traveling public.
To answer this question 工 began with a simple OLS
regression model of safety on time with a dummy for
deregulation. The regression results indicated that safety
had been adversely affected by deregulation. There were
several potential problems with these first results.
Regression Issues
One of the OLS model assumptions is that the
distribution of the error terms is normal. Since accidents
。ccur with a Poisson distribution , this assumption is
violated. The use of maximum likelihood techniques showed
that the OLS model did not overstate the case for an adverse
affect from deregulation.
The OLS assumption of no correlation of the error terms
is violated by using cross-sectional data from the several
firms in the study. Regression results from the pooled
cross-sectionally correlated and time-wise auto-regressive
96
model formulation indicate that the OLS results were not
invalidated by making this assumption.
There is no theoretical reason to assume that the log
form of the equation is the correct formulation. The
regression results from the Box-Cox formulation show that
the log form is a good approximation. These results als。
confirm the OLS results that indicate an adverse effect from
deregulation.
The use of the log form created problems where there
were no occurrences for some data points. 工n these cases
the log formulation called for taking the log of zero. This
problem was "solved" in three different ways. First , use
was made of a "zero dummy." Here at each occurrence of
10g(O) , the data point was replaced by log(1) and the "zer。
dummy" was set equal to one. The second "solution" involved
modifying all the data points by adding a constant so that
all rates were positive. The third was the use of the Box-
Cox formulation. Each of these approaches confirmed the
initial OLS results. Table XI shows a comparison of the
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E’。rmulation Issues
It is possible with the simple model of safety
regressed on time that important independent variables might
be left out of the model. One of the issues often
considered as a result of deregulation is increasing fleet
age. The competitive pressures of the deregulated industry
have increased the age of aircraft in the fleet.
Other researchers have found that the average age of
aircraft involved in accidents has not gone up as fast as
the average age of the fleet (Winston and Morrison , 1988:
11). This indicates that older airplanes are not causing
safety problems. Therefore leaving fleet age out of the
model does not change the results.
Changes in hiring practices for pilots are also cited
as a factor in airline safety. How the increased age of
airline new hires might affect safety is not clear. Some
argue that older pilots might not retain the skills
necessary to cope with emergency situations. Others argue
that older pilots might be more experienced and therefore
safer. Again as with fleet age the average age of pilots
involved in accidents has gone up. It has not gone up as
fast as the average age of all pilots , nor is the change
statistically significant (Morrison and Winston , 1988: 11).
Morrison and Winston also found that flying experience of
pilots involved in accidents has gone up during the
deregulation era. They measured experience both as total
99
flying hours and as hours in aircraft type (Morrison and
Winston , 1988: 11). Therefore , the results of our
regressions should not be affected by leaving out pilot age
as a factor.
Economic-well being of the airlines is a consideration
that is often cited as a possible determinant of airline
safety. Rose found that in some cases it did affect safety.
*Economic well-being- was included in an alternative
formulation of the model. The regression results from this
model indicated that in this case economic well-being was
not a determinant of safety. Its inclusion or omission did
not affect the results.
Data Problems
The data set is not ideal. Fatal accidents are the
kinds of occurrences that concern travelers and terrorize
board rooms. However , measuring safety using fatal accident
statistics is difficult. Fatal accidents are simply to。
rare. Using all accidents as a measure of safety seems
reasonable. Minor accidents have the same kinds of causes
and the difference between a minor accident and tragedy
。ften seems a matter of luck. Many other researchers have
used this approach.
*Rose used operating margin which she defined as one minus
the operating ratio. I used operating ratio as the measure
。f economic well-being.
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工n this study , that approach was extended to include
all incidents investigated by the NTSB. Rose objected t。
this extension. She states that most accidents are caused
by pilot error , maintenance problems or training
deficiencies. These cause categories are clearly factors
under the airlines ’ control. She suspected that incidents
are likely to contain a higher proportion of occurrences
with cause factors like air traffic control error. Thus , a
higher percentage of these occurrences would be caused by
factors not under the airlines ’ control (Rose , 1989: 96).
In this study 工 have divided the occurrences into those
with cause factors that are under the airlines' control and
those with cause factors not under their control. This
eliminates that difficulty with incident data. There is
another difficulty.
Dozens of incidents are reported every year. This data
is on-line for the years after 1980. For prior years it is
not available on-line. Nor is the data available at all
from anyone source. What is available , is computer
listings of those incidents investigated by the NTSB.
The NTSB investigates those incidents that are deemed
to be of particular interest from a safety standpoint. T。
the extent that this is accomplished , this pre-sorting by
the NTSB should improve the usefulness of the data set.
However , there is the possibility that the NTSB has , from
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time to time , for organizational or safety or other reasons ,
changed the way it selects incidents to investigate.
If there was a problem with incident data , the
regressions using incident data should differ from those
using accident data. However , regression results for models
using all accidents and models using incidents and accidents
do not differ greatly. The difference of interest is in the
significance of the coefficient on the deregulation dummies.
The increased sample size obtained by using incidents and
accidents provides more statistical power. While the dummy
variables are significant at the five or ten per cent level
using accident data , they are significant at the one per
cent level using incidents and accidents. This additional
statistical power was the reason for using incidents.
Other Factors and Timing
There is also the possibility that the change in safety
levels implied by these findings was caused by some factor
。ther than deregulation. The air traffic control strike and
the controllers ’ subsequent dismissal is often cited as a
factor that might have affected safety. Using only those
。ccurrences that are caused by factors under the airlines ’
control is one technique that was used to eliminate that
concern.
If the structural change in the model was caused by
deregulation , the change should occur within a reasonable
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time after deregulation. Two techniques were used to test
for timing. The results of the CUSUM test were not
conclusive.
The second method used was the simple expedient of
checking to see if moving the dummy variables in time
provided a better fit. The results of this simple
experiment showed that the timeframe 1979-1980 best captured
the structural change found. This fits with the 1978
passage of the airline deregulation act. All observers note
that deregulation had actually begun before the bill was
signed. Bailey notes that deregulation was in complete
effect by January 1979 (Bailey and Panzar , 1981: 130).
Again the results fit well with these observations.
CONCLUSIONS
The initial results from the simplest model using the
simplest regression technique suggested that deregulation
has adversely affected safety. Issues including OLS
assumptions , model formulation , and data problems were
raised and addressed. 工n every case the resulting
regression model gave the same results. The coefficient for
the dummy for time since deregulation is positive and
significant. Only for the models using fatal accidents were
the results ambiguous.
工t is possible that some factor has been overlooked.
工t is possible some other factor is the cause of these
103
statistical results. But , every effort has been made t。
eliminate other possibilities and I feel compelled t。
conclude that deregulation adversely affected airline
safety. This adverse effect amounts to approximately seven
。r eight additional fatal accidents since deregulation.
other Concerns
Airline safety did not improve after deregulation at
the same pace as before deregulation. This was true for
。ccurrences with cause factors under the control of the
airlines. 工t was also true for those incidents and
accidents with cause factors that were not under the
airlines ’ control. Those occurrences not under the control
。f the airlines fared more poorly than those under their
control.
Some of the problems that raised the rate of
。ccurrences that were not under the airlines' control had t。
do with infrastructure. Airport and airway facilities and
air traffic control did not fare well under deregulation.
The increased traffic generated by deregulation was not
matched by a corresponding increase in investment in
infrastructure. The results from the model using
uncontrollable occurrences indicates that the investment
probably should have been made.
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Recommendations
Economics is not an interesting science , if it has n。
relevant input into policy making. I will , therefore ,
hazard some recommendations based on observations made in
this study.
The benefits to the consumer of airline deregulation
were calculated by Morrison and Winston to be roughly six
billion dollars per year (Morrison and Winston , 1990: 390).
Even if this figure is far too large , clearly , we can spend
。ur safety dollars more effectively than by returning to a
1960 ’ s style regulation of the airline industry.
The following is sometimes suggested as a mechanism for
a deregulation effect on safety. Deregulation increases
competitive pressure. The increased competitiveness
decreases profitability. Decreased profitability leads t。
cost cutting on maintenance and/or training. That leads t。
increased accidents or incidents. Rose's results , as
confirmed here , suggest a disconnect between airline
profitability and safety.
This indicates a need for further research to determine
a mechanism and a solution. The results of other research
suggest possible alternatives.
Market-based pricing arrangements for landing rights
that place a premium on peak demand periods has been cited
as a place to start (Bailey and Kirstein , 1989: 157).
Worsening airport congestion is one of the results of
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deregulation. User fees that reflected the opportunity
costs of the peak period landing slots would help reduce
this dangerous congestion. The extra revenue could be used
to upgrade facilities to reduce the problem.
The experience with air taxi operations has shown that
tightening training requirements and mandating higher
experience levels for pilots can have a profound effect on
safety. When stricter standards were accompanied by
increased surveillance and inspection emphasis , safety
levels of the air taxi services improved dramatically.
Deregulation did cause an increased workload in the
FAA ’ s air carrier inspection offices. This increased
workload was not accompanied by increased staffing to match.
Whether stricter training requirements , congestion
pricing at airports , or increased surveillance by the FAA
are appropriate steps to take is not certain. Further
research of this form where occurrences are separated by
cause seems an appropriate place to start. In this way a
mechanism for the deregulation safety connection might be
ascertained.
Consumers have benefited from airline deregulation.
E’。r consumers to reap the full benefits of a competitive
transportation system, policy makers need to consider the
economic pressures of deregulation and their effect on the
airlines. They also need to consider how the impacts of the
expanding market for air travel affects the need for
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The separation of occurrences into those under the
airlines control and those not under their control is
central to this work. The data is taken from NTSB computer
listings. The information included in the listings and the
format of the listings changed in 1982 and again in 1983.
The way the data was encoded also changed with the changes
in formatting.
The listings are voluminous. The data fields available
vary considerably for the three formats. Therefore , the
three formats will be discussed separately.
Pre 1982
The first format , which was used up through 1981 ,
consists of about 285 data fields. Approximately sixty-five
per cent of these are coded entries. There were
approximately 2500 different codes used for this process
(NTSB , 1981: vi). For the purpose of determining whether
the occurrence was or was not under the airlines ’ control ,
many of these fields were not required. Some of the encoded
information did not directly pertain to the cause of the
accident/incident. Some of the information had a direct
bearing for some occurrences but not others. Fortunately
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most of these contained information that is repeated in the
cause or remarks sections when pertinent.
The accident/incident listing formats are the same for
all types of aircraft operations. Therefore , the raw data 工
received from the NTSB also included a large number of
fields that applied to general aviation , helicopter
。perations， crop dusting , etc. that had no bearing on
airline operations.
The first section is identifying information. 工t
includes the identifier code , the date , time and place and
the make and model of the aircraft. The second section
contains general information. This includes additional
information on the aircraft and the location , and
information on the operator and the type of operations. It
also includes the type of accident/incident and the
。perational phase.
The next section concerns weather , airport facilities ,
and data on the type of clearance and type of approach. The
next section is planned routing. That is followed by data
describing the accident site and pilot data. The pilot data
includes ratings and certificates , experience , and medical
information.
Causes and factors is the subject of the next section.
This is the largest section. Up to ten cause/factors can be
shown. There are approximately 1,200 codes available t。
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describe the cause or factor. There is also a provision for
entering a cause directly when no appropriate code exists.
The next section is a listing of injury codes. It is
followed by two short narrative sections labeled remarks and
cause. The cause section can be used for additional remarks
if it is not needed to list the cause. This is the use most
。ften made of this section.
The last few sections are detailed views of particular
subjects. The first of these addresses engine failures and
malfunctions and the crews ’ corrective actions. The next
section covers weather and navigational aids in more detail.
The next section provides a more detailed look at the
pilots' flying experience with emphasis on recent
exper l.ence.
The next section contains the results of alcohol and
toxicology tests on the pilot. It also includes details on
impact damage with an emphasis on survivability and the
possibility of post-crash egress.
The next section covers fire detection and fire
extinguishing equipment and certain other aircraft safety
systems. The information shown includes the availability ,
use and in some cases the effectiveness of the equipment.
The next section is administrative data concerning the
NTSB. The section following is germane to crop dusting and
。ther aerial applications. The last two sections apply t。
collisions between aircraft , and ditching , respectively.
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1982 and Post 1982
The changes in format in 1982 and again in 1983 did not
change the nature of the data gathered. They did change the
volume. :F’rom 285 fields the number rose to approximately
700. There were similar changes in the record length and
the numbers of codes available.
The change in codes available was dramatic. Prior t。
1982 it was possible to enter a code indicating that the
pilot suffered from a psychologicalcondition. Beginning in
1982 , one could choose from a list of more than twenty
"psychological conditions" ranging from diverted attention
to company induced pressure to mental performance overload.
Further it was then possible to apply these codes not just
to the pilot but also to any other individual deemed
relevant to the investigation.
Data Manipulations
The data was received on tape. It was in IBM-style
fixed-length record files with multiple records per line and
undetermined-length short records that are terminated by a
new line. This required that a parsing routine be written
and used on the data.
After the data had been parsed , it was necessary t。
sort the fields into the those required for the analysis and
those that were extraneous to it.
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The fields not used include those showing identifying
characteristics of the aircrew members , their flying
experience , and some medical information. Detailed accident
location data and planned itineraries are not shown. Als。
left out are detailed breakouts of injury codes.
The information included is only data needed to make
the determination of under the airline ’ s control or not
under the airline ’ s control. These include causes , cause
factors , person identification codes associated with the
causes and factors , and a narrative description of the
accident/incident.
Note that aircrew experience and medical data and
detailed weather code fields are not included. The
information in the cause/factor fields and the narrative are
used to determine when this information is relevant.
DETERMINATIONS
The next step was to decode the data and make the
appropriate determinations. Due to the huge number of
possible codes and the relative paucity of occurrences , it
was determined that the most expeditious way to decode was
simply to reverse the coding process. This entailed simply
looking up the code for each field in the record under
scrutiny. Following are some examples of the determinations
made for this study. The fields are decoded in the right-
hand column.
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The examples were chosen to illustrate the methods
used. They include examples from each of the three formats.
Note that the controllable/not controllable determination is
a two step process. First a judgment is made as to the
person or agency responsible for the occurrence. Then the
determination of controllable or not is made , based on that
person ’ s relationship with the airline.
The responsible agents fell naturally into just a few
groupings. The largest , of course , were pilot and
maintenance. Passengers , manufacturers , and air traffic
control (ATC) made up the largest groupings for those not
under the airlines ’ c。ntr。l.*
A complete list of all responsible agents includes
pilot with 339 occurrences; co-pilot , 20; flight engineer ,
5; maintenance , 346; ground crew , 25; flight attendant , 71;
and company , 12. Company includes both company policies and
dispatchers. This is a total of 816 occurrences under the
airlines' control. (Two occurrences had both pilot and
maintenance as causes.)
Responsible agents not under the airlines ’ control
include passengers , 53 occurrences; manufacturers , 40
(includes design and quality control); ATC , 37 (includes
ground control); other aircraft , 28; no one , 27 (medical
problems suffered by the crew in flight); National Weather
Service , 17; hijackers , 13; airport/facilities , 13 (includes
runway intrusions and ground vehicle collisions with
aircraft); birds , 11; cargo , 5 (cargo that was mislabeled by
shippers to circumvent FAR ’ s)i stowaway , 1; and
contaminated fuel , 1. This a total of 246 not under the
control of the airlines.
There were also 54 occurrences with the responsible party
unknown. Foreign object damage where the source of the
foreign object could not be determined caused two more.




The first example has been extracted and decoded and is
labeled Example 1. F’rom the example we see that the nozzle
retention vane failed due to metal fatigue. Further
portions of the turbine assembly separated from the aircraft
and caused foreign object damage to the wing. The
determination is that maintenance is responsible for the
。ccurrence.
This is a typical example. Systems or component
failures are assumed to be a maintenance responsibility
unless the NTSB specifically finds some other agency to be
responsible. (See Example 2.) The reasoning here is that
inspection and maintenance are company maintenance
responsibilities. The decision to remove and replace a worn
component or to wait until the next inspection cycle rest
entirely with the company.
Example 2 shows how a failure might not be laid on
maintenance. Here the cargo door failed and separated in
flight causing an explosive decompression. The door's
design is specifically listed as a cause. I made the
determination that the responsible party was the
manufacturer.
It is appropriate to digress here for a moment. There
is a natural hierarchy when assessing responsibility for an
aircraft accident. Before an aircraft is allowed to fly ,
the design is certified airworthy by the FAA. Maintenance
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personnel certify the aircraft ready. The pilot (or the
pilot ’ s representative) preflights the aircraft , affirming
maintenance's judgment. Only then does the pilot accept
responsibility and fly the airplane. It is only natural
then to assume that if something goes wrong at this point
that the pilot is responsible.
Maintenance would be held responsible only if the
airplane was broken and that break was bad enough that the
pilot could not be reasonably expected to rescue the
situation. For an investigator to reach the conclusion that
design was responsible was a novel idea.
Weather
The NTSB ’ s purposes in assigning causes to these
。ccurrences is different from that needed for this analysis.
These differences show up most clearly with regard t。
。ccurrences involving adverse weather. In Example 3 the
aircraft ran off the runway on landing roll-out. The
weather conditions and a lack of snow removal operations are
listed as the causes of the incident.
Weather does not cause accidents. Flying into adverse
weather conditions that are beyond the capabilities of the
aircraft or aircrew causes accidents. Rarely ,
misinformation concerning the nature or severity of the
weather causes accidents.
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In this case , while there was not as much information
available as the crew apparently desired , there was n。
misinformation passed on. The crew did know that it was
snowing hard enough to cause a complete white-out. They
were told that the field had not been plowed since the snow
started. And they did know that these conditions had
prevailed for several minutes. Knowing all of this the crew
decided to land at the scheduled destination anyway.
The aircraft in question had more than a hundred people
。n board. These people all had reason to expect that they
would be able to make their business meetings , start their
vacations or return to their families. These expectations
can bring considerable pressure on the crew to complete the
flight to the scheduled destination. It is exactly these
kinds of issues that this study tries to address.
There is a group of occurrences classified as in-flight
encounters with weather that need to be addressed. These
involve turbulence. In Example 4 we see that the aircraft
encountered turbulence and that several flight attendants
and passengers were injured.
This is a recurring theme and several issues need to be
addressed. First , turbulence is a common occurrence. It is
so common that flights that encounter some turbulence are
the rule rather than the exception. Second , those wh。
travel with their seat belt securely fastened are not often
injured by turbulence. Indeed , through this whole listing
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there is not one case of a person whose seat belt is
securely fastened being injured by turbulence.
Given these observations , the turbulence related
。ccurrences were sorted using the following criteria. If
the seat belt sign was illuminated , the injured party was
listed as the responsible party. In those cases where both
passengers and flight attendants were injured , the flight
attendant was listed as the responsible party. (The flight
attendant is assumed to be more culpable than passengers.)
In those cases where the seat belt sign is not on , the pilot
is assumed responsible. In the few instances where the
turbulence was clear air turbulence (CAT) , and that
turbulence was not forecast , the National Weather Service is
listed as the responsible party. (See Example 5.)
In Example 5 the key phrase is "unforecast severe clear
air turbulence." Note that the only warning of turbulence
was a pilot report (pirep) that specifically denied the
presence of severe turbulence. Another important factor is
that the turbulence involved is clear air turbulence. Clear
air turbulence is difficult (impossible) to foresee from the
cockpit. While difficult to foresee from the cockpit , CAT
is relatively easy to forecast. Therefore in this example




工n Example 6 we have a case where the pilot suffers a
heart attack. We have no indication there were earlier
problems. The determination is no one is responsible. (At
least given the requirement for a physical every six months
there is nothing more that the company could be expected t。
do to avoid similar cases.)
Not all medical problems meet the same determination.
See Example 7. Here the pilot did know he had a problem.
He simply failed to meet his responsibilities. The company
pays pilots to sit reserve and not fly just so there will be
someone available to fly , if needed in a case like this.
For this system to work those who aren't well enough to fly
need to make that decision for themselves.
Unknown
Examples 8 and 9 show cases where a determination could
not be made. Example 9 , where the investigation results are
not available , is the more common case.
。ther Results
The other categories are straightforward. Hijackers
are responsible for hijackings. Air traffic control is
responsible for issuing inappropriate instructions.
Passengers are responsible for their actions , such as being
drunk or failing to follow instructions or starting fires in
the lavatories.
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The last category of occurrence is that caused by
birds. Like all flyers , birds have a responsibility to see
and avoid other flyers. This is especially true in the case
。f bird/aircraft collisions. The prognosis of these
collisions is uniformly grave for birds; such collisions are
rarely fatal to aircraft. Birds should be expected to see
aircraft at greater distances than pilots can be expected t。
see birds. Lastly , evasive maneuvers sufficient to avoid
collision are not likely to do more damage to the bird than
the collision. This cannot always be said for the aircraft.
Thus for all bird/aircraft collisions the bird is deemed t。
be the responsible party.
Controllable by the Airline
After the individual or entity responsible has been
identified , the occurrences are sorted into controllable ,
uncontrollable or unknown. Those occurrences where the
responsible individual is identified as a company employee
are considered controllable. These categories include
pilot , co-pilot , flight engineer , flight attendant ,
maintenance , company (usually taken to mean dispatchers or
company policies) , and ground crews.
Those listed as uncontrollable include hijacker ,
passenger , manufacturer , air traffic control , NWS , airport
。r airport facilities , other aircraft , cargo (cargo that was
mislabeled and shipped contrary to FAA regulations) , and
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stowaways. Also included is the category "no one." This
was used most often to indicate a crewmember having an in-
flight medical problem, while their medical certificate was
complete and up-to-date.
The third category is that of unknown. It includes
those occurrences where the investigation is complete , but
no cause was found and those where information is incomplete
。r not available. These usually are those investigations
under the jurisdiction of foreign governments. The unknown
category also includes the two instances of foreign object





































































































retention , guide vane
maintenance
miscellaneous acts or conditions
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AFTER ABORTING ONE APPROACH AND HOLDING FOR SEVERAL MINUTES ,
THE FLIGHT WAS CLEARED FOR THE ILS APPROACH RUNWAY 32 AT 0947 EST.
WHILE THE FLIGHT WAS HOLDING , THE CREW HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS
WITH APPROACH CONTROL AND THE COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING
RUNWAY CONDITIONS AND BRAKING ACTION. ON 2 OCCASIONS , THE UNITED
CREW REQUESTED , THROUGH THE TOWER , THAT AIRPORT PERSONNEL INSPECT
THE RUNWAY. THE TOWER WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT ANYONE AND STATED THAT
THE LAST FIELD CONDITION REPORT WAS TAKEN AT 0815 EST. THE CREW
WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT THE FIELD WAS COMPLETELY WHITED OUT AND
THERE HAD BEEN NO PLOWING SINCE THE SNOW STARTED. THE APPROACH AND
TOUCHDOWN WERE NORMAL WITH THE LEFT MAIN GEAR TOUCHING DOWN ABOUT
20 FT INSIDE THE LEFT EDGE OF THE RUNWAY ABOUT 1200 FT FROM THE
THRESHOLD. THE LEFT MAIN GEAR LEFT THE RUNWAY APPROXIMATELY 400 FT
LATER AND TRAVELED AN ADDITIONAL 750 FT BEFORE THE RIGHT GEAR RAN
OFF THE RUNWAY. PRIOR TO STOPPING , THE CREW WAS ABLE TO GET THE












































ABOUT 10 MIN BEFORE ARRIVAL , THE ACFT SUDDENLY ENCOUNTERED
TURBULENCE WHICH ONE OCCUPANT DESCRIBED AS A SINGLE TREMENDOUS JOLT. THE
MISHAP OCCURRED WHILE THE ACFT WAS APRX 39 MILES EAST OF ANCHORAGE INTL
ARPT AND WAS DESCENDING THRU 10 ,000 FT. THE SEAT BELT SIGN WAS ON & THE
FLIGHT ATTENDANTS (F/A ’ S) WERE PREPARING 봐IE CABIN FOR LANDING. ONE
PASSENGER & ONE F/A WERE SERIOUSLY INJURED; THE OTHER THREE F/A ’S & THREE
OF THE PASSENGERS RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. THERE WAS A SIGMET WHICH





























Causes , Factors and Persons Responsible
downdraft
descent


































THIS AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED UNFORECAST SEVERE CLEAR AIR
TURBULANCE (CAT) WHILE IN CRUISE FLIGHT AT FL350 NEAR GOSHEN , IN.
AS A RESULT OF THE ENCOUNTER , THE AIRCRAFT ENTERED AN UNCONTROLLED
DESCENT WHICH WAS ARRESTED AT 31 , 500 FEET. A TOTAL OF SEVENTEEN
PASSENGERS AND FIVE FLIGHT ATTENDANTS RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. THE
AIRCRAFT WAS INSPECTED AND FOUND AIRWORTHY. THE ONLY WARNING THAT
THE CREW HAD AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CAT WAS A PIREP , PASSED ON
BY THE CENTER CONTROLLER , THAT REPORTED MODERATE OR LESS











































































miscellaneous acts , conditions
miscellaneous













































incapacitation (other organic problem)
pilot in command
flight to alternate destination
performed
Narrative
DURING A SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER FLIGHT AT NORMAL CRUISING ALTITUDE ,
THE CAPTAIN PASSED OUT UPON RE-ENTERING THE COCKPIT AFTER EXCUSING
HIMSELF TO GO TO THE LAVATORY. THE FLIGHT CREW DIVERTED TO AN ALTERNATE
DESTINATION DUE TO THE MEDICAL EMERGENCY. A REVIEW OF THE CAPTAIN ’s
MEDICAL HISTORY REVEALED THAT CHRONIC LYMPHATIC LUKEMIA WAS DIAGNOSED IN
1981 AND WAS FIRST REPORTED TO THE FAA IN 1985. THE CAPTAIN HAD RECEIVED
SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION FROIo{ THE FAA TO HOLD A FIRST CLASS MEDICAL
CERTIFICATE IN JULY OF 1985 AND RETURNED TO FLIGHT STATUS IN FEBRUARY OF















































AT V1 SPD AS THE CAPT STARTED TO RAISE THE NOSEW




































ACFT AWAITING CLRNC.SPARKS & SMOKE FM COVE LT.F/

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A/L Date NTSB No. Cause Controllable
CAL 87/02/25 LAX87MA125A1 ATC n。
CAL 87/08/02 CHI87IA183B2 pilot yes
CAL 87/08/03 DEN87IA207 2 maintenance yes
CAL 87/11/01 MIA88IA055A2 ATC n。
CAL 87/11/01 MIA88IA055B2 ATC n。
CAL 87/11/15 DCA88MA004 1 pilot yes
CAL 87/12/03 FTW88IA037 2 manufacturer n。
CAL 87/12/27 DEN88IA043 2 pilot yes
CAL 88/03/10 ATL88IA108A2 ATC n。
CAL 88/03/10 ATL88IA108B2 ATC n。
CAL 88/03/18 NYC88IA109A2 ATC n。
CAL 88/04/03 MIA88FA138 1 pilot yes
CAL 88/04/17 ATL88IA147 2 manufacturer n。
CAL 88/07/06 CH工88工A159 2 maintenance yes
DEL 64/03/26 6607071 0030 pilot yes
DEL 64/05/05 6607074 0007 pilot yes
DEL 64/06/10 6607074 0052 pilot yes
DEL 64/08/26 6607074 0022 pilot yes
DEL 64/11/24 6607071 0054 copilot yes
DEL 65/11/18 6610064 0034 maintenance yes
DEL 66/02/27 6706141 0018 copilot yes
DEL 66/03/03 7003261 0011 pilot yes
DEL 66/03/04 6710171 0012 company yes
DEL 66/08/10 6706144 0029 maintenance yes
DEL 66/09/22 6706061 0029 pilot yes
DEL 66/10/22 6807251 0055 pilot yes
DEL 66/11/18 6706144 0045 maintenance yes
DEL 67/03/07 6710121 0014 pilot yes
DEL 67/06/17 6807104 0038 maintenance yes
DEL 67/06/24 6904171 0027 maintenance yes
DEL 67/09/16 6807251 0052 。ther a/c n。
DEL 68/03/20 6902191 0015 pilot yes
DEL 68/06/30 6906191 0054 maintenance yes
DEL 69/01/31 7001231 0028 manufacturer n。
DEL 69/03/07 7004014 0037 maintenance yes
DEL 69/03/16 7011161 0012 flight attendant yes
DEL 69/05/08 7001231 0035 pilot yes
DEL 69/06/10 7002041 0040 pilot yes
DEL 69/07/22 7001231 0030 pilot yes
DEL 69/08/02 7004011 0047 flight attendant yes
DEL 69/09/04 7001231 0034 pilot yes
DEL 69/09/17 7005271 0056 maintenance yes
DEL 69/10/16 7002044 0029 maintenance yes
DEL 70/05/18 7211091 0039 pilot yes
DEL 70/09/08 7410011 0016 pfμ” 야 yes





A/L Date NTSB No. Cause Controllable
DEL 71/01/11 7206151 0004 Pi--피야 yesDEL 71/05/18 7410011 0012 light attendant yes
DEL 71/08/05 7205121 0023 pb피야 yesDEL 71/08/18 7209071 0036 ird n。
DEL 71/10/09 7204101 0022 ground crew yes
DEL 71/12/26 7206094 0020 stow-away n。
DEL 72/02/26 7401281 0019 passenger + WX n。
DEL 72/03/18 7312074 0045 maintenance yes
DEL 72/03/19 7304231 0011 maintenance yes
DEL 72/03/28 7401141 0012 pilot yes
DEL 72/05/06 7310184 0028 pilot yes
DEL 72/07/22 7401141 0032 pilot yes
DEL 72/09/17 7303144 0023 pilot yes
DEL 72/09/28 7410011 0035 pilot yes
DEL 72/09/30 7304231 0031 pilot yes
DEL 72/12/20 7310181 0017 ATC n。
DEL 73/01/08 7408264 0003 maintenance yes
DEL 73/02/28 7401071 0002 flight attendant yes
DEL 73/04/01 7304101 0004 flight attendant yes
DEL 73/07/31 7311084 0022 pilot yes
DEL 73/07/31 7505141 0011 pilot yes
DEL 73/08/20 7401071 0021 flight attendant yes
DEL 73/11/27 7502261 0028 pilot yes
DEL 73/12/21 7407181 0031 NWS n。
DEL 74/01/03 7305104 0003 pilot yes
DEL 74/02/15 7305101 0003 flight attendant yes
DEL 74/02/21 7409111 0015 pilot yes
DEL 74/04/05 7506044 0019 carg。 n。
DEL 74/04/06 7506044 0020 carg。 n。
DEL 74/07/03 7410151 0023 pilot yes
DEL 74/07/27 7410151 0022 flight attendant yes
DEL 74/08/03 7506044 0014 carg。 n。
DEL 74/11/06 7501241 0034 pilot yes
DEL 74/11/25 7602181 0038 maintenance yes
DEL 75/05/06 7508114 0004 pilot yes
DEL 75/08/03 7602054 0012 pilot yes
DEL 75/08/08 7603051 0015 NWS n。
DEL 75/08/16 7603051 0029 pilot yes
DEL 75/09/22 7604131 0028 ATC n。
DEL 75/09/29 7606244 0018 maintenance yes
DEL 75/11/07 7606244 0025 pilot yes
DEL 75/12/22 7612101 0045 pilot yes
DEL 76/01/25 7709134 0005 maintenance yes
DEL 76/02/22 7704071 0004 flight attendant yes
DEL 76/03/03 7612101 0007 passenger + WX n。





A/L Date NTSB No. Cause Controllable
DEL 76/05/27 7702021 0013 passenger + WX n。
DEL 76/12/27 7709134 0017 maintenance yes
DEL 77/02/21 7807201 0003 pilot yes
DEL 77/04/13 7804284 0004 maintenance yes
DEL 77/08/05 7804281 0014 flight attendant yes
DEL 78/03/28 8005231 0002 pilot yes
DEL 78/06/11 8101141 0009 pilot yes
DEL 78/08/08 7810144 0007 maintenance ylienksDEL 78/08/12 7908274 0019 unknown
DEL 78/08/31 7908274 0025 company yes
DEL 78/09/07 7812181 0014 。ther a/c n。
DEL 79/02/15 8102091 0012 ATC n。
DEL 79/06/24 8103171 0014 flight attendant yes
DEL 79/07/15 8102091 0015 hijacker n。
DEL 79/11/25 8104084 0023 no one n。
DEL 80/05/22 8106194 0007 manufacturer n。
DEL 80/07/15 8012161 0004 flight attendant yes
DEL 80/09/12 8106191 0010 flight attendant yes
DEL 81/04/17 8212144 0005 maintenance yes
DEL 81/05/18 8212221 0022 flight attendant yes
DEL 81/05/29 8109084 0003 pilot yes
DEL 81/08/10 8209224 0020 manufacturer n。
DEL 83/11/26 CHI84IA052B2 。ther a/c n。
DEL 84/06/03 MIA84IA174 2 unknown unk
DEL 84/07/16 CHI84IA301 2 maintenance yes
DEL 84/10/19 ATL85LA014 1 flight attendant yes
DEL 85/04/16 BF085IA036 2 pilot yes
DEL 85/05/11 FTW85IA221 2 maintenance yes
DEL 85/08/02 DCA85AA031 1 pilot yes
DEL 85/09/08 MIA85IA246 2 maintenance yes
DEL 85/10/24 NYC86IA019B2 pilot yes
DEL 85/10/25 F'I’W86IA020 2 pilot yes
DEL 85/12/28 MIA86MA048 2 maintenance yes
DEL 86/01/09 ATL86IA054 2 maintenance yes
DEL 86/11/13 DCA87MA012 1 manufacturer n。
DEL 87/06/18 ATL87工A179A2 copilot yes
DEL 87/07/07 ATL87工A201 2 pilot yes
DEL 87/07/12 NYC87IA202 2 pilot yes
DEL 87/08/25 ATL87FA240 1 pilot yes
DEL 87/11/10 ATL88LA034 1 flight attendant yes
DEL 87/12/01 LAX88IA064 2 pilot yes
DEL 88/01/25 ATL88LA084 1 flight attendant yes
DEL 88/03/09 ATL88工A107 2 airport/facilities n。
DEL 88/03/20 SEA88IA065 2 maintenance yes
DEL 88/03/22 NYC88IA112 2 no one n。




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































passenger + wx n。
maintenance yes





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C。영-gguhh야 20 yes돼 t 따때e--뾰r 5 yes
Fliaht Attendant 71 yes
MC。a뼈따앤때뾰 12 yes344 yes
Ground Crew 25 yes
Pilot and Maintenance 2 yes
Total Controllable 816
p짧f뺑힘 53 n。Manufacturer 40 n。
ATC 37 n。
Other Aircraft 28 n。
No one 27 n。
NWS 17 n。
Hijacker 13 n。





Total Not Controllable 245
Unknown 54 unk




ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
APPENDIX C
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
COMMAND FILE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11) year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controllable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y))/hours
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lncrate = log(crate)
* generate time since 선eregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print y hours crate lncrate year d timedum
。Is lncrate year /exactdw
。Is lncrate year d /exactdw
。Is lncrate year timedum /exactdw




ORD工NARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
(con파lued)
F江，E 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
sample 1 27
read(11) year fatal acc hours
* generate zero dummy
genr zerodum = dum(.1 - fatal)
* generate fatal accident rate
genr fatrate = (1000000*(fatal + zerodum»/hours
* generate log of the fatrate
genr lnfatrat = log(fatrate)
* generate accident rate
genr accrate = (1000000*acc)/hours
* generate log of the accident rate
genr lnaccrat = log(accrate)
* generate deregulation dummy
genr d = dum(year - 79.9)
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print year fatal fatrate lnfatrat zerodum hours
print year acc accrate lnaccrat d timedum
。Is lnaccrat year /exactdw
。Is lnaccrat year d /exactdw
。Is lnaccrat year timedum /exactdw
。Is lnaccrat year d timedum /exactdw
。Is lnfatrat year zerodum /exactdw
。Is lnfatrat year zerodum d /exactdw
。Is lnfatrat year zerodum timedum /exactdw






ORO工NARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
(con바lued)
OUTPUTF江E





* SHAZAM - FOR 386/486 EXTENDED MEMORY SITE NO. 1438A4X
*
*





* FOR USE ONLY BY: William C. De Jager










* If this does not describe you then you have stolen this copy
* and if you type anything except STOP or HELP SHAZAM you







* FOR USE ON SINGLE COMPUTER ONLY - NO COPIES PERMITTED *
*********************************************************************
Hello/Bonjour/Aloha/Howdy/G Day/Kia Ora/Konnichiwa/Buenos Dias/Nee Hau




UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\tot.doc
7 VARIABLES AND 25 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
Y HOURS CRATE LNCRATE YR D TIMEDUM
64 2441185. 26.21678 3.266400 64 0.00 0.00
45 2691129. 16.72161 2.816702 65 0.00 0.00
45 2819170. 15.96214 2.770220 66 0.00 0.00
48 3507054. 13.68670 2.616425 67 0.00 0.00
43 4015838. 10.70760 2.370954 68 0.00 0.00
44 4336713. 10.14593 2.317073 69 0.00 0.00
44 4294706. 10.24517 2.326807 70 0.00 0.00
48 4224634. 11.36193 2.430268 71 0.00 0.00
40 4204233. 9.514221 2.252788 72 0.00 0.00
30 4346571. 6.901992 1.931810 73 0.00 0.00
34 3997587. 8.505131 2.140670 74 0.00 0.00
36 3936489. 9.145205 2.213230 75 0.00 0.00
14 4024069. 3.479066 1.246764 76 0.00 0.00
20 4135728. 4.835908 1.576069 77 0.00 0.00
20 4166439. 4.800262 1.568671 78 0.00 0.00
14 4329449. 3.233668 1.173617 79 0.00 0.00
9. 4439343. 2.027327 0.7067182 80 1. 0 1. 0
27 4049954. 6.666742 1.897131 81 1. 0 2.0
15 4016962. 3.734165 1.317524 82 1. 0 3.0
32 4197657. 7.623300 2.031209 83 1. 0 4.0
24 4547810. 5.277265 1.663408 84 1. 0 5.0
25 4744502. 5.269257 1.661889 85 1. 0 6.0
26 5389885. 4.823851 1.573572 86 1. 0 7.0
36 6921046. 5.201526 1.648952 87 1. 0 8.0
33 7166746. 4.604600 1.527056 88 1. 0 9.0
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY















ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
(con파lued)
OLS ESTIMATION
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE a LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.25148
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.013625
R-SQUARE a 0.5997 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED 톨 0.5823
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.3596
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF
YEAR -0.62229E-01 0.10600E-01 -5.8706
CONSTANT 6.6912 0.80922 8.2687
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.62760
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.084513
R-SQUARE = 0.6485 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6165
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 2.9506
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF
YEAR -0.88835E-01 0.18311E-01 -4.8514
o 0.48039 0.27509 1.7463
CONSTANT 8.5404 1.3124 6.5072
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.38251
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.699334
R-SQUARE = 0.7983 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.7800
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.6928
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF
YEAR -0.11270 0.13295E-01 -8.4764
TIMEDUM 0.15621 0.33563E-01 4.6543
CONSTANT 10.246 0.96341 10.635
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.37669
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.626381
R-SQUARE = 0.7983 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.7695
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.6927
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 21 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.11239 0.15397E-01 -7.2997 -0.8469 -1.3987 -4.3540
o -0.10398E-01 0.24681 -0.42131E-01-0.0092 -0.86137E-02 -0.19081E-02
TIMEDUM 0.15705 0.39755E-01 3.9505 0.6529 0.77425 0.14410




UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\£atacc.doc
4 VARIABLES AND 27 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YR FATAL FATRATE LNFATRAT ZERODUM HOURS
61 6. 1.641810 0.4957994 0.00 3654503.
62 6. 1. 718620 0.5415214 0.00 3491174.
63 6. 1.664712 0.5096519 0.00 3604228.
64 11 2.914084 1.069556 0.00 3774771.
65 8. 1.964643 0.6753105 0.00 4071987.
66 5. 1.181200 0.1665312 0.00 4232982.
67 8. 1.624669 0.4853041 0.00 4924080.
68 13 2.354249 0.8562217 0.00 5521931.
69 8. 1.357715 0.3058029 0.00 5892254.
70 4. 0.6919813 -0.3681963 0.00 5780503.
71 7. 1.226721 0.2043446 0.00 5706270.
72 7. 1.236862 0.2125773 0.00 5659485.
73 8. 1.356260 0.3047307 0.00 5898575.
74 7. 1.278657 0.2458101 0.00 5474495.
75 2. 0.3688223 -0.9974402 0.00 5422665.
76 2. 0.3579354 -1.027403 0.00 5587601.
77 3. 0.5171662 -0.6593910 0.00 5800843.
78 4. 0.6631582 -0.4107417 0.00 6031743.
79 5. 0.7462328 -0.2927177 0.00 6700322.
80 0.0 0.1471112 -1.916566 1. 0 6797578.
81 4. 0.6087087 -0.4964155 0.00 6571288.
82 3. 0.4658267 -0.7639416 0.00 6440163.
83 4. 0.6015934 -0.5081735 0.00 6649009.
84 0.1344358 -2.006669 0.00 7438497.
85 4. 0.5033070 -0.6865549 0.00 7947435.
86 0.1068729 -2.236115 0.00 9356906.




YR ACC ACCRATE LNACCRAT D TlMEDUM
61. 66 18.05991 2.893695 0.00 0.00
62. 47 13.46252 2.599910 0.00 0.00
63. 54 14.98240 2.706876 0.00 0.00
64. 59 15.63009 2.749198 0.00 0.00
65. 65 15.96272 2.770256 0.00 0.00
66. 56 13.22944 2.582445 0.00 0.00
67. 54 10.96652 2.394847 0.00 0.00
68. 56 10.14138 2.316624 0.00 0.00
69. 51 8.655431 2.158187 0.00 0.00
70. 43 7.438799 2.006709 0.00 0.00
71. 43 7.535571 2.019635 0.00 0.00
72. 46 8.127948 2.095308 0.00 0.00
73. 36 6.103169 1.808808 0.00 0.00
74. 43 7.854606 2.061100 0.00 0.00
75. 30 5.532335 1.710610 0.00 0.00
76. 22 3.937289 1.370492 0.00 0.00
77. 20 3.447775 1.237729 0.00 0.00
78. 20 3.315791 1.198696 0.00 0.00
79. 23 3.432671 1.233339 0.00 0.00
80. 15 2.206668 0.7914838 1. 0 1.0
81. 25 3.804429 1.336166 1. 0 2.0
82. 15 2.329134 0.8454964 1. 0 3.0
83. 22 3.308764 1.196575 1. 0 4.0
84. 12 1.613229 0.4782378 1.0 5.0
85. 17 2.139055 0.7603641 1. 0 6.0
86. 20 2.137459 0.7596176 1. 0 7.0
87. 30 3.089280 1.127938 1. 0 8.0
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY





















ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
(con파lued)
OLS EST工MATION
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE c LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.80983
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.236618
R-SQUARE c 0.9172 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED c 0.9138
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSEc 1.1679
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 DF
YEAR -0.88846E-Ol 0.53405E-02 -16.636
CONSTANT 8.3231 0.39738 20.945
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.83163
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABIL 工TY c 0.198224
R-SQUARE = 0.9173 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9104
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.1662
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 DF
YEAR -0.90168E-Ol 0.89107E-02 -10.119
D 0.28490E-Ol 0.15199 0.18744
CONSTANT 8.4125 0.62580 13.443
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.06439
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.393702
R-SQUARE = 0.9285 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9226
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.0078
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 DF
YEAR -0.10040 0.77855E-02 -12.895
TIMEDUM 0.49267E-Ol 0.25228E-Ol 1.9529
CONSTANT 9.1121 0.55242 16.495
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.06226
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.325728
R-SQUARE = 0.9340 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9254
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 0.93054
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 DF
YEAR -0.95495E-Ol 0.84249E-02 -11.335
D -0.24890 0.18012 -1.3818
TIMEDU삐 0.77622E-01 0.32160E-Ol 2.4136
CONSTANT 8.7854 0.59155 14.852
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY

























ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
(con바lued)
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNFATRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.31694
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.736955
R-SQUARE = 0.7295 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.7069
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.3403
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 DF
YEAR -0.85020E-01 0.11791E-01 -7.2109
ZERODUM -1.1842 0.48628 -2.4353
CONSTANT 6.0693 0.87468 6.9388
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNFATRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STAT工STIC = 2.31715
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.662994
R-SQUARE = 0.7296 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6943
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.3371
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF
YEAR -0.83196E-01 0.19699E-01 -4.2234
ZERODUM -1.1658 0.52097 -2.2378
D -0.40763E-01 0.34845 -0.11698
CONSTANT 5.9457 1.3833 4.2981
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNFATRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.33838
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.681875
R-SQUARE = 0.7337 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6990
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.2558
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 DF
YEAR -0.76168E-01 0.18831E-01 -4.0449
ZERODUM -1.2521 0.50526 -2.4781
TIMEDUM -0.36700E-01 0.60341E-01 -0.60822
CONSTANT 5.4656 1.3307 4.1075
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNFATRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.36679
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.636887
R-SQUARE = 0.7369 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6891
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.1925
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 DF
YEAR -0.79749E-01 0.20349E-01 -3.9191
ZERODUM -1.4465 0.63609 -2.2741
o 0.27908 0.53890 0.51788
TIMEDUM -0.73622E-01 0.94039E-01 -0.78288
CONSTANT 5.7044 1.4288 3.9925
APPEND工X D
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
APPENDIX D
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
COMMAND FILE
FILE 11 d:\shazam\d\f1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11) year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y))/hours
* generate log crate
genr lncrate = log(crate)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print y hours crate lncrate year d timedum
nl 1 /ncoef=2
eq lncrate = yr * year + const
coef yr .1 const 200
nl 1 /ncoef-=3
eq lncrate - yr * year + dummy * d + const
coef yr .1 dummy .1 const 200
nl 1 /ncoef=3
eq lncrate = yr * year + tdum * timedum + const
coef yr .1 tdum .1 const 200
nl 1 /ncoef=4
eq lncrate = yr * year + dummy * d + tdum * timedum + const




MAXIMUM LIKEL工HOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
sample 1 27
read(11) year fat acc hours
* generate zero dummy
genr zerodurn - d피n(.1 - fat)
* generate fatal accident rate
genr fatrate = (1000000*(fat + zerodurn)/hours
* generate log fatrate
genr lnfatrat = log(fatrate)
* generate accident rate
genr accrate 톨 «1000000*acc»/hours
* generate log accident rate
genr lnaccrat a log(accrate)
* generate deregulation dummy
genr d = durn(year - 79.9)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print year fat fatrate d timedurn zerodurn
print year acc accrate d timedurn hours
nl 1 /ncaef=2
eq lnaccrat = yr * year + canst
coef yr .1 canst 200
nl 1 /ncaef=3
eq lnaccrat = yr * year + dummy * d + canst
caef yr .1 dummy .1 canst 200
nl 1 /ncaef=3
eq lnaccrat = yr * year + tdum * timedum + canst
caef yr .1 tdum .1 canst 200
nl 1 /ncoef=4
eq lnaccrat = yr * year + dummy * d + tdum * timedum + canst




MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
nl 1 Incoef=3
eq lnfatrat = yr * year + zd * zerodum + const
coef yr .1 zd 1 const 200
nl 1 Inc∞f=4
eq lnfatrat = yr * year + dummy * d + zd * zerodum + const
coef yr .1 dummy .1 zd 1 const 200
nl 1 Incoef=4
eq lnfatrat = yr * year + tdum * timedum + zd * zerodum + const
coef yr .1 tdum .1 zd 1 const 200
nl 1 Incoef=5
eq lnfatrat = yr * year + dummy * d + tdum * timedum + zd * zerodum + const










MAXIMUM LIKEL工HOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
2 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 2 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -10.38533
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.13438
COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-R~TIO
YR -0.62229E-01 0.10171E-01 -6.1184
CONST 6.6912 0.77641 8.6181
3 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 3 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -8.762643
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.11802
COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-RATIO
YR -0.88835E-01 0.17178E-01 -5.1716
DUMMY 0.48039 0.25806 1.8616
CONST 8.5404 1.2312 6.9367
3 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 3 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -1.817325
MAXIMUM L工KELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.67712E-01




4 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 4 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -1.816268
MAXIMUM L工KELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.67706E-01








MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (US工NG SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\£atacc.doc
4 VARIABLES AND 27 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR FAT FATRATE D TIMEDUM ZERODUM
61 6.000000 1.641810 0.0 0.00000 0.0
62 6.000000 1.718620 0.0 0.00000 0.0
63 6.000000 1.664712 0.0 0.00000 0.0
64 11.00000 2.914084 0.0 0.00000 0.0
65 8.000000 1.964643 0.0 0.00000 0.0
66 5.000000 1.181200 0.0 0.00000 0.0
67 8.000000 1.624669 0.0 0.00000 0.0
68 13.00000 2.354249 0.0 0.00000 0.0
69 8.000000 1.357715 0.0 0.00000 0.0
70 4.000000 0.6919813 0.0 0.00000 0.0
71 7.000000 1.226721 0.0 0.00000 0.0
72 7.000000 1.236862 0.0 0.00000 0.0
73 8.000000 1.356260 0.0 0.00000 0.0
74 7.000000 1.278657 0.0 0.00000 0.0
75 2.000000 0.3688223 0.0 0.00000 0.0
76 2.000000 0.3579354 0.0 0.00000 0.0
77 3.000000 0.5171662 0.0 0.00000 0.0
78 4.000000 0.6631582 0.0 0.00000 0.0
79 5.000000 0.7462328 0.0 0.00000 0.0
80 0.0000000 0.1471112 1.0000
81 4.000000 0.6087087 2.0000 0.0
82 3.000000 0.4658267 3.0000 0.0
83 4.000000 0.6015934 4.0000 0.0
84 1.000000 0.1344358 5.0000 0.0
85 4.000000 0.5033070 6.0000 0.0
86 1 .000000 0.1068729 7.0000 0.0
87 4.000000 0.4119040 8.0000 0.0
184
APPENDIX D
MAX工MUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-L工NEAR)
(continued)
YEAR ACC ACCRATE D TIMEDUM HOURS
61 66 18.05991 0.00 0.00000 3654503
62 47 13.46252 0.00 0.00000 3491174
63 54 14.98240 0.00 0.00000 3604228
64 59 15.63009 0.00 0.00000 3774771
65 65 15.96272 0.00 0.00000 4071987
66 56 13.22944 0.00 0.00000 4232982
67 54 10.96652 0.00 0.00000 4924080
68 56 10.14138 0.00 0.00000 5521931
69 51 8.655431 0.00 0.00000 5892254
70 43 7.438799 0.00 0.00000 5780503
71 43 7.535571 0.00 0.00000 5706270
72 46 8.127948 0.00 0.00000 5659485
73 36 6.103169 0.00 0.00000 5898575
74 43 7.854606 0.00 0.00000 5474495
75 30 5.532335 0.00 0.00000 5422665
76 22 3.937289 0.00 0.00000 5587601
77 20 3.447775 0.00 0.00000 5800843
78 20 3.315791 0.00 0.00000 6031743
79 23 3.432671 0.00 0.00000 6700322
80 15 2.206668 1. 0 1.0000 6797578
81 25 3.804429 1. 0 2.0000 6571288
82 15 2.329134 1. 0 3.0000 6440163
83 22 3.308764 1. 0 4.0000 6649009
84 12 1.613229 1. 0 5.0000 7438497
85 17 2.139055 1. 0 6.0000 7947435
86 20 2.137459 1. 0 7.0000 9356906












MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
2 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 2 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD F’UNCTION= 4.086653
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.43257E-01
COEFFICIENT ST. ERROR T-RATIO
YR -0.88846E-01 0.51409E-02 -17.282
CONST 8.3231 0.38241 21.765
3 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 3 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKEL工HOOD FUNCTION= 4.106401
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.43194E-01




3 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 3 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= 6.077580
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.37326E-01




4 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 4 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= 7.154268
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.34465E-01







MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD (USING SHAZAM NON-LINEAR)
(continued)
3 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 3 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -16.43384
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED - 0.19779







4 VARIABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 4 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -16.42581
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.19767









4 VARIABLES 工N 1 EQUATIONS WITH 4 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -16.21843
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.19466









5 VAR工ABLES IN 1 EQUATIONS WITH 5 COEFFICIENTS
LOG-LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -16.05485
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATE OF SIGMA-SQUARED = 0.19231
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APPENDIX E
OLS USING THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
COMMAND FILE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\£1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11) year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y»/hours
* generate square root crate
genr sqrtcrat = sqrt(crate)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)


































OLS USING THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
sample 1 27
read(11) year fat acc hours
* generate fatal accident rate
genr fatrate = (1000000*fat)/hours
* generate squareroot fatrate
genr sqrtfatr = sqrt(fatrate)
* generate accident rate
genr accrate = «1000000*acc)/hours
* generate sqrt accident rate
genr sqrtaccr = sqrt(accrate)
* generate deregulation dummy
genr d = dum(year - 79.9)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print year fat fatrate d timedum
print year acc accrate d timedum hours
。ls sqrtaccr year d /exactdw
Ols sqrtaccr year timedum /exactdw
Ols sqrtaccr year d timedum /exactdw
。ls sqrtfatr year d /exactdw
Ols sqrtfatr year timedum /exactdw





OLS USING THE SQtUiAnRuEe Ro。T OF RATE
(continued)
OUTPUTFILE
UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\tot.doc
7 VARIABLES AND 25 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
Y HOURS CRATE SQRTCRAT YR D TIMEDUM
64 2441185. 26.21678 5.120232 64 0.00 0.00
45 2691129. 16.72161 4.089206 65 0.00 0.00
45 2819170. 15.96214 3.995265 66 0.00 0.00
48 3507054. 13.68670 3.699554 67 0.00 0.00
43 4015838. 10.70760 3.272247 68 0.00 0.00
44 4336713. 10.14593 3.185268 69 0.00 0.00
44 4294706. 10.24517 3.200808 70 0.00 0.00
48 4224634. 11.36193 3.370746 71 0.00 0.00
40 4204233. 9.514221 3.084513 72 0.00 0.00
30 4346571. 6.901992 2.627164 73 0.00 0.00
34 3997587. 8.505131 2.916356 74 0.00 0.00
36 3936489. 9.145205 3.024104 75 0.00 0.00
14 4024069. 3.479066 1.865225 76 0.00 0.00
20 4135728. 4.835908 2.199070 77 0.00 0.00
20 4166439. 4.800262 2.190950 78 0.00 0.00
14 4329449. 3.233668 1.798240 79 0.00 0.00
9. 4439343. 2.027327 1.423842 80 1. 0 1. 00
27 4049954. 6.666742 2.582004 81 1. 0 2.00
15 4016962. 3.734165 1.932399 82 1. 0 3.00
32 4197657. 7.623300 2.761032 83 1. 0 4.00
24 4547810. 5.277265 2.297230 84 1. 0 5.00
25 4744502. 5.269257 2.295486 85 1. 0 6.00
26 5389885. 4.823851 2.196327 86 1. 0 7.00
36 6921046. 5.201526 2.280685 87 1. 0 8.00
33 7166746. 4.604600 2.145833 88 1. 0 9.00
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY







OLS US工NG THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)
OLS ESTIMATION
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE c SQRTCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STAT工STIC 톨 1.45116
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.032192
R-SQUARE 률 0.7198 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED c 0.6943
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 c 0.21887
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.46783
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE 톨 4.8151
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.7822
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -14.8845
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.13971 0.23392E-Ol -5.9728 -0.7865 -1.2153 -3.8165
o 0.85674 0.35142 2.4380 0.4612 0.49604 0.11086
CONSTANT 13.092 1.6766 7.8086 0.8572 0.00000 4.7057
OLS ESTIMATION
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.01000
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.330309
R-SQUARE = 0.8402 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.8257
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.12478
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.35324
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 2.7452
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.7822
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -7.86054
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.16403 0.16931E-Ol -9.6883 -0.9001 -1.4268 -4.4809
TIMEDUM 0.22214 0.42740E-Ol 5.1975 0.7424 0.76544 0.14372
CONSTANT 14.849 1. 2269 12.103 0.9324 0.00000 5.3371
OLS ESTIMATION
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.13590
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY c 0.379236
R-SQUARE c 0.8439 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.8216
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 2.6825
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 21 OF
YEAR -0.17039 0.19383E-Ol -8.7906
o 0.21770 0.31070 0.70068
TIMEDUM 0.20449 0.50046E-Ol 4.0861
CONSTANT 15.285 1.3887 11.006
APPENDIX E
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OLS USING THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)























































































































































OLS USING THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)
YEAR ACC ACCRATE D TIMEDUM HOURS
61.00000 66 18.05991 0.00 0.00 3654503.
62.00000 47 13.46252 0.00 0.00 3491174.
63.00000 54 14.98240 0.00 0.00 3604228.
64.00000 59 15.63009 0.00 0.00 3774771.
65.00000 65 15.96272 0.00 0.00 4071987.
66.00000 56 13.22944 0.00 0.00 4232982.
67.00000 54 10.96652 0.00 0.00 4924080.
68.00000 56 10.14138 0.00 0.00 5521931.
69.00000 51 8.655431 0.00 0.00 5892254.
70.00000 43 7.438799 0.00 0.00 5780503.
71.00000 43 7.535571 0.00 0.00 5706270.
72.00000 46 8.127948 0.00 0.00 5659485.
73.00000 36 6.103169 0.00 0.00 5898575.
74.00000 43 7.854606 0.00 0.00 5474495.
75.00000 30 5.532335 0.00 0.00 5422665.
76.00000 22 3.937289 0.00 0.00 5587601.
77.00000 20 3.447775 0.00 0.00 5800843.
78.00000 20 3.315791 0.00 0.00 6031743.
79.00000 23 3.432671 0.00 0.00 6700322.
80.00000 15 2.206668 1. 0 1. 0 6797578.
81.00000 25 3.804429 1. 0 2.0 6571288.
82.00000 15 2.329134 1. 0 3.0 6440163.
83.00000 22 3.308764 1. 0 4.0 6649009.
84.00000 12 1.613229 1. 0 5.0 7438497.
85.00000 17 2.139055 1. 0 6.0 7947435.
86.00000 20 2.137459 1. 0 7.0 9356906.
87.00000 30 3.089280 1. 0 8.0 9711000.
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY







OLS USING THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 10 CURRENT PAR= 500
OLS ESTIMATION
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VAR工ABLE = SQRTACCR
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.56732
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.058680
R-SQUARE - 0.9282 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED - 0.9222
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.65967E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.25684
SL~ OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 1.5832
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE - 2.5559
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION =-0.202451E-01
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.12721 0.10382E-01 -12.253 -0.9285 -1.0962 -3.6829
o 0.34704 0.17709 1.9596 0.3714 0.17533 0.40230E-01
CONSTANT 11.867 0.72914 16.275 0.9576 0.00000 4.6427
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 10 CURRENT PAR= 500
OLS ESTIMATION
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTACCR
••• NOTE •• SAMPLE RANGE SET TO: 1 , 27
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.03626
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.365287
R-SQUARE = 0.9535 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9496
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.42751E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.20676
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.0260
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.5559
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 5.83556
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.13709 0.78556E-02 -17.451 -0.9628 -1.1814 -3.9690
TIMEDUM 0.11084 0.25455E-01 4.3542 0.6643 0.29476 0.57819E-01
CONSTANT 12.553 0.55739 22.521 0.9771 0.00000 4.9112
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTACCR
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.00110
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.269177
R-SQUARE = 0.9539 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9479
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.0175
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF
YEAR -0.13546 0.88098E-02 -15.376
D -0.82706E-01 0.18835 -0.43912
TIMEDUM 0.12026 0.33629E-01 3.5760
CONSTANT 12.444 0.61857 20.118
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY







OLS US工NG THE SQUARE ROOT OF RATE
(continued)
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR'" 10 CURRENT PAR- 500
OLS ESTIMATION
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE ... SQRTFATR
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC'" 2.10287
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.449845
R-SQUARE 톨 0.6602 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED'" 0.6319
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2'" 0.56895E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.23853
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE'" 1.3655
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 0.93649
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 1.97709
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.36699E-Ol 0.96419E-02 -3.8062 -0.6135 -0.74092 -2.8999
o -0.74544E-Ol 0.16447 -0.45325 -0.0921 -0.88229E-Ol -0.23585E-Ol
CONSTANT 3.6743 0.67715 5.4262 0.7422 0.00000 3.9235
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 10 CURRENT PAR= 500
OLS ESTIMAT 工ON
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTFATR
••• NOTE •• SAMPLE RANGE SET TO: 1 , 27
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.26869
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY'" 0.608279
R-SQUARE'" 0.6714 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6440
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.55030E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA'" 0.23458
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.3207
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 0.93649
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION'" 2.42714
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAI‘E COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.47016E-Ol 0.89126E-02 -5.2752 -0.7328 -0.94920 -3.7151
TIMEDUM 0.29253E-Ol 0.28880E-01 1.0129 0.2025 0.18226 0.41649E-Ol
CONSTANT 4.3766 0.63239 6.9208 0.8162 0.00000 4.6734
27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = SQRTFATR
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC'" 2.12690
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY 흩 0.390211
R-SQUARE = 0.6997 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6605
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.2069
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF
YEAR -0.41068E-Ol 0.95949E-02 -4.2802
o -0.30205 0.20513 -1.4724
TIMEDUM 0.63663E-Ol 0.36626E-Ol 1.7382






FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\£1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11) year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y»/hours
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr tirnedum = d*(year - 79)
print year y hours crate d timed-um
box crate year /aut。
box crate year d /aut。
box crate year timedurn /aut。






FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
sample 1 27
read(11) year fatal acc hours
* generate fatal accident rate
genr fatrate = (1000000*(fatal + .5»/hours
* generate accident rate
genr accrate = (1000000*acc)/hours
* generate deregulation dummy
genr d = dum(year - 79.9)
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
























UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\tot. doc
7 VARIABLES AND 25 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR Y HOURS CRATE D
TIMEDUM
64. 64 2441185. 26.21678 0.00 0.00
65. 45 2691129. 16.72161 0.00 0.00
66. 45 2819170. 15.96214 0.00 0.00
67. 48 3507054. 13.68670 0.00 0.00
68. 43 4015838. 10.70760 0.00 0.00
69. 44 4336713. 10.14593 0.00 0.00
70. 44 4294706. 10.24517 0.00 0.00
71. 48 4224634. 11.36193 0.00 0.00
72. 40 4204233. 9.514221 0.00 0.00
73. 30 4346571. 6.901992 0.00 0.00
74. 34 3997587. 8.505131 0.00 0.00
75. 36 3936489. 9.145205 0.00 0.00
76. 14 4024069. 3.479066 0.00 0.00
77. 20 4135728. 4.835908 0.00 0.00
78. 20 4166439. 4.800262 0.00 0.00
79. 14 4329449. 3.233668 0.00 0.00
80. 9. 4439343. 2.027327 1. 0 1. 0
81. 27 4049954. 6.666742 1. 0 2.0
82. 15 4016962. 3.734165 1. 0 3.0
83. 32 4197657. 7.623300 1. 0 4.0
84. 24 4547810. 5.277265 1. 0 5.0
85. 25 4744502. 5.269257 1. 0 6.0
86. 26 5389885. 4.823851 1. 0 7.0
87. 36 6921046. 5.201526 1. 0 8.0






R-SQUARE = 0.7047 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6918
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 12.012
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -56.8449
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.14926 0.34136E-01 -4.3725 -0.6737 -0.84381 -5.0465
CONSTANT 14.476 2.6077 5.5512 0.7567 0.00000 6.4399
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =CRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.7188 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6932
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 11.440
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION ~ -56.1350
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.20026 0.42404E-01 -4.7227 -0.7095 -1.1321 -6.7709
o 1.0288 0.63117 1.6300 0.3283 0.38714 0.16476
CONSTANT 17.925 3.0453 5.8861 0.7821 0.00000 7.9742
DEPENDENT VARIABLE ~CRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.8395 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.8249
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 4.6345
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION ~ -48.7636
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.20955 0.18411E-01 -11.382 -0.9246 -1.4061 -8.4023
TIMEDUM 0.28760 0.46788E-01 6.1468 0.7950 0.76446 0.27312
CONSTANT 18.169 1.3351 13.608 0.9454 0.00000 9.5854
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =CRATE
R-SQUARE a 0.8458 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.8238
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.2791
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -48.4371
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 21 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.23658 0.22537E-01 -10.497 -0.9165 -1.4576 -8.7108
o 0.29375 0.37295 0.78766 0.1694 0.12047 0.51233E-01
TIMEDUM 0.28813 0.58823E-01 4.8983 0.7303 0.70324 0.25126





UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d: \shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
4 VARIABLES AND 27 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YR FATAL FATRATE HOURS ACC ACCRATE D TIMEDUM
61 6.0 1.778628 3654503. 66 18.05991 0.00 0.00
62 6.0 1.861838 3491174. 47 13.46252 0.00 0.00
63 6.0 1.803438 3604228. 54 14.98240 0.00 0.00
64 11. 3.046542 3774771. 59 15.63009 0.00 0.00
65 8.0 2.087433 4071987. 65 15.96272 0.00 0.00
66 5.0 1.299320 4232982. 56 13.22944 0.00 0.00
67 8.0 1.726211 4924080. 54 10.96652 0.00 0.00
68 13. 2.444797 5521931. 56 10.14138 0.00 0.00
69 8.0 1.442572 5892254. 51 8.655431 0.00 0.00
70 4.0 0.7784790 5780503. 43 7.438799 0.00 0.00
71 7.0 1.314344 5706270. 43 7.535571 0.00 0.00
72 7.0 1.325209 5659485. 46 8.127948 0.00 0.00
73 8.0 1.441026 5898575. 36 6.103169 0.00 0.00
74 7.0 1.369989 5474495. 43 7.854606 0.00 0.00
75 2.0 0.4610279 5422665. 30 5.532335 0.00 0.00
76 2.0 0.4474192 5587601. 22 3.937289 0.00 0.00
77 3.0 0.6033606 5800843. 20 3.447775 0.00 0.00
78 4.0 0.7460530 6031743. 20 3.315791 0.00 0.00
79 5.0 0.8208561 6700322. 23 3.432671 0.00 0.00
80 0.00 0.0735556 6797578. 15 2.206668 1. 0 1. 00
81 4.0 0.6847973 6571288. 25 3.804429 1. 0 2.00
82 3.0 0.5434645 6440163. 15 2.329134 1.0 3.00
83 4.0 0.6767926 6649009. 22 3.308764 1.0 4.00
84 1. 0 0.2016536 7438497. 12 1.613229 1.0 5.00
85 4.0 0.5662204 7947435. 17 2.139055 1. 0 6.00
86 1. 0 0.1603094 9356906. 20 2.137459 1.0 7.00






R-SQUARE - 0.9238 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED - 0.9207
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 2.6260
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -42.2704
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.13828 0.92394E-02 -14.966 -0.9485 -0.95357 -6.2147
CONSTANT 12.533 0.68759 18.228 0.9644 0.00000 7.6120
0.9207
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
-0.9485 -0.95357 -6.2147
0.9644 0.00000 7.6120
DEPENDENT VA RIABLE =ACCRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.9238 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED =
SUM OF SQUAR ED ERRORS-SSE= 2.6260
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -42.2704
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF
YEAR -0 .13828 0.92394E-02 -14.966
CONSTANT 12.533 0.68759 18.228
DEPENDENT VAR工ABLE =ACCRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.9534 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9496
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.9523
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -36.4489
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.26838 0.14755E-01 -18.189 -0.9656 -1.1789 -7.4732
TIMEDUM 0.21412 0.47954E-Ol 4.4652 0.6736 0.29026 0.10743
CONSTANT 22.646 1.0471 21.627 0.9753 0.00000 8.5214
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 톨ACCRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.9535 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9474
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.6556
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -36.3395
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.25442 0.16153E-Ol -15.750 -0.9566 -1.1613 -7.3729
o -0.16109 0.34847 -0.46227 -0.0959 -0.43105E-Ol -0.18691E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.22131 0.62021E-Ol 3.5684 0.5969 0.31174 0.11556






R-SQUARE 훌 0.7110 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED a 0.6994
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSEa 4.0117
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -10.3931
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.77985E-01 0.92406E-02 -8.4394 -0.8603 -0.84713 -5.4413
CONSTANT 5.7669 0.68754 8.3877' 0.8590 0.00000 5.4375
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =FATRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.7110 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6994
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 4.0117
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -10.3931
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.77985E-01 0.92406E-02 -8.4394 -0.8603 -0.84713 -5.4413
CONSTANT 5.7669 0.68754 8.3877 0.8590 0.00000 5.4375
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =FATRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.7262 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.7034
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.7783
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -9.72613
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 24 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.89832E-Ol 0.13717E-Ol -6.5487 -0.8007 -0.97869 -6.2470
TlMEDUM 0.50862E-Ol 0.44728E-Ol 1.1371 0.2261 0.17101 0.63730E-Ol
CONSTANT 6.5849 0.97370 6.7627 0.8098 0.00000 6.1881
DEPENDENT VARIABLE =FATRATE
R-SQUARE = 0.7335 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.6987
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.6999
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -9.30013
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
N회에E COEFF‘ICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.83288E-Ol 0.15861E-Ol -5.2511 -0.7384 -0.90473 -5.8113
o -0.31217 0.34423 -0.90688 -0.1858 -0.19880 -0.87213E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.85181E-Ol 0.61147E-Ol 1.3931 0.2789 0.28555 0.10709
CONSTANT 6.1390 1.1136 5.5126 0.7545 0.00000 5.7884
APPEND工X G




POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE
COMMAND F工LE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \agr.doc
sample 1 200
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controllable rate
genr ocrate = (1000000*(y+1»/hours
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lnocrate = log(ocrate)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
















UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\agr.doc
8 VARIABLES AND 200 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR OCRATE LNOCRATE D TIMEDUM
64.00000 22.01207 3.091591 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 22.98716 3.134936 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 17.65019 2.870746 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 7.392663 2.000488 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 11.31496 2.426126 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 3.138102 1 .143618 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 10.41702 2.343441 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 16.69885 2.815340 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 7.781968 2.051809 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 12.10068 2.493261 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 11.39848 2.433480 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 11 .11245 2.408066 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 6.096539 1.807721 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 7.445573 2.007620 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 7.264749 1.983034 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 6.686745 1.900127 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 1.441745 0.3658541 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 6.552350 1.879824 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 6.459635 1.865573 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 10.62232 2.362957 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 8.001526 2.079632 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 11.64321 2.454723 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 5.285088 1.664889 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 5.989992 1.790090 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 7.479348 2.012146 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 12.88959 2.556420 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 32.24316 3.473306 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 26.02021 3.258874 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 14.77443 2.692898 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 5.981112 1.788606 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 10.28315 2.330506 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 10.27053 2.329278 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 15.03774 2.710563 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 10.20710 2.323084 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 5.471238 1.699505 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 5.936691 1. 781152 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 17.07262 2.837476 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 24.46603 3.197286 0.0000000 0.0000000
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POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE
(continued)
77.00000 10.72421 2.372503 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 9.499157 2.251203 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 8.305579 2.116927 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 10.06994 2.309554 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 14.96394 2.705643 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 12.96143 2.561978 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 29.00208 3.367368 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 7.688789 2.039763 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 2.663669 0.9797046 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 6.079680 1.804952 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 6.251009 1.832743 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 3.100160 1.131454 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 27.83951 3.326456 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 8.581592 2.149619 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 30.35834 3.413071 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 13.84682 2.628056 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 9.389701 2.239613 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 26.76509 3.287098 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 9.454924 2.246536 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 11.60699 2.451607 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 18.56459 2.921256 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 14.28117 2.658942 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 15.70913 2.754242 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 13.66038 2.614499 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 9.328863 2.233113 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 7.159221 1.968401 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 8.313782 2.117915 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 3.115066 1.136250 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 4.534688 1.511756 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 6.011133 1.793613 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 1.539684 0.4315771 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 1.501281 0.4063185 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 4.246753 1.446155 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 10.80516 2.380024 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 2.693820 0.9909604 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 6.576580 1.883515 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 5.842311 1. 765126 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 44.68198 3.799570 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 31 .12773 3.438099 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 30.09897 3.404491 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 24.68851 3.206338 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 14.65736 2.684942 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 17.95441 2.887836 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 9.602381 2.262011 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 9.422865 2.243139 0.0000000 0.0000000
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POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-W工SE
AUTOREGRESSIVE
(continued)
72.00000 15.30725 2.728327 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 11.69064 2.458789 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 9.988364 2.301421 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 12.47900 2.524047 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 6.016594 1.794521 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 7.342737 1.993712 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 5.779328 1.754287 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 4.132283 1.418830 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 4.066909 1.402883 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 11.23619 2.419140 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 5.869647 1.769794 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 7.022531 1.949124 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 6.491441 1.870485 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 6.345814 1.847795 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 11.05964 2.403302 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 10.16819 2.319265 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 6.005925 1.792746 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 40.55123 3.702566 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 17.60212 2.868019 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 5.344021 1.675978 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 7.978776 2.076785 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 17.45981 2.859902 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 3.128911 1.140685 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 9.782534 2.280599 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 27.90190 3.328695 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 25.56760 3.241326 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 11.26888 2.422045 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 7.854812 2.061126 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 8.077642 2.089100 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 3.897131 1.360241 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 7.634171 2.032634 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 6.468975 1.867018 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 3.748927 1.321470 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 3.634210 1.290392 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 22.00640 3.091333 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 3.728297 1.315951 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 6.652895 1.895052 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 12.48120 2.524224 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 8.400538 2.128296 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 3.935451 1.370025 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 4.787633 1.566036 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 9.708090 2.272960 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 31.27259 3.442742 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 18.69176 2.928083 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 12.96284 2.562087 0.0000000 0.0000000
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POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND T工ME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE
(continued)
67.00000 14.99116 2.707460 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 13.09140 2.571956 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 14.78948 2.693916 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 20.60000 3.025291 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 15.30633 2.728267 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 6.702188 1.902434 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 6.365615 1.850911 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 11.98863 2.483958 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 8.251506 2.110396 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 3.055796 1.117040 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 6.468473 1.866940 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 6.824844 1.920569 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 13.68466 2.616276 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 2.274956 0.8219606 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 10.03731 2.306310 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 7.313987 1.989789 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 8.030322 2.083225 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 5.650500 1. 731744 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 3.013065 1.102958 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 10.49670 2.351061 1.000000 7.000000
87.00000 9.596008 2.261347 1.000000 8.000000
88.00000 8.235943 2.108508 1.000000 9.000000
64.00000 25.80416 3.250536 0.0000000 0.0000000
65.00000 17.35728 2.854012 0.0000000 0.0000000
66.00000 12.13560 2.496143 0.0000000 0.0000000
67.00000 13.23271 2.582692 0.0000000 0.0000000
68.00000 9.653721 2.267343 0.0000000 0.0000000
69.00000 11.52158 2.444222 0.0000000 0.0000000
70.00000 12.78667 2.548403 0.0000000 0.0000000
71.00000 8.893764 2.185350 0.0000000 0.0000000
72.00000 13.35292 2.591735 0.0000000 0.0000000
73.00000 4.899095 1.589050 0.0000000 0.0000000
74.00000 13.00896 2.565638 0.0000000 0.0000000
75.00000 13.38540 2.594165 0.0000000 0.0000000
76.00000 1.644672 0.4975409 0.0000000 0.0000000
77.00000 4.860000 1.581038 0.0000000 0.0000000
78.00000 3.333294 1.203961 0.0000000 0.0000000
79.00000 5.006684 1.610774 0.0000000 0.0000000
80.00000 3.904191 1.362051 1.000000 1.000000
81.00000 4.629062 1.532354 1.000000 2.000000
82.00000 10.08265 2.310816 1.000000 3.000000
83.00000 14.56611 2.678698 1.000000 4.000000
84.00000 4.533770 1.511554 1.000000 5.000000
85.00000 4.288532 1.455945 1.000000 6.000000
86.00000 8.360435 2.123510 1.000000 7.000000
APPEND工X G
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POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE
(cont inued)
POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES ESTIMATION
8 CROSS-SECTIONS AND 25 TIME-PERIODS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93










CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
-0.5131 -0.58098 -1.8841
0.6731 0.00000 2.8827
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3046 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9277
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.84





















DEPENDENT VARIABLE m LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE m 0.4021 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9431
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.58





















DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE m 0.4054 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9438
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE 률 167.57
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.202
PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
























POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND T工ME-W工SE
AUTOREGRESSIVE W工TH ZERO DUMMY
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APPENDIX H
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDAST 工C AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE WITH ZERO DUMMY
COMMAND F工LE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \agrzd.doc
sample 1 125
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y»/hours
* generate zero dummy for crate = 0
genr zerodum = dum (.001 - crate)
* generate modified rate with ones where there were zeroes
genr moderate = crate + zerodum
* generate log of the modified rate
genr lnmodrat = log(modcrate)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d * (year - 79)
print year crate zerodum moderate lnmodrat d
pool lnmodrat year zerodum
pool lnmodrat year zerodum d
pool lnmodrat year zerodum timedum








POOLED CROSS-SECT工ONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
OUTPUTF표E
UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d: \shazam\d\£1 \agrzd.doc
8 VARIABLES AND 125 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YR CRATE ZERODUM MODCRATE LNMODRAT D
64 19.26056 0.00 19.26056 2.958059 0.00
65 20.43303 0.00 20.43303 3.017153 0.00
66 15.44391 0.00 15.44391 2.737215 0.00
67 5.544497 0.00 5.544497 1.712806 0.00
68 9.698537 0.00 9.698537 2.271975 0.00
69 1.569051 0.00 1.569051 0.4504708 0.00
70 8.928877 0.00 8.928877 2.189291 0.00
71 15.18077 0.00 15.18077 2.720030 0.00
72 6.225574 0.00 6.225574 1.828666 0.00
73 10.58809 0.00 10.58809 2.359730 0.00
74 9.770125 0.00 9.770125 2.279329 0.00
75 9.524959 0.00 9.524959 2.253916 0.00
76 4.572404 0.00 4.572404 1.520039 0.00
77 5.956458 0.00 5.956458 1.784476 0.00
78 5.811799 0.00 5.811799 1.759890 0.00
79 5.349396 0.00 5.349396 1.676984 0.00
80 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0
81 4.914263 0.00 4.914263 1.592142 1. 0
82 4.844727 0.00 4.844727 1.577891 1. 0
83 9.104842 0.00 9.104842 2.208806 1. 0
84 6.667938 0.00 6.667938 1.897311 1. 0
85 10.47889 0.00 10.47889 2.349362 1. 0
86 4.228071 0.00 4.228071 1.441746 1. 0
87 5.134278 0.00 5.134278 1.635939 1. 0
88 6.731413 0.00 6.731413 1.906785 1. 0
64 23.19960 0.00 23.19960 3.144135 0.00
65 4.290796 0.00 4.290796 1.456472 0.00
66 26.56355 0.00 26.56355 3.279540 0.00
67 10.38511 0.00 10.38511 2.340373 0.00
68 6.259801 0.00 6.259801 1.834148 0.00
69 24.08858 0.00 24.08858 3.181738 0.00
70 7.091193 0.00 7.091193 1.958854 0.00
71 9.285590 0.00 9.285590 2.228464 0.00
72 16.50185 0.00 16.50185 2.803473 0.00
73 12.49603 0.00 12.49603 2.525411 0.00
74 13.74549 0.00 13.74549 2.620711 0.00
75 11.70889 0.00 11.70889 2.460349 0.00
76 7.463090 0.00 7.463090 2.009970 0.00
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POOLED CROSS-SECT工ON따JLY HETEROSKEDAST 工C AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE W工TH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
77 5.369416 0.00 5.369416 1.680719 0.00
78 6.651026 0.00 6.651026 1.894771 0.00
79 1 .557533 0.00 1.557533 0.4431031 0.00
80 3.023125 0.00 3.023125 1.106291 1. 0
81 4.508349 0.00 4.508349 1.505931 1. 0
82 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0
83 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0
84 2.831169 0.00 2.831169 1.040690 1. 0
85 9.454515 0.00 9.454515 2.246492 1. 0
86 1.346910 0.00 1.346910 0.2978132 1. 0
87 5.637069 0.00 5.637069 1.729364 1. 0
88 5.007695 0.00 5.007695 1.610976 1. 0
64 42.19964 0.00 42.19964 3.742412 0.00
65 28.73329 0.00 28.73329 3.358056 0.00
66 27.36270 0.00 27.36270 3.309181 0.00
67 22.63114 0.00 22.63114 3.119327 0.00
68 12.82519 0.00 12.82519 2.551411 0.00
69 16.32219 0.00 16.32219 2.792525 0.00
70 8.001984 0.00 8.001984 2.079690 0.00
71 7.852388 0.00 7.852388 2.060818 0.00
72 13.77653 0.00 13.77653 2.622966 0.00
73 10.22931 0.00 10.22931 2.325257 0.00
74 8.323636 0.00 8.323636 2.119099 0.00
75 10.91913 0.00 10.91913 2.390516 0.00
76 4.512445 0.00 4.512445 1.506839 0.00
77 5.874190 0.00 5.874190 1.770568 0.00
78 4.334496 0.00 4.334496 1.466605 0.00
79 2.754855 0.00 2.754855 1.013365 0.00
80 2.711273 0.00 2.711273 0.9974181 1. 0
81 9.831668 0.00 9.831668 2.285609 1. 0
82 4.402235 0.00 4.402235 1.482112 1. 0
83 5.618025 0.00 5.618025 1.725980 1. 0
84 5.193153 0.00 5.193153 1.647341 1. 0
85 5.076651 0.00 5.076651 1.624652 1. 0
86 9.830788 0.00 9.830788 2.285519 1. 0
87 8.897170 0.00 8.897170 2.185733 1. 0
88 4.504444 0.00 4.504444 1.505064 1. 0
64 22.93703 0.00 22.93703 3.132753 0.00
65 14.87767 0.00 14.87767 2.699861 0.00
66 9.708479 0.00 9.708479 2.273000 0.00
67 11.34233 0.00 11.34233 2.428541 0.00
68 8.044768 0.00 8.044768 2.085022 0.00
69 10.08139 0.00 10.08139 2.310691 0.00
70 11.36593 0.00 11.36593 2.430620 0.00
71 7.411470 0.00 7.411470 2.003029 0.00
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APPENDIX H
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
72 11.86926 。 .00 11.86926 2.473952 0.00
73 3.266063 0.00 3.266063 1 .183585 0.00
74 11.38284 c.oo 11.38284 2.432107 0.00
75 11.71223 0.00 11 .71223 2.460633 0.00
76 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 0.00
77 3.240000 0.00 3.240000 1.175573 0.00
78 1.666647 0.00 1.666647 0.5108140 0.00
79 3.337789 0.00 3.337789 1.205309 0.00
80 1.952096 0.00 1.952096 0.6689034 1. 0
81 2.314531 0.00 2.314531 0.8392070 1. 0
82 7.561989 0.00 7.561989 2.023134 1 .0
83 12.13843 0.00 12.13843 2.496376 1 .0
84 2.266885 0.00 2.266885 0.8184066 1. 0
85 2.144266 0.00 2.144266 0.7627974 1. 0
86 6.270326 0.00 6.270326 1.835828 1. 0
87 3.506422 0.00 3.506422 1.254596 1. 0
88 1.645606 0.00 1.645606 0.4981085 1. 0
64 23.44022 0.00 23.44022 3.154453 0.00
65 13.61260 0.00 13.61260 2.610996 0.00
66 17.27419 0.00 17.27419 2.849214 0.00
67 21.01157 0.00 21.01157 3.045073 0.00
68 14.09827 0.00 14.09827 2.646052 0.00
69 9.338676 0.00 9.338676 2.234165 0.00
70 11 .15222 0.00 11 .15222 2.411638 0.00
71 10.91646 0.00 10.91646 2.390272 0.00
72 4.393113 0.00 4.393113 1.480038 0.00
73 3.302761 0.00 3.302761 1.194759 0.00
74 4.887436 0.00 4.887436 1.586668 0.00
75 6.506147 0.00 6.506147 1.872747 0.00
76 1.231834 0.00 1.231834 0.2085037 0.00
77 4.708248 0.00 4.708248 1.549316 0.00
78 6.476209 0.00 6.476209 1.868135 0.00
79 1.227556 0.00 1.227556 0.2050249 0.00
80 3.257690 0.00 3.257690 1.181018 1. 0
81 3.955837 0.00 3.955837 1.375192 1. 0
82 2.630862 0.00 2.630862 0.9673117 1 .0
83 9.602769 0.00 9.602769 2.262052 1. 0
84 7.402707 0.00 7.402707 2.001846 1 .0
85 2.419743 0.00 2.419743 0.8836614 1. 0
86 4.457436 0.00 4.457436 1.494574 1. 0
87 4.088518 0.00 4.088518 1.408183 1. 0
88 2.496083 0.00 2.496083 0.9147228 1.0
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APPENDIX H
POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND TIME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE W工TH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES ESTIMATION
5 CROSS-SECTIONS AND 25 TIME-PERIODS
125 TOTAL OBSERVATIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 톨 LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE • 0.4813 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8970
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 109.94
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -101.360
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 122 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.63626E-Ol 0.82718E-02 -7.6919 -0.5715 -0.56733 -2.5909
ZERODUM -1.6486 0.27019 -6.1016 -0.4835 -0.35878 -0.28266E-Ol
CONSTANT 6.7576 0.62971 10.731 0.6968 0.00000 3.6207
BUSE R-SQUARE - 0.4856 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9013
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 104.93
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -99.9352
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAl‘E COEFFICIENT ERROR 121 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.86907E-Ol 0.13815E-Ol -6.2908 -0.4964 -0.77492 -3.5389
ZERODUM -1.7429 0.28721 -6.0684 -0.4830 -0.37930 -0.29883E-Ol
D 0.42132 0.20769 2.0286 0.1814 0.25006 0.81267E-Ol
CONSTANT 8.3713 0.99236 8.4358 0.6085 0.00000 4.4854
BUSE R-SQUARE • 0.5541 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9208
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 104.77
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -95.2710
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 121 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.10857 0.12593E-Ol -8.6219 -0.6169 -0.96811 -4.4212
ZERODUM -1.5223 0.27464 -5.5428 -0.4500 -0.33129 -0.26101E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.13126 0.31427E-Ol 4.1768 0.3550 0.46364 0.12659
CONSTANT 9.9248 0.91087 10.896 0.7037 0.00000 5.3177
BUSE R-SQUARE • 0.5535 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9209
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 99.747
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -95.1486
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 120 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.11257 0.13972E-Ol -8.0571 -0.5925 -1.0038 -4.5841
ZERODUM -1.5522 0.28708 -5.4068 -0.4426 -0.33779 -0.26613E-Ol
o 0.11452 0.22232 0.51513 0.0470 0.67974E-Ol 0.22090E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.12419 0.36636E-Ol 3.3897 0.2956 0.43865 0.11977






FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \。pr.doe
sample 1 152
read(11) airline year d totoec y n u hours oprati。
* generate controllable rate
genr oerate = (1000000*(y+1))/hours
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lnoerate = log(oerate)
* generate time sinee deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print year oerate lnoerate d timedum oprati。
219
pool lnoerate year oprati。
pool lnoerate year opratio d
pool lnoerate year opratio timedum








read(11) airline year d totoec y n u hours lagopr
* generate controllable rate
genr oerate = (1000000*(y+1))/hours
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lnoerate = log(oerate)
* generate time sinee deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print year 。erate lnoerate d timedum lagopr
pool lnoerate year lagopr /ncross=8
pool lnoerate year lagopr d /neross=8
pool lnoerate year lagopr timedum /neross=8







UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d: \shazam\d\£1 \。pr.doc
9 VARIABLES AND 152 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YR OCRATE LNOCRATE D TIMEDUM OPRATI。
70 10.41702 2.343441 0.00 0.00 1.013336
71 16.69885 2.815340 0.00 0.00 0.9769582
72 7.781968 2.051809 0.00 0.00 0.9695126
73 12.10068 2.493261 0.00 0.00 1.024519
74 11.39848 2.433480 0.00 0.00 0.9761608
75 11 .11245 2.408066 0.00 0.00 1.015878
76 6.096539 1.807721 0.00 0.00 0.9661233
77 7.445573 2.007620 0.00 0.00 0.9729827
78 7.264749 1.983034 0.00 0.00 0.9644798
79 6.686745 1.900127 0.00 0.00 0.9984729
80 1.441745 0.3658541 1. 0 1. 0 1.030660
81 6.552350 1.879824 1. 0 2.0 0.9889147
82 6.459635 1.865573 1. 0 3.0 1.004587
83 10.62232 2.362957 1. 0 4.0 0.9449481
84 8.001526 2.079632 1. 0 5.0 0.9333518
85 11.64321 2.454723 1. 0 6.0 0.9135595
86 5.285088 1.664889 1. 0 7.0 0.9330558
87 5.989992 1.790090 1. 0 8.0 0.9335834
88 7.479348 2.012146 1. 0 9.0 0.9063228
70 10.27053 2.329278 0.00 0.00 0.9301763
71 15.03774 2.710563 0.00 0.00 0.9084038
72 10.20710 2.323084 0.00 0.00 0.9064261
73 5.471238 1.699505 0.00 0.00 0.9607209
74 5.936691 1.781152 0.00 0.00 0.8977497
75 17.07262 2.837476 0.00 0.00 0.9343404
76 24.46603 3.197286 0.00 0.00 0.9318145
77 10.72421 2.372503 0.00 0.00 0.9319356
78 9.499157 2.251203 0.00 0.00 0.9446996
79 8.305579 2.116927 0.00 0.00 1.022308
80 10.06994 2.309554 1. 0 1.0 1.062655
81 14.96394 2.705643 1.0 2.0 1.055547
82 12.96143 2.561978 1. 0 3.0 1.050567
83 29.00208 3.367368 1. 0 4.0 1.132921
84 7.688789 2.039763 1. 0 5.0 0.9101411
85 2.663669 0.9797046 1. 0 6.0 0.9101889
86 6.079680 1.804952 1. 0 7.0 0.9302108
87 6.251009 1.832743 1. 0 8.0 0.9932102
88 3.100160 1.131454 1.0 9.0 0.9827683
70 9.454924 2.246536 0.00 0.00 0.8780282





72 18.56459 2.921256 0.00 0.00 0.8855433
73 14.28117 2.658942 0.00 0.00 0.8898662
74 15.70913 2.754242 0.00 0.00 0.8797147
75 13.66038 2.614499 0.00 0.00 0.9504106
76 9.328863 2.233113 0.00 0.00 0.9215828
77 7.159221 1.968401 0.00 0.00 0.9069057
78 8.313782 2.117915 0.00 0.00 0.9035657
79 3.115066 1.136250 0.00 0.00 0.9537052
80 4.534688 1.511756 1. 0 1. 0 0.9502776
81 6.011133 1.793613 1. 0 2.0 0.9762623
82 1.539684 0.4315771 1. 0 3.0 1.023665
83 1.501281 0.4063185 1. 0 4.0 1.014649
84 4.246753 1.446155 1. 0 5.0 0.9360994
85 10.80516 2.380024 1. 0 6.0 0.9512033
86 2.693820 0.9909604 1. 0 7.0 0.9499553
87 6.576580 1.883515 1. 0 8.0 0.9287347
88 5.842311 1.765126 1. 0 9.0 0.9290386
70 9.602381 2.262011 0.00 0.00 ·0.9548052
71 9.422865 2.243139 0.00 0.00 0.9659982
72 15.30725 2.728327 0.00 0.00 0.9542277
73 11 .69064 2.458789 0.00 0.00 1 .015489
74 9.988364 2.301421 0.00 0.00 0.9537769
75 12.47900 2.524047 0.00 0.00 0.9960571
76 6.016594 1.794521 0.00 0.00 0.9565586
77 7.342737 1.993712 0.00 0.00 0.9830934
78 5.779328 1.754287 0.00 0.00 0.9593276
79 4.132283 1.418830 0.00 0.00 0.9614558
80 4.066909 1.402883 1. 0 1. 0 0.9994623
81 11.23619 2.419140 1. 0 2.0 1.013401
82 5.869647 1.769794 1. 0 3.0 1.004983
83 7.022531 1.949124 1. 0 4.0 1.025394
84 6.491441 1.870485 1. 0 5.0 0.9565456
85 6.345814 1.847795 1. 0 6.0 0.9539746
86 11.05964 2.403302 1. 0 7.0 0.9856234
87 10.16819 2.319265 1. 0 8.0 0.9869959
88 6.005925 1.792746 1. 0 9.0 1.053866
70 9.782534 2.280599 0.00 0.00 0.8650809
71 27.90190 3.328695 0.00 0.00 0.9570119
72 25.56760 3.241326 0.00 0.00 0.9611554
73 11.26888 2.422045 0.00 0.00 0.9115769
74 7.854812 2.061126 0.00 0.00 0.8982241
75 8.077642 2.089100 0.00 0.00 0.9387390
76 3.897131 1.360241 0.00 0.00 0.8935346
77 7.634171 2.032634 0.00 0.00 0.8998075
78 6.468975 1 .867018 0.00 0.00 0.9144751
79 3.748927 1.321470 0.00 0.00 0.9567365





81 22.00640 3.091333 1. 0 2.0 0.9988829
82 3.728297 1.315951 1. 0 3.0 1 .004236
83 6.652895 1.895052 1.0 4.0 0.9686219
84 12.48120 2.524224 1. 0 5.0 0.9606870
85 8.400538 2.128296 1. 0 6.0 0.9712254
86 3.935451 1.370025 1. 0 7.0 0.9583825
87 4.787633 1.566036 1.0 8.0 0.9595731
88 9.708090 2.272960 1 .0 9.0 0.9649883
70 20.60000 3.025291 0.00 0.00 1.026581
71 15.30633 2.728267 0.00 0.00 1.013768
72 6.702188 1.902434 0.00 0.00 1.001487
73 6.365615 1.850911 0.00 0.00 1.001192
74 11 .98863 2.483958 0.00 0.00 1.062088
75 8.251506 2.110396 0.00 0.00 1.020982
76 3.055796 1.117040 0.00 0.00 0.9917985
77 6.468473 1 .866940 0.00 0.00 0.9542797
78 6.824844 1.920569 0.00 0.00 0.9370113
79 13.68466 2.616276 0.00 0.00 0.9720072
80 2.274956 0.8219606 1. 0 1. 0 1.035619
81 10.03731 2.306310 1. 0 2.0 1.105263
82 7.313987 1.989789 1. 0 3.0 1.107374
83 8.030322 2.083225 1. 0 4.0 0.9962797
84 5.650500 1.731744 1. 0 5.0 1.039986
85 3.013065 1.102958 1. 0 6.0 1.065752
86 10.49670 2.351061 1. 0 7.0 1.136255
87 9.596008 2.261347 1. 0 8.0 1 .054600
88 8.235943 2.108508 1. 0 9.0 1.029308
70 12.78667 2.548403 0.00 0.00 1.073206
71 8.893764 2.185350 0.00 0.00 0.9880938
72 13.35292 2.591735 0.00 0.00 0.9470673
73 4.899095 1.589050 0.00 0.00 0.9522793
74 13.00896 2.565638 0.00 0.00 1.010386
75 13.38540 2.594165 0.00 0.00 1 .045252
76 1.644672 0.4975409 0.00 0.00 0.9738675
77 4.860000 1.581038 0.00 0.00 0.9816897
78 3.333294 1.203961 0.00 0.00 0.9801738
79 5.006684 1.610774 0.00 0.00 1.015234
80 3.904191 1.362051 1. 0 1.0 1.010865
81 4.629062 1.532354 1. 0 2.0 0.9988842
82 10.08265 2.310816 1.0 3.0 1.032190
83 14.56611 2.678698 1. 0 4.0 1.019582
84 4.533770 1.511554 1. 0 5.0 0.9793932
85 4.288532 1.455945 1. 0 6.0 1.016468
86 8.360435 2.123510 1. 0 7.0 1.023801
87 5.259633 1.660061 1.0 8.0 0.9407275
88 3.291211 1.191256 1.0 9.0 0.9405159





71 12.00810 2.485582 0.00 0.00 0.9772700
72 5.491392 1.703182 0.00 0.00 0.9560165
73 4.403681 1.482441 0.00 0.00 0.9226813
74 6.109295 1.809811 0.00 0.00 0.9204581
75 7.807376 2.055069 0.00 0.00 1.002413
76 2.463667 0.9016509 0.00 0.00 0.9870916
77 5.885309 1.772459 0.00 0.00 0.9728370
78 7.555577 2.022286 0.00 0.00 0.9178491
79 2.455111 0.8981721 0.00 0.00 1.073398
80 4.343586 1.468700 1. 0 1. 0 1.015533
81 5.274449 1.662874 1.0 2.0 1.032823
82 3.946294 1.372777 1. 0 3.0 1.014857
83 10.80312 2.379835 1. 0 4.0 0.9711791
84 8.460237 2.135377 1. 0 5.0 0.9097885
85 3.629615 1.289127 1. 0 6.0 1.066666
86 5.348924 1.676895 1. 0 7.0 1.001496
87 4.906222 1.590504 1. 0 8.0 0.9807680





POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES ESTIMATION
8 CROSS-SECTIONS AND 19 TIME-PERIODS
152 TOTAL OBSERVATIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE - 0.0894 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE - 0.9126
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 127.91
LOG OP’ THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION= -111.560
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 149 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.34749E-Ol 0.90833E-02 -3.8256 -0.2991 -0.32752 -1.3859
OPRATIO 0.43557 0.86916 0.50114 0.0410 0.38967E-Ol 0.21473
CONSTANT 4.3062 1.0405 4.1385 0.3211 0.00000 2.1740
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.0995 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9174
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 119.91
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -111.077
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 148 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.49431E-Ol 0.16293E-Ol -3.0339 -0.2420 -0.46590 -1.9715
OPRATIO 0.14604 0.88790 0.16448 0.0135 0.13065E-Ol 0.71995E-Ol
o 0.19647 0.18033 1.0895 0.0892 0.16881 0.46983E-Ol
CONSTANT 5.6563 1.5764 3.5880 0.2829 0.00000 2.8556
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE - 0.2234 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9451
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 119.60
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -102.781
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 148 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.10124 0.16219E-Ol -6.2419 -0.4565 -0.95419 -4.0377
OPRATIO 0.50828 0.78862 0.64452 0.0529 0.45472E-Ol 0.25057
TIMEDUM 0.13604 0.28809E-Ol 4.7222 0.3619 0.71739 0.16267
CONSTANT 9.1719 1.3629 6.7295 0.4840 0.00000 4.6305
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2256 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9453
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 111.61
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -102.688
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 147 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.10593 0.18790E-01 -5.6374 -0.4216 -0.99838 -4.2247
OPRATIO 0.40417 0.82072 0.49246 0.0406 0.36157E-Ol 0.19925
D 0.77962E-Ol 0.16211 0.48092 0.0396 0.66986E-Ol 0.18644E-01
TIMEDUM 0.13330 0.29463E-Ol 4.5244 0.3496 0.70294 0.15939





UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d: \shazam\d\£1 \lopr.doc
9 VARIABLES AND 144 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR OCRATE LNOCRATE D TIMEDUM LAGOPR
71 16.69885 2.815340 0.00 O. 1.013336
72 7.781968 2.051809 0.00 O. 0.9769582
73 12.10068 2.493261 0.00 O. 0.9695126
74 11.39848 2.433480 0.00 O. 1.024519
75 11.11245 2.408066 0.00 O. 0.9761608
76 6.096539 1.807721 0.00 O. 1.015878
77 7.445573 2.007620 0.00 O. 0.9661233
78 7.264749 1.983034 0.00 O. 0.9729827
79 6.686745 1.900127 0.00 O. 0.9644798
80 1.441745 0.3658541 1. 0 0.9984729
81 6.552350 1.879824 1.0 2 1.030660
82 6.459635 1.865573 1.0 3 0.9889147
83 10.62232 2.362957 1 .0 4 1.004587
84 8.001526 2.079632 1. 0 5 0.9449481
85 11 .64321 2.454723 1 .0 6 0.9333518
86 5.285088 1 .664889 1 .0 7 0.9135595
87 5.989992 1.790090 1. 0 8 0.9330558
88 7.479348 2.012146 1. 0 9 0.9335834
71 15.03774 2.710563 0.00 O. 0.9301763
72 10.20710 2.323084 0.00 O. 0.9084038
73 5.471238 1.699505 0.00 O. 0.9064261
74 5.936691 1.781152 0.00 O. 0.9607209
75 17.07262 2.837476 0.00 O. 0.8977497
76 24.46603 3.197286 0.00 O. 0.9343404
77 10.72421 2.372503 0.00 O. 0.9318145
78 9.499157 2.251203 0.00 O. 0.9319356
79 8.305579 2.116927 0.00 O. 0.9446996
80 10.06994 2.309554 1. 0 1.022308
81 14.96394 2.705643 1.0 2 1.062655
82 12.96143 2.561978 1.0 3 1.055547
83 29.00208 3.367368 1.0 4 1.050567
84 7.688789 2.039763 1. 0 5 1.132921
85 2.663669 0.9797046 1.0 6 0.9101411
86 6.079680 1.804952 1. 0 7 0.9101889
87 6.251009 1.832743 1.0 8 0.9302108
88 3.100160 1. 131454 1.0 9 0.9932102
71 11.60699 2.451607 0.00 O. 0.8780282
72 18.56459 2.921256 0.00 O. 0.9103325
73 14.28117 2.658942 0.00 O. 0.8855433
74 15.70913 2.754242 0.00 O. 0.8898662
75 13.66038 2.614499 0.00 O. 0.8797147





77 7.159221 1 .968401 0.00 o. 0.9215828
78 8.313782 2.117915 0.00 o. 0.9069057
79 3.115066 1.136250 0.00 o. 0.9035657
80 4.534688 1.511756 1. 0 0.9537052
81 6.011133 1 .793613 1. 0 2 0.9502776
82 1.539684 0.4315771 1. 0 3 0.9762623
83 1.501281 0.4063185 1. 0 4 1.023665
84 4.246753 1.446155 1. 0 5 1.014649
85 10.80516 2.380024 1. 0 6 0.9360994
86 2.693820 0.9909604 1. 0 7 0.9512033
87 6.576580 1.883515 1. 0 8 0.9499553
88 5.842311 1.765126 1. 0 9 0.9287347
71 9.422865 2.243139 0.00 o. 0.9548052
72 15.30725 2.728327 0.00 o. 0.9659982
73 11.69064 2.458789 0.00 o. 0.9542277
74 9.988364 2.301421 0.00 o. 1.015489
75 12.47900 2.524047 0.00 o. 0.9537769
76 6.016594 1. 794521 0.00 o. 0.9960571
77 7.342737 1.993712 0.00 o. 0.9565586
78 5.779328 1.754287 0.00 o. 0.9830934
79 4.132283 1.418830 0.00 o. 0.9593276
80 4.066909 1.402883 1. 0 0.9614558
81 11.23619 2.419140 1. 0 2 0.9994623
82 5.869647 1.769794 1. 0 3 1.013401
83 7.022531 1.949124 1. 0 4 1.004983
84 6.491441 1 .870485 1. 0 5 1.025394
85 6.345814 1.847795 1. 0 6 0.9565456
86 11.05964 2.403302 1. 0 7 0.9539746
87 10.16819 2.319265 1. 0 8 0.9856234
88 6.005925 1 .792746 1. 0 9 0.9869959
71 27.90190 3.328695 0.00 o. 0.8650809
72 25.56760 3.241326 0.00 o. 0.9570119
73 11.26888 2.422045 0.00 o. 0.9611554
74 7.854812 2.061126 0.00 o. 0.9115769
75 8.077642 2.089100 0.00 o. 0.8982241
76 3.897131 1.360241 0.00 o. 0.9387390
77 7.634171 2.032634 0.00 o. 0.8935346
78 6.468975 1.867018 0.00 o. 0.8998075
79 3.748927 1.321470 0.00 o. 0.9144751
80 3.634210 1.290392 1. 0 0.9567365
81 22.00640 3.091333 1. 0 2 1.014600
82 3.728297 1.315951 1. 0 3 0.9988829
83 6.652895 1.895052 1. 0 4 1.004236
84 12.48120 2.524224 1. 0 5 0.9686219
85 8.400538 2.128296 1. 0 6 0.9606870
86 3.935451 1.370025 1. 0 7 0.9712254





88 9.708090 2.272960 1. 0 9 0.9595731
71 15.30633 2.728267 0.00 O. 1.026581
72 6.702188 1.902434 0.00 O. 1.013768
73 6.365615 1. 850911 0.00 O. 1.001487
74 11.98863 2.483958 0.00 O. 1.001192
75 8.251506 2.110396 0.00 O. 1.062088
76 3.055796 1.117040 0.00 O. 1.020982
77 6.468473 1.866940 0.00 O. 0.9917985
78 6.824844 1.920569 0.00 O. 0.9542797
79 13.68466 2.616276 0.00 O. 0.9370113
80 2.274956 0.8219606 1. 0 0.9720072
81 10.03731 2.306310 1. 0 2 1.035619
82 7.313987 1.989789 1. 0 3 1.105263
83 8.030322 2.083225 1. 0 4 1.107374
84 5.650500 1.731744 1. 0 5 0.9962797
85 3.013065 1. 102958 1. 0 6 1.039986
86 10.49670 2.351061 1. 0 7 1.065752
87 9.596008 2.261347 1. 0 8 1.136255
88 8.235943 2.108508 1. 0 9 1.054600
71 8.893764 2.185350 0.00 O. 1.073206
72 13.35292 2.591735 0.00 O. 0.9880938
73 4.899095 1.589050 0.00 O. 0.9470673
74 13.00896 2.565638 0.00 O. 0.9522793
75 13.38540 2.594165 0.00 O. 1.010386
76 1.644672 0.4975409 0.00 O. 1.045252
77 4.860000 1. 581 038 0.00 O. 0.9738675
78 3.333294 1.203961 0.00 O. 0.9816897
79 5.006684 1.610774 0.00 O. 0.9801738
80 3.904191 1.362051 1. 0 1.015234
81 4.629062 1.532354 1. 0 2 1.010865
82 10.08265 2.310816 1. 0 3 0.9988842
83 14.56611 2.678698 1. 0 4 1.032190
84 4.533770 1.511554 1. 0 5 1.019582
85 4.288532 1.455945 1. 0 6 0.9793932
86 8.360435 2.123510 1. 0 7 1.016468
87 5.259633 1.660061 1. 0 8 1 .023801
88 3.291211 1 .191256 1. 0 9 0.9407275
71 12.00810 2.485582 0.00 O. 1 .013977
72 5.491392 1.703182 0.00 O. 0.9772700
73 4.403681 1.482441 0.00 O. 0.9560165
74 6.109295 1.809811 0.00 O. 0.9226813
75 7.807376 2.055069 0.00 O. 0.9204581
76 2.463667 0.9016509 0.00 O. 1.002413
77 5.885309 1.772459 0.00 O. 0.9870916
78 7.555577 2.022286 0.00 O. 0.9728370
79 2.455111 0.8981721 0.00 O. 0.9178491




































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE a LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE - 0.0639 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE - 0.9122
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 119.90
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -108.100
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 141 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.30378E-Ol 0.98058E-02 -3.0980 -0.2524 -0.27001 -1.2352
LAGOPR 0.31373 0.89691 0.34979 0.0294 0.27993E-Ol 0.15678
CONSTANT 4.0650 1.0783 3.7699 0.3026 0.00000 2.0791
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 톨 LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.0714 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9151
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 111.88
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -107.777
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 140 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.44329E-Ol 0.17929E-Ol -2.4724 -0.2045 -0.39401 -1.8025
LAGOPR 0.24078E-Ol 0.94346 0.25521E-Ol 0.0022 0.21484E-02 0.12033E-Ol
o 0.17554 0.19009 0.92345 0.0778 0.15037 0.44892E-01
CONSTANT 5.3709 1.7510 3.0673 0.2509 0.00000 2.7470
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2075 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9445
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 111.51
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -99.4537
VAR工ABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 140 OF . CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.10990 0.18670E-Ol -5.8862 -0.4454 -0.97680 -4.4686
LAGOPR 0.56560E-Ol 0.83008 0.68138E-Ol 0.0058 0.50466E-02 0.28264E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.14870 0.31214E-Ol 4.7639 0.3735 0.78865 0.19014
CONSTANT 10.287 1.5870 6.4823 0.4805 0.00000 5.2616
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2168 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9461
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 103.50
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -99.0964
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 139 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.12075 0.21893E-Ol -5.5157 -0.4238 -1.0733 -4.9101
LAGOPR -0.16927 0.87296 -0.19390 -0.0164 -0.15103E-01 -0.84588E-01
o 0.14440 0.16556 0.87222 0.0738 0.12370 0.36929E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.14700 0.31103E-Ol 4.7263 0.3721 0.77963 0.18797
CONSTANT 11.305 1.9267 5.8673 0.4455 0.00000 5.7820
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COMMAND FILE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \。przd.doc
sample 1 95
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours oprati。
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = «1000000*y»/hours
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
* generate zero dummy for crate = 0
genr zerodum = dum (.001 - crate)
* generate modified rate with ones where there were zeroes
genr moderate = crate + zerodum
* generate log of the modified rate
genr lnmodrat = log(modcrate)






pool lnmodrat year zerodum oprati。
pool lnmodrat year zerodum opratio d
pool lnmodrat year zerodum oprati。




OPERAT工NG RATIO WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \loprzd.doc
sample 1 90
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours lagopr
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = ((1000000*y»/hours
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
* generate zero dummy for crate = 0
genr zerodum = dum (.001 - crate)
* generate modified rate with ones where there were zeroes
genr moderate = crate + zerodum
* generate log of the modified rate
genr lnrnodrat = log(modcrate)





pool lnmodrat year zerodum lagopr
pool lnmodrat year zerodum lagopr d
pool lnmodrat year zerodum lagopr
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(continued)
OUTPUTFILE
UNIT 11 IS NOW ASS工GNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\ 。przd.doc
9 VARIABLES AND 95 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YR CRATE ZERODUM MODCRATE LNMODRAT D TIMEDUM OPRATIO
70 8.928877 0.00 8.928877 2.189291 0.00 0.00 1.013336
71 15.18077 0.00 15.18077 2.720030 0.00 0.00 0.9769582
72 6.225574 0.00 6.225574 1.828666 0.00 0.00 0.9695126
73 10.58809 0.00 10.58809 2.359730 0.00 0.00 1.024519
74 9.770125 0.00 9.770125 2.279329 0.00 0.00 0.9761608
75 9.524959 0.00 9.524959 2.253916 0.00 0.00 1.015878
76 4.572404 0.00 4.572404 1.520039 0.00 0.00 0.9661233
77 5.956458 0.00 5.956458 1.784476 0.00 0.00 0.9729827
78 5.811799 0.00 5.811799 1.759890 0.00 0.00 0.9644798
79 5.349396 0.00 5.349396 1.676984 0.00 0.00 0.9984729
80 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0 1. 0 1.030660
81 4.914263 0.00 4.914263 1.592142 1. 0 2.0 0.9889147
82 4.844727 0.00 4.844727 1 .577891 1. 0 3.0 1.004587
83 9.104842 0.00 9.104842 2.208806 1. 0 4.0 0.9449481
84 6.667938 0.00 6.667938 1.897311 1. 0 5.0 0.9333518
85 10.47889 0.00 10.47889 2.349362 1. 0 6.0 0.9135595
86 4.228071 0.00 4.228071 1.441746 1. 0 7.0 0.9330558
87 5.134278 0.00 5.134278 1.635939 1. 0 8.0 0.9335834
88 6.731413 0.00 6.731413 1.906785 1. 0 9.0 0.9063228
70 7.091193 0.00 7.091193 1.958854 0.00 0.00 0.8780282
71 9.285590 0.00 9.285590 2.228464 0.00 0.00 0.9103325
72 16.50185 0.00 16.50185 2.803473 0.00 0.00 0.8855433
73 12.49603 0.00 12.49603 2.525411 0.00 0.00 0.8898662
74 13.74549 0.00 13.74549 2.620711 0.00 0.00 0.8797147
75 11.70889 0.00 11.70889 2.460349 0.00 0.00 0.9504106
76 7.463090 0.00 7.463090 2.009970 0.00 0.00 0.9215828
77 5.369416 0.00 5.369416 1.680719 0.00 0.00 0.9069057
78 6.651026 0.00 6.651026 1.894771 0.00 0.00 0.9035657
79 1.557533 0.00 1.557533 0.4431031 0.00 0.00 0.9537052
80 3.023125 0.00 3.023125 1.106291 1. 0 1. 0 0.9502776
81 4.508349 0.00 4.508349 1.505931 1. 0 2.0 0.9762623
82 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0 3.0 1.023665
83 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1. 0 4.0 1.014649
84 2.831169 0.00 2.831169 1.040690 1. 0 5.0 0.9360994
85 9.454515 0.00 9.454515 2.246492 1. 0 6.0 0.9512033
86 1.346910 0.00 1.346910 0.2978132 1. 0 7.0 0.9499553
87 5.637069 0.00 5.637069 1.729364 1. 0 8.0 0.9287347
88 5.007695 0.00 5.007695 1.610976 1. 0 9.0 0.9290386
234
APPEND工X J
OPERATING RATIO WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
70 8.001984 0.00 8.001984 2.079690 0.00 0.00 0.9548052
71 7.852388 0.00 7.852388 2.060818 0.00 0.00 0.9659982
72 13.77653 0.00 13.77653 2.622966 0.00 0.00 0.9542277
73 10.22931 0.00 10.22931 2.325257 0.00 0.00 1 .015489
74 8.323636 0.00 8.323636 2.119099 0.00 0.00 0.9537769
75 10.91913 0.00 10.91913 2.390516 0.00 0.00 0.9960571
76 4.512445 0.00 4.512445 1.506839 0.00 0.00 0.9565586
77 5.874190 0.00 5.874190 1.770568 0.00 0.00 0.9830934
78 4.334496 0.00 4.334496 1.466605 0.00 0.00 0.9593276
79 2.754855 0.00 2.754855 1.013365 0.00 0.00 0.9614558
80 2.711273 0.00 2.711273 0.9974181 1. 0 1. 0 0.9994623
81 9.831668 0.00 9.831668 2.285609 1. 0 2.0 1 .013401
82 4.402235 0.00 4.402235 1.482112 1. 0 3.0 1.004983
83 5.618025 0.00 5.618025 1.725980 1. 0 4.0 1.025394
84 5.193153 0.00 5.193153 1.647341 1. 0 5.0 0.9565456
85 5.076651 0.00 5.076651 1.624652 1. 0 6.0 0.9539746
86 9.830788 0.00 9.830788 2.285519 1. 0 7.0 0.9856234
87 8.897170 0.00 8.897170 2.185733 1 .0 8.0 0.9869959
88 4.504444 0.00 4.504444 1.505064 1 .0 9.0 1.053866
70 11.36593 0.00 11.36593 2.430620 0.00 0.00 1.073206
71 7.411470 0.00 7.411470 2.003029 0.00 0.00 0.9880938
72 11.86926 0.00 11.86926 2.473952 0.00 0.00 0.9470673
73 3.266063 0.00 3.266063 1.183585 0.00 0.00 0.9522793
74 11.38284 0.00 11.38284 2.432107 0.00 0.00 1 .010386
75 11.71223 0.00 11.71223 2.460633 0.00 0.00 1 .045252
76 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 0.00 0.00 0.9738675
77 3.240000 0.00 3.240000 1.175573 0.00 0.00 0.9816897
78 1.666647 0.00 1.666647 0.5108140 0.00 0.00 0.9801738
79 3.337789 0.00 3.337789 1.205309 0.00 0.00 1 .015234
80 1.952096 0.00 1.952096 0.6689034 1 .0 1. 0 1.010865
81 2.314531 0.00 2.314531 0.8392070 1. 0 2.0 0.9988842
82 7.561989 0.00 7.561989 2.023134 1. 0 3.0 1.032190
83 12.13843 0.00 12.13843 2.496376 1. 0 4.0 1.019582
84 2.266885 0.00 2.266885 0.8184066 1. 0 5.0 0.9793932
85 2.144266 0.00 2.144266 0.7627974 1. 0 6.0 1.016468
86 6.270326 0.00 6.270326 1.835828 1. 0 7.0 1 .023801
87 3.506422 0.00 3.506422 1.254596 1. 0 8.0 0.9407275
88 1.645606 0.00 1.645606 0.4981085 1. 0 9.0 0.9405159
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70 11.15222 0.00 11 .15222 2.411638 0.00 0.00 1.013977
71 10.91646 0.00 10.91646 2.390272 0.00 0.00 0.9772700
72 4.393113 0.00 4.393113 1.480038 0.00 0.00 0.9560165
73 3.302761 0.00 3.302761 1.194759 0.00 0.00 0.9226813
74 4.887436 0.00 4.887436 1.586668 0.00 0.00 0.9204581
75 6.506147 0.00 6.506147 1.872747 0.00 0.00 1.002413
76 1.231834 0.00 1.231834 0.2085037 0.00 0.00 0.9870916
77 4.708248 0.00 4.708248 1.549316 0.00 0.00 0.9728370
78 6.476209 0.00 6.476209 1.868135 0.00 0.00 0.9178491
79 1.227556 0.00 1.227556 0.2050249 0.00 0.00 1.073398
80 3.257690 0.00 3.257690 1.181018 1.0 1. 0 1.015533
81 3.955837 0.00 3.955837 1.375192 1.0 2.0 1 .032823
82 2.630862 0.00 2.630862 0.9673117 1. 0 3.0 1.014857
83 9.602769 0.00 9.602769 2.262052 1.0 4.0 0.9711791
84 7.402707 0.00 7.402707 2.001846 1.0 5.0 0.9097885
85 2.419743 0.00 2.419743 0.8836614 1. 0 6.0 1.066666
86 4.457436 0.00 4.457436 1.494574 1.0 7.0 1 .001496
87 4.088518 0.00 4.088518 1.408183 1. 0 8.0 0.9807680
88 2.496083 0.00 2.496083 0.9147228 1. 0 9.0 0.9239948
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POOLED CROSS-SECTION TIME-SERIES ESTIMATION
5 CROSS-SECTIONS AND 19 TIME-PERIODS
95 TOTAL OBSERVATIONS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE a LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4108 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8835
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.81432
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.90240
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 74.103
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE - 1.6270
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -71.2998
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 91 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.44851E-Ol 0.11764E-Ol -3.8127 -0.3711 -0.35292 -2.1777
ZERODUM -1.5886 0.25687 -6.1846 -0.5440 -0.45834 -0.41111E-Ol
OPRATIO -1.6587 1.3227 -1.2540 -0.1303 -0.10421 -0.99242
CONSTANT 6.8885 1.5833 4.3507 0.4150 0.00000 4.2338
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4191 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8932
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 a 0.76733
STANDARD ERROR OF’ THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA 흩 0.87598
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 69.060
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE a 1.6270
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION a -70.3050
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 90 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT ‘ AT MEANS
YEAR -0.71026E-Ol 0.21492E-Ol -3.3048 -0.3290 -0.55887 -3.4486
ZERODUM -1.6732 0.26870 -6.2268 -0.5487 -0.48273 -0.43299E-Ol
OPRATIO -2.1365 1.3245 -1.6130 -0.1676 -0.13422 -1.2783
o 0.35088 0.23857 1.4707 0.1532 0.25168 0.10215
CONSTANT 9.2570 2.1876 4.2315 0.4074 0.00000 5.6895
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4915 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9149
VARIANCE OF’ THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.76529
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA - 0.87481
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 68.876
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1.6270
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -66.1001
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 90 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.11470 0.22970E-Ol -4.9934 -0.46~8 -0.90249 -5.5690
ZERODUM -1.5104 0.24443 -6.1793 -0.5458 -0.43576 -0.39086E-Ol
OPRATIO -0.96362 1.2433 -0.77507 -0.0814 -0.60538E-Ol -0.57653
TIMEDUM 0.14113 0.40888E-Ol 3.4517 0.3419 0.62132 0.20544
CONSTANT 11.392 1.9353 5.8864 0.5272 0.00000 7.0016
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4870 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9163
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.71809
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA 톨 0.84740
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 63.910
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1 .6270
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -65.8931
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 89 OF’ CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.12342 0.25859E-Ol -4.7729 -0.4514 -0.97115 -5.9926
ZERODUM -1.5513 0.25858 -5.9992 -0.5366 -0.44755 -0.40144E-01
OPRATIO -1.2307 1.2821 -0.95991 -0.1012 -0.77315E-01 -0.73631
o 0.17760 0.22902 0.77546 0.0819 0.12739 0.51704E-Ol
TI~mDUM 0.13255 0.42281E-Ol 3.1349 0.3153 0.58351 0.19294
CONSTANT 12.276 2.2478 5.4613 0.5010 0.00000 7.5450
ALL VARIABLES HAVE BEEN DELETED
238
APPEND工χ J
OPERAT工NG RAT工o WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\loprzd.doc
9 VARIABLES AND 90 OBSERVATIONS START工NG AT OBS 1
YR CRATE ZERODUM MODCRATE LNMODRAT D TlMEDUM LAGOPR
71 15.18077 0.00 15.18077 2.720030 0.00 0.00 1.013336
72 6.225574 0.00 6.225574 1.828666 0.00 0.00 0.9769582
73 10.58809 0.00 10.58809 2.359730 0.00 0.00 0.9695126
74 9.770125 0.00 9.770125 2.279329 0.00 0.00 1.024519
75 9.524959 0.00 9.524959 2.253916 0.00 0.00 0.9761608
76 4.572404 0.00 4.572404 1.520039 0.00 0.00 1.015878
77 5.956458 0.00 5.956458 1.784476 0.00 0.00 0.9661233
78 5.811799 0.00 5.811799 1.759890 0.00 0.00 0.9729827
79 5.349396 0.00 5.349396 1 .676984 0.00 0.00 0.9644798
80 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1.0 1. 0 0.9984729
81 4.914263 0.00 4.914263 1.592142 1. 0 2.0 1.030660
82 4.844727 0.00 4.844727 1.577891 1. 0 3.0 0.9889147
83 9.104842 0.00 9.104842 2.208806 1.0 4.0 1.004587
84 6.667938 0.00 6.667938 1.897311 1. 0 5.0 0.9449481
85 10.47889 0.00 10.47889 2.349362 1. 0 6.0 0.9333518
86 4.228071 0.00 4.228071 1.441746 1. 0 7.0 0.9135595
87 5.134278 0.00 5.134278 1.635939 1.0 8.0 0.9330558
88 6.731413 0.00 6.731413 1.906785 1.0 9.0 0.9335834
71 9.285590 0.00 9.285590 2.228464 0.00 0.00 0.8780282
72 16.50185 0.00 16.50185 2.803473 0.00 0.00 0.9103325
73 12.49603 0.00 12.49603 2.525411 0.00 0.00 0.8855433
74 13.74549 0.00 13.74549 2.620711 0.00 0.00 0.8898662
75 11.70889 0.00 11.70889 2.460349 0.00 0.00 0.8797147
76 7.463090 0.00 7.463090 2.009970 0.00 0.00 0.9504106
77 5.369416 0.00 5.369416 1.680719 0.00 0.00 0.9215828
78 6.651026 0.00 6.651026 1.894771 0.00 0.00 0.9069057
79 1.557533 0.00 1.557533 0.4431031 0.00 0.00 0.9035657
80 3.023125 0.00 3.023125 1.106291 1. 0 1. 0 0.9537052
81 4.508349 0.00 4.508349 1.505931 1.0 2.0 0.9502776
82 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 1.0 3.0 0.9762623
83 0.0000000 1 .0 1.000000 0.0000000 1.0 4.0 1.023665
84 2.831169 0.00 2.831169 1 .040690 1. 0 5.0 1.014649
85 9.454515 0.00 9.454515 2.246492 1. 0 6.0 0.9360994
86 1.346910 0.00 1.346910 0.2978132 1. 0 7.0 0.9512033
87 5.637069 0.00 5.637069 1.729364 1.0 8.0 0.9499553
88 5.007695 0.00 5.007695 1.610976 1. 0 9.0 0.9287347
239
APPENDIX J
OPERATING RAT工o WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
71 7.852388 0.00 7.852388 2.060818 0.00 0.00 0.9548052
72 13.77653 0.00 13.77653 2.622966 0.00 0.00 0.9659982
73 10.22931 0.00 10.22931 2.325257 0.00 0.00 0.9542277
74 8.323636 0.00 8.323636 2.119099 0.00 0.00 1.015489
75 10.91913 0.00 10.91913 2.390516 0.00 0.00 0.9537769
76 4.512445 0.00 4.512445 1.506839 0.00 0.00 0.9960571
77 5.874190 0.00 5.874190 1.770568 0.00 0.00 0.9565586
78 4.334496 0.00 4.334496 1.466605 0.00 0.00 0.9830934
79 2.754855 0.00 2.754855 1.013365 0.00 0.00 0.9593276
80 2.711273 0.00 2.711273 0.9974181 1. 0 1. 0 0.9614558
81 9.831668 0.00 9.831668 2.285609 1.0 2.0 0.9994623
82 4.402235 0.00 4.402235 1.482112 1. 0 3.0 1.013401
83 5.618025 0.00 5.618025 1.725980 1. 0 4.0 1.004983
84 5.193153 0.00 5.193153 1.647341 1. 0 5.0 1.025394
85 '5.076651 0.00 5.076651 1.624652 1. 0 6.0 0.9565456
86 9.830788 0.00 9.830788 2.285519 1. 0 7.0 0.9539746
87 8.897170 0.00 8.897170 2.185733 1. 0 8.0 0.9856234
88 4.504444 0.00 4.504444 1.505064 1. 0 9.0 0.9869959
71 7.411470 0.00 7.411470 2.003029 0.00 0.00 1.073206
72 11.86926 0.00 11.86926 2.473952 0.00 0.00 0.9880938
73 3.266063 0.00 3.266063 1.183585 0.00 0.00 0.9470673
74 11 .38284 0.00 11.38284 2.432107 0.00 0.00 0.9522793
75 11 .71223 0.00 11 .71223 2.460633 0.00 0.00 1.010386
76 0.0000000 1. 0 1.000000 0.0000000 0.00 0.00 1.045252
77 3.240000 0.00 3.240000 1.175573 0.00 0.00 0.9738675
78 1.666647 0.00 1.666647 0.5108140 0.00 0.00 0.9816897
79 3.337789 0.00 3.337789 1.205309 0.00 0.00 0.9801738
80 1.952096 0.00 1.952096 0.6689034 1. 0 1. 0 1.015234
81 2.314531 0.00 2.314531 0.8392070 1. 0 2.0 1.010865
82 7.561989 0.00 7.561989 2.023134 1. 0 3.0 0.9988842
83 12.13843 0.00 12.13843 2.496376 1. 0 4.0 1.032190
84 2.266885 0.00 2.266885 0.8184066 1. 0 5.0 1.019582
85 2.144266 0.00 2.144266 0.7627974 1. 0 6.0 0.9793932
86 6.270326 0.00 6.270326 1.835828 1. 0 7.0 1.016468
87 3.506422 0.00 3.506422 1.254596 1.0 8.0 1.023801
88 1.645606 0.00 1.645606 0.4981085 1. 0 9.0 0.9407275
240
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OPERATING RAT工o WITH ZERO DUMMY
(continued)
71 10.91646 0.00 10.91646 2.390272 0.00 0.00 1.013977
72 4.393113 0.00 4.393113 1.480038 0.00 0.00 0.9772700
73 3.302761 0.00 3.302761 1. 194759 0.00 0.00 0.9560165
74 4.887436 0.00 4.887436 1.586668 0.00 0.00 0.9226813
75 6.506147 0.00 6.506147 1.872747 0.00 0.00 0.9204581
76 1.231834 0.00 1.231834 0.2085037 0.00 0.00 1 .002413
77 4.708248 0.00 4.708248 1.549316 0.00 0.00 0.9870916
78 6.476209 0.00 6.476209 1.868135 0.00 0.00 0.9728370
79 1.227556 0.00 1.227556 0.2050249 0.00 0.00 0.9178491
80 3.257690 0.00 3.257690 1.181018 1. 0 1. 0 1.073398
81 3.955837 0.00 3.955837 1.375192 1. 0 2.0 1.015533
82 2.630862 0.00 2.630862 0.9673117 1. 0 3.0 1.032823
83 9.602769 0.00 9.602769 2.262052 1. 0 4.0 1.014857
84 7.402707 0.00 7.402707 2.001846 1. 0 5.0 0.9711791
85 2.419743 0.00 2.419743 0.8836614 1. 0 6.0 0.9097885
86 4.457436 0.00 4.457436 1.494574 1. 0 7.0 1.066666
87 4.088518 0.00 4.088518 1.408183 1. 0 8.0 1.001496
88 2.496083 0.00 2.496083 0.9147228 1. 0 9.0 0.9807680
241
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(continued)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNMODRAT
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3775 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8693
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 69.047
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -70.2680
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 86 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.43520E-Ol 0.13353E-Ol -3.2593 -0.3316 -0.32276 -2.1700
ZERODUM -1.6363 0.26669 -6.1356 -0.5518 -0.48203 -0.45611E-Ol
LAGOPR -0.63141 1.4579 -0.43309 -0.0466 -0.38653E-Ol -0.38600
CONSTANT 5.7859 1.7279 3.3486 0.3396 0.00000 3.6288
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3874 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.8798
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 64.017
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -69.4198
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 85 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.71581E-Ol 0.24639E-Ol -2.9052 -0.3005 -0.53087 -3.5691
ZERODUM -1.7224 0.27709 -6.2159 -0.5590 -0.50739 -0.48010E-Ol
LAGOPR -1.2950 1.5030 -0.86163 -0.0931 -0.79277E-Ol -0.79167
D 0.35907 0.26177 1.3717 0.1472 0.25665 0.11260
CONSTANT 8.4846 2.5834 3.2843 0.3356 0.00000 5.3214
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.5224 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9163
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 63.643
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 톨 -63.1460
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 85 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.14325 0.26149E-Ol -5.4782 -0.5108 -1.0624 -7.1426
ZERODUM -1.5307 0.23492 -6.5156 -0.5771 -0.45092 -0.42667E-Ol
LAGOPR -0.45915 1.2855 -0.35718 -0.0387 -0.28108E-Ol -0.28069
TIMEDUM 0.17957 0.43507E-Ol 4.1273 0.4086 0.79464 0.28156
CONSTANT 13.103 2.1986 5.9599 0.5429 0.00000 8.2181
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.5226 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9195
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 58.672
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION - -62.7964
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 84 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.15612 0.29669E-Ol -5.2621 -0.4979 -1.1579 -7.7844
ZERODUM -1.5868 0.24851 -6.3851 -0.5716 -0.46745 -0.44231E-Ol
LAGOPR -0.85039 1.3469 -0.63135 -0.0687 -0.52058E-Ol -0.51986
D 0.22136 0.23487 0.94248 0.1023 0.15822 0.69418E-Ol
TIMEDUM 0.17213 0.43644E-Ol 3.9440 0.3953 0.76172 0.26989







FILE 11 d:\shazam\d\f1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11) year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr crate = ((1000000*y»/hours
* generate log of the controlable rate
genr lncrate = log(crate)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)



































FILE 11 d:\shazam\d\f1 \fatacc.doc
sample 1 27
read(11) year fatal acc hours
* generate accident rate
genr accrate = (1000000*acc)/hours
* generate log of the accident rate
genr lnaccrat = log(accrate)
* generate deregulation dummy
genr d = dum(year - 79.9)
genr tirnedurn = d*(year - 79)
print year acc accrate lnaccrat hours
。Is lnaccrat year lexactdw
diagnos Irecur siglevel=1
。Is lnaccrat year lexactdw
diagnos Irecur siglevel=5









UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\tot. doc
7 VARIABLES AND 25 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
Y HOURS CRATE LNCRATE YEAR
64.00000 2441185. 26.21678 3.266400 64.00000
45.00000 2691129. 16.72161 2.816702 65.00000
45.00000 2819170. 15.96214 2.770220 66.00000
48.00000 3507054. 13.68670 2.616425 67.00000
43.00000 4015838. 10.70760 2.370954 68.00000
44.00000 4336713. 10.14593 2.317073 69.00000
44.00000 4294706. 10.24517 2.326807 70.00000
48.00000 4224634. 11. 36193 2.430268 71.00000
40.00000 4204233. 9.514221 2.252788 72.00000
30.00000 4346571. 6.901992 1.931810 73.00000
34.00000 3997587. 8.505131 2.140670 74.00000
36.00000 3936489. 9.145205 2.213230 75.00000
14.00000 4024069. 3.479066 1.246764 76.00000
20.00000 4135728. 4.835908 1.576069 77.00000
20.00000 4166439. 4.800262 1 .568671 78.00000
14.00000 4329449. 3.233668 1. 173617 79.00000
9.000000 4439343. 2.027327 0.7067182 80.00000
27.00000 4049954. 6.666742 1.897131 81.00000
15.00000 4016962. 3.734165 1.317524 82.00000
32.00000 4197657. 7.623300 2.031209 83.00000
24.00000 4547810. 5.277265 1.663408 84.00000
25.00000 4744502. 5.269257 1.661889 85.00000
26.00000 5389885. 4.823851 1.573572 86.00000
36.00000 6921046. 5.201526 1.648952 87.00000






25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE m LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.25148
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.013625
R-SQUARE = 0.5997 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED 톨 0.5823
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.14607
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA 흐 0.38219
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.3596
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1.9618
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -10.3853
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.62229E-01 0.10600E-01 -5.8706 -0.7744 -0.77443 -2.4107
CONSTANT 6.6912 0.80922 8.2687 0.8650 0.00000 3.4107
























































RECURSIVE RESIDUALS - SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL = 1 훌
OBS REC-RES CUSUM BOUND LOWER CUSUMSQ UPPER
3 0.16461 0.48425 5.9583 -0.36464 0.00807 0.45160
4 0.88456E-Ol 0.74446 6.4350 -0.32116 0.01039 0.49508
5 0.16565E-02 0.74933 6.9116 -0.27768 0.01040 0.53855
6 0.10095 1.04629 7.3883 -0.23421 0.01343 0.58203
7 0.18855 1.60096 7.8650 -0.19073 0.02401 0.62551
8 0.29946 2.48189 8.3416 -0.14725 0.05070 0.66899
9 0.13345 2.87447 8.8183 -0.10377 0.05600 0.71247
10 -0.88221E-Ol 2.61495 9.2949 -0.06029 0.05832 0.75595
11 0.20651 3.22245 9.7716 -0.01681 0.07101 0.79942
12 0.28914 4.07302 10.2483 0.02666 0.09590 0.84290
13 -0.54136 2.48049 10.7249 0.07014 0.18313 0.88638
14 -0.19627E-Ol 2.42275 11.2016 0.11362 0.18325 0.92986
15 0.74276E-Ol 2.64125 11.6783 0.15710 0.18489 0.97334
16 -0.19585 2.06511 12.1549 0.20058 0.19631 1.01681
17 -0.46636 0.69320 12.6316 0.24405 0.26104 1.06029
18 0.80273 3.05462 13.1083 0.28753 0.45284 1.10377
19 0.21824 3.69663 13.5849 0.33101 0.46702 1.14725
20 0.91376 6.38467 14.0616 0.37449 0.71555 1.19073
21 0.49461 7.83970 14.5383 0.41797 0.78837 1.23421
22 0.48159 9.25640 15.0149 0.46145 0.85740 1.27768
23 0.38946 10.40210 15.4916 0.50492 0.90255 1. 32116
24 0.46130 11.75912 15.9682 0.54840 0.96589 1.36464
25 0.33853 12.75497 16.4449 0.59188 1.00000 1.40812
HARVEY(1981 ,EQUATION 2.10 RECURSIVE T-TEST = 2.6596 WITH 22 D.F.






25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATIST 工C = 1.25148
DURB工N-WATSON PROBABILITY 률 0.013625
R-SQUARE = 0.5997 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.5823
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.14607
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA - 0.38219
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.3596
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1.9618
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -10.3853
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.62229E-01 0.10600E-01 -5.8706 -0.7744 -0.77443 -2.4107
CONSTANT 6.6912 0.80922 8.2687 0.8650 0.00000 3.4107
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 5 CURRENT PAR= 500










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.25148
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.013625
R-SQUARE = 0.5997 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.5823
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.14607
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA - 0.38219
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 3.3596
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1.9618
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -10.3853
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.62229E-Ol 0.10600E-Ol -5.8706 -0.7744 -0.77443 -2.4107
CONSTANT 6.6912 0.80922 8.2687 0.8650 0.00000 3.4107


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\fatacc.doc
4 VARIABLES AND 27 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR ACC ACCRATE LNACCRAT HOURS
61.00000 66.00000 18.05991 2.893695 3654503.
62.00000 47.00000 13.46252 2.599910 3491174.
63.00000 54.00000 14.98240 2.706876 3604228.
64.00000 59.00000 15.63009 2.749198 3774771.
65.00000 65.00000 15.96272 2.770256 4071987.
66.00000 56.00000 13.22944 2.582445 4232982.
67.00000 54.00000 10.96652 2.394847 4924080.
68.00000 56.00000 10.14138 2.316624 5521931.
69.00000 51.00000 8.655431 2.158187 5892254.
70.00000 43.00000 7.438799 2.006709 5780503.
71.00000 43.00000 7.535571 2.019635 5706270.
72.00000 46.00000 8.127948 2.095308 5659485.
73.00000 36.00000 6.103169 1.808808 5898575.
74.00000 43.00000 7.854606 2.061100 5474495.
75.00000 30.00000 5.532335 1.710610 5422665.
76.00000 22.00000 3.937289 1.370492 5587601.
77.00000 20.00000 3.447775 1.237729 5800843.
78.00000 20.00000 3.315791 1.198696 6031743.
79.00000 23.00000 3.432671 1.233339 6700322.
80.00000 15.00000 2.206668 0.7914838 6797578.
81.00000 25.00000 3.804429 1.336166 6571288.
82.00000 15.00000 2.329134 0.8454964 6440163.
83.00000 22.00000 3.308764 1.196575 6649009.
84.00000 12.00000 1.613229 0.4782378 7438497.
85.00000 17.00000 2.139055 0.7603641 7947435.
86.00000 20.00000 2.137459 0.7596176 9356906.






27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC - 1.80983
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.236618
R-SQUARE = 0.9172 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.9138
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.46718E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA· 0.21614
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.1679
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE - 1.7485
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 4.08665
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 DF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.88846E-01 0.53405E-02 -16.636 -0.9577 -0.95768 -3.7601
CONSTANT 8.3231 0.39738 20.945 0.9727 0.00000 4.7601
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 6 CURRENT PAR= 500






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.80983
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.236618
R-SQUARE = 0.9172 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED - 0.9138
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 - 0.46718E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA - 0.21614
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 1.1679
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE - 1.7485
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 4.08665
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.88846E-Ol 0.53405E-02 -16.636 -0.9577 -0.95768 -3.7601















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LNACCRAT
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 1.80983
DURB工N-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.236618
R-SQUARE = 0.9172 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED - 0.9138
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.46718E-01
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.21614
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 1.1679
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 1.7485
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = 4.08665
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO PARTIAL STANDARDIZED ELASTICITY
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 25 OF CORR. COEFFICIENT AT MEANS
YEAR -0.88846E-01 0.53405E-02 -16.636 -0.9577 -0.95768 -3.7601
CONSTANT 8.3231 0.39738 20.945 0.9727 0.00000 4.7601
REQUIRED MEMORY IS PAR= 6 CURRENT PAR= 500


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RUNNING DEREGULAT 工ON DUMMY
COMMAND FILE
F~E 11 d:\shazam\d\f1 \agr.doc
sample 1 200
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controllable rate
genr ocrate = (1000000*(y+1»/hours
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lnocrate = log(ocrate)
print year y hours ocrate lnocrate
*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 74.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 74)



































*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 75.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 75)
print year d timedum
pool lnocrate year
pool lnocrate year d
pool lnocrate year











*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 76.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 76)




































*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 77.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 77)
print year d timedum
pool lnocrate year









*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 78.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr tirnedum = d*(year - 78)











































*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 79.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)














*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 80.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 80)















鋼鋼鋼鋼141i--1*14141li∞∞∞∞pppp /ncross=8/ncross=8timedum /ncross=8d timedum /ncross=8
delete d
delete timedum
*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 81.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 81)
print year d timedum
pool lnocrate year













*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 82.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 82)
print year d timedum
pool lnocrate year









*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 83.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 83)
print year d timedum
pool lnocrate year









*generate dummy for deregulation
genr d = dum(year - 84.9)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 84)







































UNIT 11 IS NOW ASSIGNED TO: d:\shazam\d\£1\agr.doc
8 VARIABLES AND 200 OBSERVATIONS STARTING AT OBS
YEAR Y HOURS 。CRATE LNOCRATE
64.00000 7.000000 363437.0 22.01207 3.091591
65.00000 8.000000 391523.0 22.98716 3.134936
66.00000 7.000000 453253.0 17.65019 2.870746
67.00000 3.000000 541077.0 7.392663 2.000488
68.00000 6.000000 618650.0 1I .31496 2.426126
69.00000 1 .000000 637328.0 3.138102 1 . 143618
70.00000 6.000000 671977.0 10.41702 2.34344 I
71.00000 10.00000 658728.0 16.69885 2.815340
72.00000 4.000000 642511.0 7.781968 2.051809
73.00000 7.000000 661120.0 12.10068 2.493261
74.00000 6.000000 614117.0 11. 39848 2.433480
75.00000 6.000000 629924.0 11 .11245 2.408066
76.00000 3.000000 656110.0 6.096539 1.807721
77.00000 4.000000 671540.0 7.445573 2.007620
78.00000 4.000000 688255.0 7.264749 1 .983034
79.00000 4.000000 747748.0 6.686745 1.900127
80.00000 0.0000000 693604.0 1.441745 0.3658541
81 .00000 3.000000 610468.0 6.552350 1.879824
82.00000 3.000000 619230.0 6.459635 1.865573
83.00000 6.000000 658990.0 10.62232 2.362957
84.00000 5.000000 749857.0 8.001526 2.079632
85.00000 9.000000 858870.0 11 .64321 2.454723
86.00000 4.000000 946058.0 5.285088 1.664889
87.00000 6.000000 1168616. 5.989992 1.790090
88.00000 9.000000 1337015. 7.479348 2.012146
64.00000 0.0000000 77582.00 12.88959 2.556420
65.00000 2.000000 93043.00 32.24316 3.473306
66.00000 2.000000 115295.0 26.02021 3.258874
67.00000 1 .000000 135369.0 14.77443 2.692898
68.00000 0.0000000 167193.0 5.981112 1.788606
69.00000 1.000000 194493.0 10.28315 2.330506
70.00000 1.000000 194732.0 10.27053 2.329278
71 .00000 2.000000 199498.0 15.03774 2.710563
72.00000 1 .000000 195942.0 10.20710 2.323084
73.00000 0.0000000 182774.0 5.471238 1.699505
74.00000 0.0000000 168444.0 5.936691 1.781152
75.00000 2.000000 175720.0 17 .07262 2.837476
76.00000 3.000000 163492.0 24.46603 3. I 97286
77.00000 1.000000 186494.0 10.72421 2.372503
78.00000 1 .000000 210545.0 9.499157 2.251203





60.00000 1.000000 196611.0 10.06994 2.309554
61 .00000 2.000000 200462.0 14.96394 2.705643
62.00000 2.000000 231456.0 12.96143 2.561976
83.00000 6.000000 241362.0 29.00208 3.367366
64.00000 1.000000 260119.0 7.666769 2.039763
65.00000 0.0000000 375422.0 2.663669 0.9797046
66.00000 2.000000 493447.0 6.079660 1.604952
67.00000 5.000000 959645.0 6.251009 1.632743
88.00000 2.000000 967692.0 3.100160 1.131454
64.00000 5.000000 215521 .0 27.83951 3.326456
65.00000 1.000000 233057.0 8.581592 2.149619
66.00000 7.000000 263519.0 30.35834 3.413071
67.00000 3.000000 288875.0 13.84682 2.628056
66.00000 2.000000 319499.0 9.389701 2.239613
69.00000 9.000000 373621 .0 26.76509 3.287098
70.00000 3.000000 423060.0 9.454924 2.246536
71.00000 4.000000 430775.0 11.60699 2.451607
72.00000 8.000000 484794.0 18.56459 2.921256
73.00000 7.000000 560178.0 14.28117 2.658942
74.00000 7.000000 509258.0 15.70913 2.754242
75.00000 6.000000 512431.0 13.66038 2.614499
76.00000 4.000000 535971.0 9.328863 2.233113
77.00000 3.000000 556720.0 7.159221 1.968401
76.00000 4.000000 601411.0 8.313782 2.117915
79.00000 1.000000 642041.0 3.115066 1.136250
80.00000 2.000000 661567.0 4.534688 1.511756
81.00000 3.000000 665432.0 6.011133 1. 793613
82.00000 0.0000000 649484.0 1.539684 0.4315771
83.00000 0.0000000 666098.0 1.501281 0.4063185
64.00000 2.000000 706422.0 4.246753 1.446155
85.00000 7.000000 740387.0 10.80516 2.380024
86.00000 1.000000 742440.0 2.693620 0.9909604
87.00000 6.000000 1064383. 6.576580 1.883515
88.00000 6.000000 1196156. 5.842311 1.765126
64.00000 17.00000 402847.0 44.68198 3.799570
65.00000 12.00000 417634.0 31.12773 3.436099
66.00000 10.00000 365461 .0 30.09897 3.404491
67.00000 11.00000 486056.0 24.68851 3.206338
68.00000 7.000000 545801 .0 14.65736 2.684942
69.00000 10.00000 612663.0 17.95441 2.887836
70.00000 5.000000 624845.0 9.602381 2.262011
71 .00000 5.000000 636749.0 9.422865 2.243139
72.00000 9.000000 653285.0 15.30725 2.728327
73.00000 7.000000 684308.0 11.69064 2.458769
74.00000 5.000000 600699.0 9.988364 2.301421
75.00000 7.000000 641077.0 12.47900 2.524047
76.00000 3.000000 664828.0 6.016594 1.794521
266
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(continued)
77.00000 4.000000 680945.0 7.342737 1.993712
78.00000 3.000000 692122.0 5.779328 1.754287
79.00000 2.000000 725991 .0 4.132283 1.418830
80.00000 2.000000 737661 .0 4.066909 1.402883
81 .00000 7.000000 711985.0 11. 23619 2.419140
82.00000 3.000000 681472.0 5.869647 1.769794
83.00000 4.000000 711994.0 7.022531 1.949124
84.00000 4.000000 770245.0 6.491441 1 .870485
85.00000 4.000000 787921 .0 6.345814 1.847795
86.00000 8.000000 813770.0 11.05964 2.403302
87.00000 7.000000 786767.0 10.16819 2.319265
88.00000 3.000000 666009.0 6.005925 1.792746
64.00000 5.000000 147961.0 40.55123 3.702566
65.00000 2.000000 170434.0 17.60212 2.868019
66.00000 0.0000000 187125.0 5.344021 1.675978
67.00000 1.000000 250665.0 7.978776 2.076785
68.00000 4.000000 286372.0 17.45981 2.859902
69.00000 0.0000000 319600.0 3.128911 1.140685
70.00000 1.000000 204446.0 9.782534 2.280599
71 .00000 6.000000 250879.0 27.90190 3.328695
72.00000 4.000000 195560.0 25.56760 3.241326
73.00000 2.000000 266220.0 11.26888 2.422045
74.00000 1.000000 254621 .0 7.854812 2.061126
75.00000 1 .000000 247597.0 8.077642 2.089100
76.00000 0.0000000 256599.0 3.897131 1.360241
77.00000 1 .000000 261980.0 7.634171 2.032634
78.00000 0.0000000 154584.0 6.468975 1.867018
79.00000 0.0000000 266743.0 3.748927 1.321470
80.00000 0.0000000 275163.0 3.634210 1.290392
81 .00000 5.000000 272648.0 22.00640 3.091333
82.00000 0.0000000 268219.0 3.728297 1.315951
83.00000 1.000000 300621 .0 6.652895 1.895052
84.00000 3.000000 320482.0 12.48120 2.524224
85.00000 2.000000 357120.0 8.400538 2.128296
86.00000 1.000000 508201 .0 3.935451 1.370025
87.00000 3.000000 835486.0 4.787633 1.566036
88.00000 7.000000 824055.0 9.708090 2.272960
64.00000 8.000000 287792.0 31.27259 3.442742
65.00000 5.000000 320997.0 18.69176 2.928083
66.00000 4.000000 385718.0 12.96284 2.562087
67.00000 6.000000 466942.0 14.99116 2.707460
68.00000 6.000000 534702.0 13.09140 2.571956
69.00000 7.000000 540925.0 14.78948 2.693916
70.00000 9.000000 485437.0 20.60000 3.025291
71 .00000 6.000000 457327.0 15.30633 2.728267
72.00000 2.000000 447615.0 6.702188 1.902434





74.00000 4.000000 417062.0 11.98863 2.483958
75.00000 2.000000 363570.0 8.251506 2.110396
76.00000 0.0000000 327247.0 3.055796 1 .117040
77.00000 1.000000 309192.0 6.468473 1.866940
78.00000 1.000000 293047.0 6.824844 1.920569
79.00000 3.000000 292298.0 13.68466 2.616276
80.00000 0.0000000 439569.0 2.274956 0.8219606
81 .00000 3.000000 398513.0 10.03731 2.306310
82.00000 2.000000 410173.0 7.313987 1.989789
83.00000 2.000000 373584.0 8.030322 2.083225
84.00000 1.000000 353951 .0 5.650500 1. 731744
85.00000 0.0000000 331888.0 3.013065 1.102958
86.00000 2.000000 285804.0 10.49670 2.351061
87.00000 2.000000 312630.0 9.596008 2.261347
88.00000 2.000000 364257.0 8.235943 2.108508
64.00000 8.000000 348781.0 25.80416 3.250536
65.00000 6.000000 403289.0 17.35728 2.854012
66.00000 4.000000 412011 .0 12.13560 2.496143
67.00000 6.000000 528992.0 13.23271 2.582692
68.00000 5.000000 621522.0 9.653721 2.267343
69.00000 7.000000 694349.0 11.52158 2.444222
70.00000 8.000000 703858.0 12.78667 2.548403
71 .00000 5.000000 674630.0 8.893764 2.185350
72.00000 8.000000 674010.0 13.35292 2.591735
73.00000 2.000000 612358.0 4.899095 1.589050
74.00000 7.000000 614961.0 13.00896 2.565638
75.00000 7.000000 597666.0 13.38540 2.594165
76.00000 0.0000000 608024.0 1.644672 0.4975409
77.00000 2.000000 617284.0 4.860000 1.581038
78.00000 1.000000 600007.0 3.333294 1.203961
79.00000 2.000000 599199.0 5.006684 1.610774
80.00000 1.000000 512270.0 3.904191 1.362051
81 .00000 1.000000 432053 ‘ 0 4.629062 1.532354
82.00000 3.000000 396721 .0 10.08265 2.310816
83.00000 5.000000 411915.0 14.56611 2.678698
84.00000 1.000000 441134.0 4.533770 1.511554
85.00000 1.000000 466360.0 4.288532 1.455945
86.00000 3.000000 478444.0 8.360435 2.123510
87.00000 2.000000 570382.0 5.259633 1.660061
88.00000 1.000000 607679.0 3.291211 1. 191256
64.00000 14.00000 597264.0 25.11452 3.223446
65.00000 9.000000 661152.0 15.12511 2.716357
66.00000 11.00000 636788.0 18.84458 2.936225
67.00000 17.00000 809078.0 22.24755 3.102232
68.00000 13.00000 922099.0 15.18275 2.720160
69.00000 9.000000 963734.0 10.37631 2.339525





71.00000 10.00000 916048.0 12.00810 2.485582
72.00000 4.000000 910516.0 5.491392 1.703182
73.00000 3.000000 908331.0 4.403681 1.482441
74.00000 4.000000 818425.0 6.109295 1.809811
75.00000 5.000000 768504.0 7.807376 2.055069
76.00000 1 .000000 811798.0 2.463667 0.9016509
77.00000 4.000000 849573.0 5.885309 1.772459
78.00000 6.000000 926468.0 7.555577 2.022286
79.00000 1 .000000 814627.0 2.455111 0.8981721
80.00000 3.000000 920898.0 4.343586 1.468700
81.00000 3.000000 758373.0 5.274449 1.662874
82.00000 2.000000 760207.0 3.946294 1.372777
83.00000 8.000000 833093.0 10.80312 2.379835
84.00000 7.000000 945600.0 8.460237 2.135377
85.00000 2.000000 826534.0 3.629615 1.289127
86.00000 5.000000 1121721. 5.348924 1.676895
87.00000 5.000000 1222937. 4.906222 1.590504











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2880 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9242
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89296
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94497
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.91
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.295
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.40225E-01 0.11131E-01 -3.6137
o -0.22946 0.16000 -1.4341
CONSTANT 5.3401 0.77392 6.9001
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9365
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89091
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94388
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.51
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 봐IE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -142.280
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.11659 0.15224E-01 -7.6582
T다，mDUM 0.10201 0.22938E-이 4.4470
CONSTANT 10.583 1.0679 9.9099
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3852 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9414
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85446
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92437
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.47
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 안IE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -141.425
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATI。
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.10263 0.17904E-Ol -5.7320
D -0.20777 0.14658 -1.4175
TIMEDUM 0.99267E-01 0.22301E-Ol 4.4512











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT ~-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 봐IE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATI。
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 DF
YEAR -0.53605E-Ol 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3130 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9231
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89294
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94496
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175. 91
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -144.774
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.22488E-Ol 0.11219E-Ol -2.0045
D -0.53954 0.15983 -3.3758
CONSTANT 4.1440 0.78568 5.2744
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3761 BUSE RAW-MO뻐NT R-SQUARE = 0.9392
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89088
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94386
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.50
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -141.639
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.11119 0.13380E-Ol -8.3105
TIMEDUM 0.10306 0.21846E-Ol 4.7175
CONSTANT 10.226 0.94498 10.821
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4214 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9448
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85402
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92413
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.39
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -135.972
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATI 。
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 DF
YEAR -0.81506E-Ol 0.15290E-Ol -5.3308
D -0.50531 0.14258 -3.5441
TIMEDUM 0.10350 0.20888E-Ol 4.9549









































































































RUNNING DEREGULAT 工ON DUMMY
(continued)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2654 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9170
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89244
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94469
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175. 81
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.817
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.57361E-01 0.11619E-01 -4.9366
o 0.63198E-01 0.16554 0.38177
CONSTANT 6.4879 0.81906 7.9211
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3975 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9422
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89049
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94366
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.43
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 봐핍 LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.473
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.10975 0.11817E-01 -9.2877
TIMEDUM 0.11231 0.21108E-01 5.3209
CONSTANT 10.141 0.84013 12.071
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4042 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9438
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85363
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92392
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.31
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.439
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.10622 0.13759E-01 -7.7205
o -0.69645E-01 0.14603 -0.47692
TlMEDUM 0.11343 0.21099E-01 5.3761









































































































RUNNING DEREGULAT 工ON DUMMY
(continued)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 만iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2642 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9169
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89284
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94490
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.89
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.716
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.58939E-01 0.11448E-01 -5.1485
D 0.94393E-01 0.16400 0.57556
CONSTANT 6.5970 0.81225 8.1219
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4027 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9435
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89090
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94387
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.51
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCT工ON = -139.476
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.10361 0.10682E-01 -9.6996
TIMEDUM 0.11343 0.21101E-01 5.3758
CONSTANT 9.7251 0.76428 12.724
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4029 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9434
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85436
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92431
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.45
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.482
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.10114 0.12385E-01 -8.1666
o -0.56520E-01 0.14877 -0.37993
TIMEDUM 0.11499 O.21950E-01 5.2387










































































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 봐핍 LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-Ol 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2695 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9189
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89292
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94494
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.90
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.718
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.60065E-Ol 0.11043E-01 -5.4390
o 0.11700 0.16029 0.72996
CONSTANT 6.6754 0.78853 8.4657
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4025 BUSE RAW-M。삐ENT R-SQUARE = 0.9434
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89110
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94398
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.55
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.557
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.98116E-01 0.98341E-02 -9.9772
TIMEDUM 0.11611 0.21744E-Ol 5.3398
CONSTANT 9.3529 0.70801 13.210
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4018 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9430
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85474
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92452
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.53
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.344
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.93809E-Ol 0.11227E-Ol -8.3554
o -0.11816 0.15236 -0.77556
TIMEDUM 0.12224 0.23625E-Ol 5.1741
CONSTANT 9.0609 0.79906 11.339
APPENDIX L









































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = I찌OCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3046 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9277
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89256
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94476
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.84
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -147.425
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.74237E-01 0.10138E-01 -7.3227
o 0.38916 0.15032 2.5889
CONSTANT 7.6548 0.72833 10.510
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4021 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9431
VARIANCE OF THE ESTlMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89128
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94408
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.58
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.342
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFF‘ICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.93619E-01 0.91204E-02 -10.265
TI~mDm4 0.12246 0.22893E-Ol 5.3490
CONSTANT 9.0477 0.66061 13.696
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4054 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9438
VARIANCE OF THE ESTlMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85495
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92463
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.57
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.202
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.96067E-01 0.10142E-01 -9.4726
o 0.84415E-01 0.15607 0.54089
TlMEDUM 0.11606 0.26028E-Ol 4.4589











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATI。
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4168 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9407
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89126
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94407
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.58
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 았iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -133.799
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.97559E-01 0.87107E-02 -11.200
o 0.85397 0.13268 6.4362
CONSTANT 9.2773 0.62998 14.726
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3923 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9413
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89154
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94421
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.63
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -140.023
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.88379E-01 0.86145E-02 -10.259
TIMEDUM 0.12745 0.24955E-01 5.1074
CONSTANT 8.6873 0.62767 13.841
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4450 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9461
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85443
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92435
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.47
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -132.131
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.10425 0.90115E-02 -11.568
o 0.66247 0.15627 4.2392
TIMEDUM 0.60054E-01 0.28904E-01 2.0777











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF’ DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 까iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEF’FICIENT ERROR 198 DF
YEAR -0.53605E-Ol 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3760 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9424
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89138
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94413
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.60
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -144.038
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.80760E-01 0.82711E-02 -9.7642
D 0.58100 0.13163 4.4140
CONSTANT 8.1183 0.60180 13.490
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3649 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9374
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89208
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94450
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.74
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -143.048
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.80396E-01 0.83109E-02 -9.6735
TI‘mDtn1 0.12050 0.28353E-Ol 4.2500
CONSTANT 8.1299 0.60908 13.348
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3940 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9441
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85524
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92479
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.63
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -141.895
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 DF
YEAR -0.85894E-Ol 0.85110E-02 -10.092
D 0.31583 0.17177 1.8387
TIMEDUM 0.79736E-Ol 0.35516E-Ol 2.2451
CONSTANT 8.4998 0.61889 13.734











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 봐iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-01 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3771 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9371
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89248
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94471
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.82
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.758
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.82675E-01 0.80062E-02 -10.326
o 0.66459 0.13242 5.0187
CONSTANT 8.2685 0.58694 14.087
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3476 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9334
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89224
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94459
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.77
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -144.117
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.75968E-Ol 0.80403E-02 -9.4484
TI~mDUM 0.12637 0.33085E-01 3.8195
CONSTANT 7.8232 0.59261 13.201
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3792 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9376
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85623
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92532
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.82
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -139.654
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.83681E-Ol 0.82435E-02 -10.151
o 0.59825 0.18566 3.2223
TIMEDUM 0.22368E-01 0.44862E-01 0.49859











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183.93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 만IE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 DF
YEAR -0.53605E-Ol 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3255 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9311
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89273
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94484
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.87
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -146.961
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.69437E-Ol 0.78860E-02 -8.8050
D 0.39719 0.13821 2.8739
CONSTANT 7.3511 0.58214 12.628
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3251 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9297
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89243
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94469
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.81
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -146.305
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.69827E-Ol 0.77715E-02 -8.9851
TIMEDUM 0.12118 0.39921E-Ol 3.0355
CONSTANT 7.3909 0.57607 12.830
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3345 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9322
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85613
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92527
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.80
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -146.031
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 DF
YEAR -0.71826E-01 0.79984E-02 -8.9800
D 0.18253 0.20893 0.87366
TIMEDUM 0.82623E-01 0.59849E-Ol 1.3805











































































































DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNOCRATE
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.2632 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9164
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92896
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96383
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 183. 93
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -149.873
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 OF
YEAR -0.53605E-Ol 0.63734E-02 -8.4109
CONSTANT 6.2333 0.48666 12.808
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3101 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9275
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89266
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94481
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.85
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF 만IE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -147.852
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.65360E-01 0.75742E-02 -8.6293
o 0.33781 0.14245 2.3714
CONSTANT 7.0708 0.56307 12.558
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3120 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9270
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89259
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94477
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.84
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -147.022
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 OF
YEAR -0.66242E-01 0.74730E-02 -8.8641
TIMEDUM 0.13406 0.50153E-Ol 2.6731
CONSTANT 7.1382 0.55709 12.813
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.3167 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9283
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85628
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92536
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.83
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 2.1624
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -146.969
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 OF
YEAR -0.67099E-Ol 0.76558E-02 -8.7645
o 0.92117E-Ol 0.23372 0.39413
TIMEDUM 0.10956 0.82186E-Ol 1.3331






FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \tot.doc
sample 1 25
read(11} year d totocc y n u hours
* generate controlable rate
genr ucrate = «1000000*n)}/hours
* generate log of the controlable rate
genr lnucrate = log(ucrate)
* generate time since deregulation dummy
genr timedum = d*(year - 79)
print n hours ucrate lnucrate year timedum
。Is lncrate year /exactdw
。Is lncrate year d /exactdw
。Is lncrate year timedum /exactdw




























25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LNUCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 0.79060
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY - 0.000115
R-SQUARE - 0.2308 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED - 0.1973
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 5.5919
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 23 OF
YEAR -0.35924E-01 0.13675E-01 -2.6269
CONSTANT 3.4555 1.0440 3.3098
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE- LNUCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC - 0.71964
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.000014
R-SQUARE - 0.2773 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.2116
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 5.2538
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF
YEAR -0.11735E-01 0.24434E-01 -0.48029
o -0.43673 0.36708 -1.1898
CONSTANT 1.7744 1.7513 1.0132
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LNUCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC - 1.15914
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY = 0.002978
R-SQUARE = 0.4995 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.4539
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 3.6388
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 22 OF
YEAR -0.90554E-01 0.19493E-01 -4.6455
TIMEDUM 0.16909 0.49207E-01 3.4364
CONSTANT 7.3030 1.4125 5.1703
25 OBSERVATIONS DEPENDENT VARIABLE - LNUCRATE
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC = 2.09847
DURBIN-WATSON PROBABILITY - 0.342895
R-SQUARE 흩 0.8036 R-SQUARE ADJUSTED = 0.7756
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE- 1.4275
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 21 OF
YEAR -0.52821E-01 0.14140E-01 -3.7356
o -1.2~27 0.22666 -5.7033
TIMEDUM 0.27391 0.36509E-01 7.5024
CONSTANT 4.7121 1. 0131 4.6511
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APPENDIX N
POOLED CROSS-SECT 工ONALLY HETEROSKEDAST 工C AND TIME-W工SE
AUTOREGRESSIVE USING REVENUE PASSENGER MILES
COMMAND FILE
FILE 11 d: \shazam\d\f1 \agrrpm.doc
sample 1 200
read(11) airline year d totocc y n u hours rpm
* generate controllable rate
genr ocrate = (1000000*(y+1»/rpm
* generate log of the controllable rate
genr lnocrate = log(ocrate)
*generate time since deregulation dummy
































POOLED CROSS-SECTIONALLY HETEROSKEDASTIC AND T工ME-WISE
AUTOREGRESSIVE US工NG REVENUE PASSENGER M工LES
(continued)
OUTPUTF:江E
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.4759 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9956
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.92929
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.96400
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 184.00
MEAN OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE = 12 .471
LOG OF πiE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -165.030
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATI。
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 198 DF
YEAR -0.10552 0.78697E-02 -13.408
CONSTANT 20.455 0.60102 34.034
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.5091 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9961
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89308
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94503
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.94
LOG OF 봐iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -163.487
VARIABLE . ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.12412 0.12084E-Ol -10.271
D 0.35330 0.17656 2.0010
CONSTANT 21.719 0.87023 24.958
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.6223 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9973
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.89288
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.94493
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 175.90
LOG OF THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -150.636
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 197 DF
YEAR -0.15816 0.10717E-Ol -14.758
TIMEDUM 0.16144 0.26759E-Ol 6.0331
CONSTANT 24.117 0.77592 31.082
BUSE R-SQUARE = 0.6221 BUSE RAW-MOMENT R-SQUARE = 0.9973
VARIANCE OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA**2 = 0.85647
STANDARD ERROR OF THE ESTIMATE-SIGMA = 0.92546
SUM OF SQUARED ERRORS-SSE= 167.87
LOG OF 만iE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION = -150.553
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-RATIO
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 196 DF
YEAR -0.15617 0.11849E-Ol -13.180
D -0.62189E-Ol 0.17573 -0.35389
TIMEDUM 0.16640 0.30232E-Ol 5.5041
CONSTANT 23.979 0.84972 28.220
